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ABSTRACT
The assumption of many researchers is that Russia’s renewed interest in Africa is driven by its quest for global power status. Few expect Russia’s security engagement to bring peace and development to countries with which it has security partnerships. This article argues that Moscow has found success by providing security solutions to fragile states and weak regimes without political strings attached, thus making Russia a preferred security partner. However, while Moscow’s opportunistic use of private military diplomacy has allowed it to successfully gain a strategic foothold in partner countries, the lack of transparency in interactions, the limited scope of impact and the high financial and diplomatic costs expose the limitations of the partnership in addressing the peace and development challenges of African host countries. The study focused on Mali and the Central African Republic as case studies, establishing the security, diplomatic and economic interests of each and assessing Russia’s role.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Paul Stronski, ‘Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056.
2 Nate Haken et al., ‘Fragile States Index 2022 – Annual Report,’ The Fund for Peace, July 13, 2022, https://fragilestatesindex.org/2022/07/13/fragile-states-index-2022-annual-report/.
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4 Annie Risemberg, ‘Mali Demands French, European Troops Leave Country Immediately,’ VOA, February 18, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/mali-demands-french-european-troops-leave-country-immediately/6448383.html.
5 LibyaReview, ‘Sudan & Russia Discuss Peace Process in Libya,’ Libya Review, July 12, 2021, https://libyareview.com/14910/sudan-russia-discuss-peace-process-in-libya/.
6 Samuel Ramani, ‘Russia Has Big Plans for Africa: America Must Push Back – Without Getting Dragged In,’ Foreign Affairs, February, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2022-02-17/russia-has-big-plans-africa.
7 Urnov Andrey, ‘Russia and Africa,’ Africa in the new world. Moscow: Institute for African Studies, Moscow. 2, September 17, 2009, http://www.inafran.ru/sites/default/files/page_file/%20%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%98%D0%AF%20%D0%98%20%D0%90%D0%A4%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90.pdf.
8 Vongani M. Nkuna, and Kgothatso B. Shai, ‘What Drives Russia's Involvement in Africa? [An Afrocentric Review of Russia–South Africa relations, 2000–2018],’ Journal of Public Affairs 21, no. 2 (2020). June 3. doi:10.1002/pa.2176.
9 Nkuna and Shai, ‘What Drives Russia's Involvement in Africa? [An Afrocentric review of Russia–South Africa relations, 2000–2018].’.
10 Mahama Tawat, ‘Russia-Ukraine War: Decoding How African Countries Voted at the UN,’ The Conversation, March 8, 2022, https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663.
11 Guinea being a high-level bauxite producer still enjoys strong support from Russia, who in turn will seek to secure its access to minerals and metals. As far as Sudan is concerned, port access is an important reason for the nurturing of relations between the two governments because the longstanding military ties between Moscow and Khartoum provide grounds for Russian influence in the Red Sea region. See Joseph Siegle, The future of Russia-Africa relations, February 2, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/ (accessed May 12, 2022).
12 AfricaNews and AFP, ‘Mali: Hundreds Show Support for Army and Russia,’ Africa News, May 29, 2021, https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/29/mali-hundreds-show-support-for-army-and-russia/.
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38 Yaya Koloma, ‘Mali’s Fragility: Root Causes and Potential Recovery Pathways,’ pp 38, Mpra.ub.uni-Muenchen.de, April 21, 2022, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/112821/.
39 Colum Lynch, Amy Mackinnon, and Robbie Gramer, Russia Flounders in Ukraine but Doubles Down in Mali, April 14, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/russia-ukraine-mali-wagner-group-mercenaries/.
40 Reuters, Russia to Keep Helping Mali Militarily Despite Western Criticism – RIA, December 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russia-keep-helping-mali-militarily-despite-western-criticism-ria-2021-12-27/ (accessed May 8, 2022).
41 AfricaIntelligence, United Nations Ramp Up Use of Intelligence Drones Across Peacekeeping Missions, February 8, 2022, https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-and-west-africa_business/2022/02/08/united-nations-ramp-up-use-of-intelligence-drones-across-peacekeeping-missions,109732562-gra (accessed May 8, 2022).
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47 Thompson, ‘Fears Gold Mining Companies Could Be Hit if Ecowas-Mali Standoff Drags On’.
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Ovigwe Eguegu
Mr Ovigwe Eguegu, based in Abuja, Nigeria, is a policy analyst at Development Reimagined, a consultancy headquartered in Beijing, China. He specialises in geopolitics and security, with particular reference to Africa in a changing global order. His work includes, research, consulting and policy advisory on international security, great power politics and regional geopolitical and geoeconomic processes. He often features in policy dialogues, seminars and workshops including one co-hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations and the South African Institute of International Affairs.