Russian interests in the Horn of Africa: A Red Sea foothold?

ABSTRACT

Russia's global strategy to establish itself as a superpower has led to its increased presence in Africa, particularly after the 2014 tensions over the Crimea in Ukraine created a rift with the West. In recent years, Russia has rebuilt its status as a regional actor in the Horn of Africa lost after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As in other parts of the world, Russia uses many tools to promote its influence in the region, providing political and military support, as well as engaging in economic and energy cooperation. More generally, Russia's renewed presence in the Horn of Africa competes – to some degree – with the ambitions of other international players in the region, particularly Western countries such as the United States and France, but also China. This article examines Russia's renewed political, military, economic and cultural commitment in the Horn of Africa.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• Africa
• Horn of Africa
• Russian naval base
• geopolitical repositioning

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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108 Reuters, ‘Sudan's civilian coalition presents vision for military exit from politics’, 18 October 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-civilian-coalition-presents-vision-military-exit-politics-2022-10-17/>.

109 Wilson Center, ‘Global Perspectives | Ethiopia-Russia Relations’, 11 February 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/global-perspectives-ethiopia-russia-relations>.

110 Reuters, ‘Ethiopians criticise United States at pro-government rally’, 30 May 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopians-criticise-united-states-pro-government-rally-2021-05-30/>; U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Four Entities and Two Individuals in Connection with the Crisis in Ethiopia’, 12 November 2021, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0478.>.

111 Ramani S, ‘Russia and the GERD: An uneasy balancing act’, Middle East Institute, 16 August 2021, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-and-gerd-uneasy-balancing-act>

112 Gridneff I, ‘Russia’s Africa moves force Europe rethink on Ethiopia’, Politico, 28 July 2022, <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-ethiopia-rethink/>.

113 Trading Economics, ‘Ethiopia Imports from Russia’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/imports/russia>.

114 Trading Economics, ‘Russia Imports from Ethiopia’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/imports/ethiopia>.

115 Abera B, ‘Ethiopia, Russia Agree to Strengthen Bilateral Relations’, Walta, 27 July 2022, <https://waltainfo.com/ethiopia-russia-agree-to-strengthen-bilateral-relations/>.

116 News Business Ethiopia, ‘Russia opens Africa–Russia economic cooperation office in Ethiopia’, 24 February 2022, <https://newbusinessethiopia.com/economy/russia-opens-africa-russia-economic-cooperation-office-in-ethiopia/>.

117 Organizing Committee of the 2nd Russia–Africa Summit Holds First Meeting, 12 October 2022, <https://summitafrica.ru/en/news/o-pervom-zasedanii-orgkomiteta-vtorogo-sammita-rossija-afrika/>.

118 Klomegah KK, ‘Russia’s interest in South Sudan’, Modern Diplomacy, 30 January 2020, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/01/30/russias-interest-in-south-sudan/>; South Sudan OFAC Sanctions, <https://www.visualofac.com/resources/full-sanctions/south-sudan-sanctions/>.

119 Lederer EM, ‘Russia and US spar over South Sudan peace agreement’, Associated Press, 15 March 2019, <https://apnews.com/article/8940aa0d71674cc49110a02c7118fd7e>.

120 BBC, ‘South Sudan sanctions ‘blocked by Russia and Angola’’, 16 September 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34267405>.

121 Lynch C, ‘Russia’s Sanctions Problem’, Foreign Policy, 22 October 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/22/russia-sanctions-expert-panels-security-council/>.

122 Klomegah, Russia’s interest in South Sudan.

123 Klomegah, Russia’s interest in South Sudan.

124 Trading Economics, ‘Russia Imports from South Sudan’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/imports/south-sudan>; Trading Economics, ‘Russia Exports to South Sudan’, updated in August 2022, < https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/south-sudan>.

125 Shabbir F, ‘Russia To Deliver 2 Ansat Helicopters To Eritrea In 2020 – Source’, Urdu Point, 20 January 2020, <https://www.urdupoint.com/en/world/russia-to-deliver-2-ansat-helicopters-to-erit-814332.html>.

126 Ghebrezghiabher H and Gerhelase T, ‘Eritrea: Supporting Russia to Stay in Power’, Washington Institute, 13 April 2022, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/eritrea-supporting-russia-stay-power>.

127 France 24, ‘UN alleges war crimes in Ethiopia's Tigray, urges Eritrea pullout’, 4 March 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210304-un-alleges-war-crimes-in-ethiopia-s-tigray-urges-eritrea-pullout.>.

128 Africa Times, ‘African nations abstain, but Eritrea casts only UN vote against Russia-Ukraine resolution’, 2 March 2022, <https://africatimes.com/2022/03/02/african-nations-abstain-but-eritrea-casts-only-un-vote-against-russia-ukraine-resolution/>.

129 Trading Economics, ‘Russia Exports to Eritrea’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/eritrea>.

130 Trading Economics, ‘Russia Imports from Eritrea’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/imports/eritrea>.

131 Trading Economics, ‘Kenya exports to Russia’, accessed 10 May 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/exports/russia>; Trading Economics, ‘Russia exports to Kenya’, accessed 10 May 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/kenya>.

132 Agence de Presse Africaine, ‘Kenya, Russia agree to form business council’, 25 October 2019, <http://www.apanews.net/en/news/kenya-russia-agree-to-form-business-council>.

133 Ngugi B, ‘Russia's Vladimir Putin woos Kenya with military kit and energy’, Nation, 26 October 2019, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/Putin-woos-Kenya-with-military-kit--and-energy/1056-5325626-yf6b73/index.html>.

134 Maksimychev D, ‘Rekindling Russia-Kenya friendship’, The Star, 12 June 2020, <https://www.the-star.co.ke/opinion/2020-06-12-rekindling-russia-kenya-friendship/>.

135 Stronski P, ‘Russian COVID-19 Diplomacy in Africa: A Mixed Bag’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 December 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/10/russian-covid-19-diplomacy-in-africa-mixed-bag-pub-85971>.

136 Dahir AL, ‘Kenya, expressing concern about counterfeit vaccines, blocks private imports of doses’, The New York Times, 3 April 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/world/kenya-covid-vaccine.html>.

137 Ball J and Davies H, ‘Where there is oil and gas there is Schlumberger’, The Guardian, 18 May 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/18/where-there-is-oil-and-gas-there-is-schlumberger>.

138 Mohamed A, ‘Somalia: Lifting Arms Embargo Key to Battling Islamist Militants’, VOA News, 11 October 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-lifting-arms-embargo-key-to-battling-islamist-militants/6785435.html>.

139 Ramani S, ‘Should Russia Militarily Assist Somalia Against Al Shabaab?’, Russian International Affairs Council, 19 June 2016, <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/samuel-ramani-en/225/>.

140 Sucuoglu G and Stearns J, ‘Turkey In Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid’, SAIIA Research Report, 24, The South African Institute of International Affairs, 21 November 2016, <https://saiia.org.za/research/turkey-in-somalia-shifting-paradigms-of-aid/>; Kenetz L, ‘Turkey cements military ties with Somalia, has already trained one-third of its army’, Nordic Monitor, 30 August 2022, <https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/08/turkey-cements-military-ties-with-somalia-already-trained-one-third-of-the-army/>.

141 TASS, ‘Russia ready to help Somalia in war on terror’, 19 September 2017,, <https://tass.com/politics/966402>.

142 Mogadishu Times, Prime Minister Khaire: Somalia's Return to Global Stage is Inevitable, 26 January 2018, <https://mogtimes.com/articles/17382/Prime-Minister-Khaire-Somalias-Return-to-Global-Stage-is-Inevitable>.

143 Trading Economics, ‘Russia Exports to Somalia’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/somalia>.

144 Afrocom, ‘Business mission in Uganda’, < https://afrocom.info/en/events>.

145 Nikkei Asia, ‘Uganda leader says China-style diplomacy 'better than' the West's’, 17 March 2022, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Uganda-leader-says-China-style-diplomacy-better-than-the-West-s>.

146 Blanshe M, ‘Russia – Uganda: Why Museveni is gravitating towards Putin’, The Africa Report, 17 June 2022, <https://www.theafricareport.com/214013/why-museveni-is-gravitating-towards-putin/>.

147 The New Times, ‘Museveni, Putin strike deal on oil and arms’, 14 December 2012, <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/60791>.

148 Reuters, ‘Uganda says Russia to help it develop nuclear energy’, 18 September 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-russia-idUSKBN1W328N>.

149 TASS, ‘Putin outlines lucrative trajectories for cooperation with Uganda’, 23 October 2019, <https://tass.com/world/1084857>.

150 TASS, ‘Russia to open business support center in Uganda’, 20 April 2021, <https://tass.com/economy/1280475>.

151 Trading Economics, ‘Russia Exports to Uganda’, updated in August 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/uganda>.

152 See Ashby H and Mutah J, ‘What Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Means for African Governments’, United States Institute of Peace, 14 April 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/what-russias-invasion-ukraine-means-african-governments; Obadare E, ‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine May Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa’, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 March 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-invasion-ukraine-may-drive-wedge-between-west-and-africa>.

153 Muronzi C, ‘Russia, West vie for influence amid Africa caution on Ukraine war’, Al Jazeera, 17 August 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/17/russian-and-western-politicians-vie-for-influence-in-africa>.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Francesco Generoso

Francesco Generoso has a degree in international relations from the University of Naples L'Orientale, Naples, Italy. He is part of the Executive Board of the Centre for International Studies as Head of Research and Publications. He is research fellow of the think tank Trinità dei Monti. He is also part of the national board of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, Italy. He has authored various articles and publications in online journals and newspapers.