The State-Orchestrated Financialization of Housing in Turkey

ABSTRACT

This study presents an assessment of the political economy of housing in contemporary Turkey in conversation with the main issues of the financialization of housing (FoH) debate. Since the early 2000s, the built-environment scene in Turkey has been undergoing a radical transformation toward a situation characterized by growing penetration of financial concerns into the housing sector. FoH in Turkey, however, is remarkably different from typical Global North examples in terms of the current depth of the process, prevalent mechanisms, leading components, and driving actors. The Turkish case is characterized by a relatively small financial footprint generating an unprecedented construction boom, under the command of a decisive and persistent state strategy. Going well beyond the enabling/facilitating role of states covered in the existing literature, this strategy represents a case in which the state itself effectively drives the housing–finance nexus.

KEYWORDS:

• financialization
• neoliberalism
• Turkey
• housing
• securitization
• mortgage markets

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Çağlar Keyder and Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ, the guest editors of this special issue, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. The usual disclaimers apply.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For instance, see Urban Land Institute & PwC (2011).

2. Author’s own calculations, based on data in EMF (2018).

3. For various analyses on this issue, see Karaçimen and Çelik (2017), Karatepe (2016), Sönmez (2013), Balaban (2012), and Yeşi̇lbağ (2016).

4. On this topic, see Fernandez and Aalbers (2019).

5. In this respect, it is noteworthy to remember that the concept of neoliberalism has been subject to similar critiques. A series of works by Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010a, 2010b)) and Brenner and Theodore (2002) have addressed these critiques by offering a fresh perspective that emphasizes the variegation of “actually existing” neoliberalizations. My perspective here builds on these contributions.

6. A similarly expanded role of states in financialization has been noted for China (Wang, 2015) and Singapore (Lai & Daniels, 2015).

7. See Davis (2007), Smith (2019), and UN-HABITAT (2003).

8. According to state sources, in the first half of the 1960s, the percentage of the population living in gecekondu settlements was 45% for İstanbul, 59% for Ankara, and 33% for İzmir. The equivalent figures in the 1980s were 70%, 55%, and 50%, respectively (Buğra, 1998, p. 307).

9. Emlak Bank functioned also as a developer. Especially intensified in the 1970s, the bank realized the first big-scale mass housing projects in Turkey. These projects, however, were often criticized for channeling public funds to residential projects for middle- and upper-class households rather than social housing (Buğra, 1998, p. 308).

10. Author’s calculation based on TUIK (n.d.)

11. For further insights about various impacts of globalization on the urban fabric, see Keyder (2005).

12. It should be emphasized here that although the stated aim of these institutions was initially to facilitate the production of social housing, the loose structure of the legal framework rendered the utilization of TOKİ funds for luxurious projects and second homes by members of the middle and upper classes possible (Çelik et al., 2016).

13. For a more detailed analysis of the transformation of the overall financial structure in Turkey in the period in question, see Ergüven (2019).

14. Between 2009 and 2012, gross capital flows to developing and emerging economies between 2009 and 2012 were around US$4.5 trillion (Orhangazi & Özgür, 2015, p. 1).

15. According to a World Bank report (Lim, Mohapatra, & Stocker, 2014, p. 3), of the “62 percent of the increase in overall inflows to developing countries between 2009 and 2013…at least 13 percent is attributable to this additional quantitative easing (QE) effect.” Further striking evidence of the impact of QE policies was that a period of uncertainty caused by the Federal Reserve's decisions in 2013 led to an alarming situation in a number of emerging markets that came to be known as the Fragile Five, of which Turkey has been a prominent member (along with India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia).

16. For a broad perspective on the impacts of QE on the developing world, see Fernandez and Aalbers (2019).

17. The Law on Amendments to Various Laws on Housing Finance System (Law No. 5582).

18. It is noteworthy that the Gulf Monarchies have acquired a growing presence in the Turkish real estate markets in recent years, accounting for 40% of all foreign transactions as of 2019 (GYODER, 2019, p. 31). The impact of Gulf capital on the recent political economic transformation of Turkey is a topic waiting to be explored in detail. For the specificities of Gulf capitalism and its form of real estate financialization, see Buckley and Hanieh (2014).

19. The Law on Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk (Law No. 6306).

20. Current corporate reports claim that there are around 6 million dwelling units that need to be demolished and rebuilt (GYODER, 2019, p. 8).

21. For further debates on various aspects of urban policy during the AKP era, see Bayırbağ (2013), Bayırbağ and Penpecioğlu (2017), Çavuşoğlu and Strutz (2014b), Coşkun (2011), Eraydin & Taşan‐Kök, 2014), Özdemir (2011), Tansel (2019), and Türkün (2011).

22. The continuing abundance of state-owned uncommodified land that has turned out to be a vital resource for TOKİ to capitalize on is an important aspect of the Turkish social formation, with historical roots. A specificity of the Ottoman land regime was that it considerably limited private property on land. This legacy was largely inherited by modern Turkey as well, engendering a peculiar situation rendering the state the owner of most of the unoccupied land in the country, which as of 2000 covered around a third of the total geographical area of the country (Keyder, 2013, pp. 172–173).

23. For detailed discussions on urban transformation-related conflicts, see Eraydin and Taşan‐Kök (2014), Kuyucu and Unsal (2010), Türkün (2011), Karaman (2013), and Çelik (2017).

24. It should be noted, however, that the outcomes of the social housing program have been criticized, for various reasons. First of all, the program has been accessible only to a small segment of the low-income population and has not managed to generate a significant change in overall homeownership rates. Second, the inadequacy of construction materials accompanied by careless labor in some cases has produced new dwelling units that experienced significant decay shortly after their ostentatious opening ceremonies (Radikal, 2008). Third, contrary to the stated rhetoric of creating livable spaces, the development of the first available TOKİ-owned land disregarding accessibility issues as well as social amenities and without accompanying transportation projects has produced several sites of social exclusion.

25. See the section titled “The Legacy of Irregular Urbanization.”

26. The Law on Consumer Protection (Law. No. 6502).

27. See the next section.

28. For a comprehensive discussion on this topic, see Fernandez and Aalbers (2019).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Melih Yeşilbağ

Melih Yeşilbağ received his PhD in sociology from the State Univeristy of New York at Binghamton, and he currently teaches Sociology at Ankara University. His research interests lie in the intersection of urban political economy, political economy of development, and political sociology. He has published in various journals including Enterprise & Society and Praksis.