ABSTRACT
We consider a Cobb–Douglas production function with two firm-specific R&D resource inputs and specify the conditions under which higher knowledge spillovers cause higher technological progress in the industry. We then consider the exponential R&D production function and establish sufficient conditions for per-firm own R&D expenditures to be an increasing function of knowledge spillovers and technological opportunities. Knowledge spillovers and technological possibilities encourage R&D spending if firms’ decisions on R&D investments are strategic complements. We consider two identical firms that, prior to competition in the product market, first decide whether to reveal their R&D efforts to the other firm and second conduct cost-reducing or demand-enhancing R&D and examine the conditions under which full revelation of R&D efforts to rivals yields higher profits. Trigger strategies which require non-cooperative firms to share their R&D inputs will ensure the efficient sharing of R&D efforts. This model has new policy implications about the effects of knowledge spillovers and complementarity in R&D on the incentives to innovate and promote welfare. We present an intellectual property policy that challenges the traditional model of intellectual property as exclusive ownership rights.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).