ABSTRACT
While research consistently shows that fact-checking improves belief accuracy, debates persist about how to best measure and interpret expressions of factual beliefs. We argue that this has led to ambiguity in interpreting the results of studies on fact-checking, including whether fact-checking effects in fact decrease confidently held false beliefs. In a two-wave, nationally representative online experiment on beliefs about immigration, we use a variety of theoretically motivated approaches toward observing the influence of fact-checking messages. Results suggest that the effects of fact-checking are robust to different methods of measuring misinformed beliefs – even after accounting for belief certainty – and across different analytical approaches. Effects are evident among those who harbored inaccurate beliefs with high degrees of confidence. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for future studies of corrections and practical implications for fact-checking efforts.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Data Availability Statement
The data described in this article are openly available in the Open Science Framework at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LQMGBG.
Open Scholarship
This article has earned the Center for Open Science badges for Open Data, Open Materials and Preregistered. The data and materials are openly accessible at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LQMGBG.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Dustin Carnahan
Dustin Carnahan (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Michigan State University.
Daniel E. Bergan
Daniel E. Bergan(Ph.D., Northwestern University) is an associate professor in the Department of Communication and James Madison College at Michigan State University.