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ABSTRACT
The working relationship between the African Union (AU), on the one hand, and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, on the other, is one of the key components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This article investigates how the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have attempted to define their respective roles for intervention in West African conflicts. There are three instruments of intervention: diplomacy, mediation and peace support operations. Empirical analysis of interventions in conflicts in Guinea, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-Bissau from 2008 to 2013 shows that, after disagreeing with ECOWAS regarding appropriate approaches, the AU has gradually refrained from taking a mediation role but has continued with its diplomatic efforts. ECOWAS has continued to initiate unilateral efforts at mediation and peace support, while it attempts to coordinate its diplomatic efforts with the AU and other actors. This article outlines the differing roles of these regional entities, and analyses their developing relationship in the context of continuing conflict in West Africa.
Acknowledgement
This article is based on research as a guest researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), University of Copenhagen, from October 2016 to October 2018. I am grateful to NIAS for providing a good research environment and opportunities to develop an African studies network. I also appreciate invaluable comments on earlier versions of this text from Nicholas Emmanuel, Ulf Engel, Katharina Döring and Jens Herpolsheimer.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Note on contributor
Sanae Suzuki received a Ph.D. in international relations at the University of Tokyo. Her research interests include comparative analysis of regional organisations and conflict management, regional security in Southeast Asia, and ASEAN. Her publications include ‘Why is ASEAN not intrusive? Non-interference meets state strength’ Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 2019 and ‘The Changing Nature of ASEAN as an Organization under the ASEAN Charter,’ in Yamakage Susumu ed. ASEAN Study Group Report, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2010. In addition, numerous referred articles have appeared in Japanese journals, and several chapters in Japanese books.
Notes
1 African Union (AU), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Addis Ababa: AU, July 9, 2002).
2 AU, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (Addis Ababa: AU, 2008).
3 Kai Striebinger, Coordination between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2016), 12–13.
4 See for example Laurie Nathan, ‘How to Manage Interorganizational Disputes over Mediation in Africa,’ Global Governance 23, no. 2 (2017): 151–62.
5 Laurie Nathan, ‘Will the Lowest Be First?: Subsidiarity in Peacemaking in Africa,’ in Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change, eds. Pamela Aall and Chester Crocker (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2016), 162.
6 As for reviewing literatures, see Olav Schram Stokke, The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work, Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) report no. 14 (Lysaker: FNI, 2001), https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/132044-1469870045/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R1401.pdf.
7 Malte Brosig, ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches,’ South African Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 2 (2011): 148.
8 See for example Malte Brosig, ‘The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa,’ International Peacekeeping 17, no. 3 (2010): 327–42. Linnéa Gelot, Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security: The African Union-United Nations Partnership in Darfur (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).
9 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, ‘The Regional Roots of the African Peace and Security Architecture: Exploring Centre–Periphery Relations,’ South African Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 2 (2011): 169–89.
10 For example, Katharina Döring argues that intervention experience in conflicts in Mali has affected the AU policies on peace and security in the region. Katharina P W Döring, ‘The Changing ASF Geography: From the Intervention Experience in Mali to the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and the Nouakchott Process,’ African Security 11, no. 1 (2018): 32–58.
11 For analysis on each conflict in West Africa, see Jane Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conflict in Africa, the United Nations and Regional Organizations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). For Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, ‘The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau’ (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Peace and Security Series 3, FES, Abuja, 2010). For Côte d’Ivoire, David Kode, The Complexities of Democracy-Building in Conflict-Affected States: The Role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d’Ivoire (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2016). Serwaa Brewoo and Nicholas Okai, ‘Mediation and the Search for Peace in the Ivorian Civil War and Post-electoral Crisis,’ in Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences, eds. Nicholas Okai et al. (Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2014), 73–82. For Mali, Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare, ‘The African Union and the Conflict in Mali: Extra-Regional Influence and the Limitations of a Regional Actor,’ Journal of International and Global Studies 6, no. 1 (2014): 106–20.
12 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Impact Report 2016 identifies four types of intervention: diplomacy, mediation, peace support operations, and post-conflict reconstruction and development taken by the AU and the RECs. As this article concerns how the AU and the RECs intervene in conflicts in particular at early stages of conflict, the first three instruments are relevant. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), The APSA Impact Report 2016: Assessment of the Impacts of Intervention by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in 2016 in the Frame of the APSA (Addis Ababa: IPSS, 2017), Annex I.
13 As for instances of mediation led by eminent African personalities, see Gilbert M Khadiagala, ‘Eminent peacemakers in African Conflicts: Contributions, Potential and Limits,’ in Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change, eds. Pamela Aall and Chester Crocker (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2016), 201–18.
14 IPSS, The APSA Impact Report 2016, Annex I.
15 Michael N Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,’ International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699–732.
16 Gehring and Oberthür use institutions instead of organisations, but include both international regimes and international organisations as relevant institutions. Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, ‘The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions,’ European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009): 125–56.
17 For analysis on actors involving in decision-making in international organisations, see Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, eds., Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Sikina Jinnah introduces theories on international bureaucracies including secretariats in international organisations. Sikina Jinnah, Post-Treaty Politics: Secretariat Influence in Global Environmental Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), 27–30. Others include Darren G Hawkins et al., eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenüner eds., Mangers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureucracies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
18 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun,’ (Africa Briefing 58, ICG, Dakar, March 5, 2009). Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Peace and Security Council Report, no. 4 (Addis Ababa: ISS, November 2009), 8–15.
19 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ‘ECOWAS Leaders against Military Transition in Guinea,’ press release no. 003/2009, January 10, 2009, quoted in Yabi, ‘The Role of ECOWAS,’ 44. ECOWAS sent a mission to Guinea. This mission included the ministers of foreign affairs of Nigeria and Burkina Faso, the chief of defence staff of Nigeria, the personal chief of staff of the President of Burkina Faso, the Commissioner of ECOWAS in charge of political affairs, peace and security, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa. Yabi, ‘The Role of ECOWAS,’ 44.
20 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 2 (Addis Ababa: ISS, September 2009), 12–16. The ICG-G had a wide range of participation including the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the EU, the Mano River Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie and the UN, the UN Security Council (UNSC) members, Spain, Japan, Germany, and World Bank.
21 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 2, 12–16.
22 ICG, ‘Guinea: Military Rule Must End’ (Africa Briefing 66, ICG, Dakar, October 16, 2009). ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 4, 8–15.
23 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Leaders Call for Suspension of Legislative Elections in Niger, Want New Transition Authority in Guinea,’ press release no. 111/2009, October 17, 2009.
24 Yabi, ‘The Role of ECOWAS,’ 47.
25 Antonia Witt, ‘A Constructive Engagement?: The European Union’s Contribution to Mediating Coups d’etat in Africa,’ in New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts, ed. Ulf Engel (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitaatsverlag, 2012), 211–36.
26 Andreas Baumert and Ralph Ellermann, ‘The African Union’s Emerging Policy an Unconstitutional Changes of Government: Mediation in Guinea and Madagascar,’ in New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts, ed. Ulf Engel (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitaatsverlag, 2012), 117. Antonia Witt, ‘A Constructive Engagement?’ 220–21.
27 This political agreement which made General Sekouba Konate the interim president for the transition period, allowed for the appointment of a new Prime Minister proposed by the Forces vives, an anti-junta groups including former prime ministers, the establishment of a National Transition Council and the organisation of presidential elections within six months. Yabi, ‘The Role of ECOWAS,’ 46–8.
28 The attempt to establish the contact group is also observed in other inter-organisational relations. See Rafael Biermann, ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-Organizational Networking: The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting,’ The Review of International Organizations 3, no. 2 (2008): 162.
29 Kwaku Asante-Darko, ‘The African Union and the Challenge of International Mediation in Niger,’ in New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts, ed. Ulf Engel (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitaatsverlag, 2012), 83–6.
30 ECOWAS, Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Bakar: ECOWAS, December 21, 2001).
31 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, October 17, 2009.
32 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 5 (Addis Ababa: ISS, December 2009), 1–2. Africa Research Bulletin, 46, no. 1 (November 1–30, 2009): 18180.
33 AU, Communiqué of the 207th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/AHG/COMM.3(CCVII) (October 29, 2009), https://oau-aec-au-documents.uwazi.io/api/files/1532205261735ooxqeb81po7jtl3tpyie019k9.pdf.
34 Asante-Darko, ‘The African Union,’ 87–8.
35 David Zounmenou and Reine Loua, ‘Confronting Complex Political Crises in West Africa: An Analysis of ECOWAS Responses to Niger and Côte d’Ivoire’ (ISS Paper 230, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2011), 7, https://www.africaportal.org/publications/confronting-complex-political-crises-in-west-africa-an-analysis-of-ecowas-responses-to-niger-and-cote-divoire/. Asante-Darko, ‘The African Union,’ 94. David Zounmenou ‘Is Niger’s Military Coup Merely Countering a Constitutional One?’ (ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, February 24, 2011), https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/is-nigers-military-coup-merely-countering-a-constitutional-one.
36 Zounmenou and Loua, ‘Confronting Complex Political Crises,’ 7–8.
37 Kode, The Complexities, 14.
38 UNSC, Resolution 1464 (2003), S/RES/1464(2003) (February 4, 2003), http://unscr.com/files/2003/01464.pdf. Africa Research Bulletin, 40, no. 2 (February 1–28, 2003): 15179–82.
39 Fabienne Hara and Gilles Yabi, ‘Côte d’Ivoire, 2002–2011,’ in Dealing with Conflict in Africa, the United Nations and Regional Organizations, ed. Jane Boulden (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 151–2.
40 Kode, The Complexities, 16. Brewoo and Okai, ‘Mediation,’ 77–8.
41 Kode, The Complexities, 18–9.
42 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Cote d’Ivoire, Abuja, December 7, 2010.
43 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Cote d’Ivoire, Abuja, December 24, 2010. ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 19 (Addis Ababa: ISS, February 2011). Brewoo and Okai, ‘Mediation,’ 80. It should be noted that, within days of the ECOWAS Summit, a number of the ECOWAS members publicly distanced themselves from the threat of force. Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, ‘Keeping the Peace in Electoral Conflicts: The Role of ECOWAS, UNOCI and the International community in Côte d’Ivoire’ (Policy Briefing, Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, Berlin, 2012).
44 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff to Meet in Bamako on Côte d’Ivoire,’ press release no. 003/2011, January 14, 2011. ISS, Peace and Security Report, no. 21 (Addis Ababa: ISS, April 2011), 10.
45 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 19, 12.
46 AU, Communiqué of the 259th Peace and Security Council, PSC/AHG/ Comm. (CCLIX) (January 28, 2011), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communique-psc-final-259th-session-on-cote-d-ivoire-en.pdf. ISS, Peace and Security Report, no. 21, 7.
47 Yabi, ‘Keeping the Peace.’
48 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 19, 13–14.
49 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 21, 10. Some think it could be used to evacuate Gbagbo and his entourage if they choose to take up an offer of exile in South Africa. Africa Confidential, 52, no. 4 (February 18, 2011): 3.
50 Yabi, ‘Keeping the Peace’; Kode, The Complexities, 19.
51 Interview by Sanae Suzuki with an official at the ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, May 21, 2018.
52 It was established by the UNSC Resolution 1528 on 27 February 2004 to be deployed from 4 April 2004 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003.
53 ECOWAS, ‘Resolution A/RES.1/03/11 of the Authority of the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire,’ press release no. 043/2011, March 25, 2011.
54 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 21, 10.
55 Brewoo and Okai, ‘Mediation,’ 80.
56 ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 32 (Addis Ababa: ISS, March 2012), 7.
57 AU, Communiqué of the 314th Peace and Security Council, PSC/AHG/3 (CCCXXVII) (March 20, 2012).
58 ICG, Mali: Avoiding Escalation, Africa report, no. 189 (Dakar: ICG, July 18, 2012).
59 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abidjan, April 26, 2012, https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2012-Extr-April1.pdf.
60 ECOWAS, ‘Final Communiqué from the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government,’ press release no. 083/2012, March 27, 2012.
61 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Chairman Ouattara Leads High-level Delegation to Mali,’ press release no. 084/2012, March 28, 2012.
62 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Mediation, Security Council Recommends Deployment of Regional Force in Mali,’ press release no. 105/2012, April 13, 2012.
63 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Seeks UN Support in Resolving Mali Crisis,’ press release no. 168/2012, June 17, 2012.
64 AU, Conclusions of Inaugural Meeting of the Support and Follow Up Group on the Situation in Mali, Abidjan, June 7, 2012, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.conclusions.mali.pdf.
65 AU, Communiqué of the 323rd Peace and Security Council, PSC/ PR/COMM. (CCCXXIII) (June 12, 2012), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-323-mali-12-06-2012.pdf.
66 AU, Communiqué of the 323rd.
67 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué of the 41st Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Yamoussoukro, June 28–29, 2012, https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/41st-ECOWAS-Summit-Yamoussoukro-28-29-June-20121.pdf.
68 ICG, Mali: Avoiding Escalation. France was against the ECOWAS force because it planned to send its forces to Mali. Interviews by Sanae Suzuki with officials at liaison offices of the RECs to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 20, 2018.
69 Algeria would not want to see the ECOWAS troops deployed in northern Mali. ICG, ‘Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action,’ (Africa Briefing 90, ICG, Dakar, September 24, 2012).
70 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Council Recommends Sanctions against Obstructive Individuals, Groups in Mali,’ press release no. 256/2012, September 17, 2012.
71 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Council Recommends.’
72 AU, Conclusions of Meeting of the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali, Bamako, October 19, 2012, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-conclusions-mali-19-10-2012.pdf.
73 This concept aimed to further coordination among the international stakeholders and assist in comprehensively dealing with the crises in Mali, through action-oriented measures covering issues relating to the transition and governance in Mali, the restoration of state authority in the north, security sector reform, elections, stabilisation and post-conflict peace building, resumption of basic services and humanitarian assistance, and follow-up. AU, Conclusions of Meeting.
74 UNSC, Resolution 2071 (2012), S/RES/2071 (2012) (October 12, 2012), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2071.
75 AU, Communiqué of the 339th Peace and Security Council, PSC/MIN/COMM.2 (CCCXXXIX) (October 24, 2012), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cps-339-com-mali-24-10-2012.pdf. ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Determined on its Two-pronged Approach to Resolving Mali Crisis,’ press release no. 311/2012. November 12, 2012.
76 UNSC, Resolution 2085 (2012), S/RES/2085(2012) (December 20, 2012), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2085. Instead of providing AFISMA logistics and funding, the UN was more concerned with human rights observance. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon continually warned that ill-conceived intervention by AFISMA could worsen the situation on the ground and noted that the deployment of such a force could result in human right abuses. He persistently cautioned that AFISMA troops would have to be held accountable for their actions and called for UN human rights monitors to be deployed to effectively police AFISMA peacekeepers. Oluwadare, ‘The African Union,’ 114–5.
77 African Confidential, 54, no. 1 (January 11, 2013): 5. Chad decided to contribute to the AFISMA, but later joined in the French troops in Mali. Interviews by Sanae Suzuki with officials at liaison offices of the RECs to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 20, 2018.
78 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Member States Urged to Rise Up to Regional Security Challenges,’ press release no. 020/2012, February 15, 2012.
79 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Chairman Ouattara Leads High-level Delegation to Mali,’ press release no. 084/2012, March 28, 2012.
80 Interim President Reimundo Pareira and Carlos Gomes Junior, the outgoing Prime Minister, were arrested and detained by the army for secret deal between the government and the Angolan technical military and security mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG), which sought to undermine the powers of the military. Mustapha Abdallah and Nicholas Okai, ‘A Confiscated State: Understanding the Complexities of Mediation and Peace Processes in Guinea-Bissau,’ in Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences, eds. Nicholas Okai et al., (Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2014), 86.
81 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Mediation, Security Council Recommends.’ As for Angola's presence in Guinea-Bissau, see ISS, Peace and Security Council Report, no. 33 (Addis Ababa: ISS, April 2012), 6–11.
82 AU, Communiqué of the 318th Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM (CCCXVIII) (April 17, 2012), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-comm-guinea-bissau-17-04-2012.pdf.
83 AU, Communiqué of the 319th Peace and Security Council, PSC/MIN/COMM/1 (CCCXIX) (April 24, 2012), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-comm-319-mali-24-04-2012-eng.pdf.
84 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS to Send Troops to Guinea Bissau, Mali,’ press release no. 121/2012, April 27, 2012.
85 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Sanctions Guinea Bissau after Failed Talks,’ press release no. 124/2012, May 1, 2012.
86 ICG, Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau, Africa report no. 190 (Dakar: ICG, August 17, 2012). ISS, Is There a Risk of a New Coup in Guinea-Bissau? ECOWAS Peace and Security Report no. 8 (Dakar: ISS, April 2014), https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/ECOWAS-Report-8-ENG.pdf.
87 UNSC, Resolution 2048 (2012), S/RES/2048 (2012) (May 18, 2012), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/727466/.
88 ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Mediation, Security Council to Meet in Abidjan on Mali, Guinea-Bissau,’ press release no. 102/2012, April 11, 2012. ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS to Send Troops.’ ECOWAS, Final Communiqué of the 41st Ordinary Session.
89 ECOWAS, ‘Forty-first Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Final Communiqué,’ press release no. 180/2012, June 28, 2012.
90 ECOWAS, Communiqué of the 42nd Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Yamoussoukro, February 27–28, 2013, https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/42nd-ECOWAS-Summit-Yamoussoukro-27-28-Feb-20131.pdf. ECOWAS, ‘Final Communique of the Forty Second Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government,’ press release no. 053/2013, February 27 and 28, 2013. ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS Leaders Canvass International Support for Successful Political Transitions in Mali, Guinea Bissau,’ press release no. 210/2013, July 17, 2013.
91 For this analysis, ‘Behavioural Interaction’ introduced by Gehring and Oberthür is a useful analytical concept. It is one of the four causal mechanisms where one organisation triggers behavioural changes that affect implementation in the other organisation. Gehring and Oberthür, ‘The Causal Mechanisms,’ 125–56.