Selling terror: a multidimensional analysis of the Islamic State’s recruitment propaganda

ABSTRACT

The Islamic State (ISIS) early became infamous for its broadcasts of extreme violence. However, within months, the group’s initially dominant images of combat and executions had been subsumed into a broader propaganda platform more focused on state-building and community engagement. Drawing on a close reading of Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery, this article conceptualises three dominant themes within ISIS’ recruitment propaganda—violence, state and caliphate—and analyses their development and presentation over time. Employing a recruitment model adapted from Prochaska and DiClemente’s theory of behavioural change, it finds that ISIS developed a multidimensional propaganda platform, undergoing both broad thematic and structural evolution, which democratised the appeal of its jihad to cohorts who would otherwise be uninspired by extremist violence. ‘Technological coding’—the selective publication of thematic content by broadcast format—is proposed as a means by which ISIS was able to sustain binary violent and non-violent identities, and its function in the group’s propaganda machine is explored in depth. In the wake of ISIS’ territorial defeat, understanding the logic and effectiveness of its recruitment methodology is essential in preventing its resurgence or the rise of a newer organisation seeking to take its place.

KEYWORDS:

• Extremism
• ISIS
• propaganda
• radicalisation
• recruitment
• terrorism

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank William A. Rivera, Founder and CEO of Computational Security Services; David A. Siegel, Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University; Dr Fiona Black, Clinical Psychologist; and Dr Carrick Anderson, Psychiatrist, for their contributions to the development of this work.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Hegghammer (2013, 5–6) offers a ‘best minimal estimate of the supply of foreign fighters from the West to Al Qaeda between 1990 and 2010 [as] 945 individuals over two decades.’ Even Hegghammer’s ‘maximum estimate’ of 7,500 fighters equates to an average recruitment by Al Qaeda of around 350 per year. Soufan Group (2015) suggests that ISIS, in contrast, recruited at least 5248 fighters from western countries (excluding the Balkans) between April 2013 and November 2015, a rate of around 2031 fighters per year.

2 Welch (2019, 186, 194–196) notes that the thematic content of Dabiq was highly distinct from Rumiyah, with the latter marking a return to the lone wolf encouragement paradigm, similar to Inspire. Winter (2018) also explores this shift across ISIS’ broader media suite.

3 Interestingly, this figure—calculated to just over 350 per year from western countries (including the Balkans) from data in Soufan Group (2015)—is almost exactly the same as Al Qaeda’s maximal estimated recruitment per year estimated in Hegghammer 2013, 5–6.

4 Abu Rumaysah—the infamous ‘Jihadi Sid’.

5 For further discussion of the processes and functions of legitimacy, see Johnston 2018.

6 Compare, for example, the differences across the definitions provided in Fedorov 2016; Melki and Jabado 2016 and Atwan 2015.

7 ‘Ikhwani’ referring to the twentieth century Wahhabist militia rather than the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood.

8 It is, however, uncertain whether this reflects trends across ISIS’ recruitment as a whole during this period or is simply a product of the narrow timeframe from which Dodwell et al.’s records come.

9 Although it had earlier destroyed artefacts, such as at the site of Tel Ajaja, these acts were not broadcast as widely or imbued with the same symbolic meaning in their presentation.

10 The outlying final 15th edition of Dabiq, ‘Break the Cross’, focused almost entirely on discussion of religious issues and is thus not understood as reflective of the broader trend.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nicolas Johnston

Nicolas Johnston is a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. He received a Masters in Strategy and Security from the Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW Canberra) and a BA in Political Science and International Comparative Studies from Duke University.