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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the degree of autonomy the Ukrainian volunteer battalions had from the regular forces during the war in Donbas. The findings indicate that the degree of autonomy was high and that in particular, three initial conditions were decisive for this outcome: (1) the relative level of militia military strength in the initial states of conflict; (2) the degree of agenda overlap; (3) the degree of bottom-up organization. The empirical evidence further suggests that the three factors produced the identified outcome through the mechanisms of “institutional lock-in,” “performance interdependence,” and “entitlement.” Consequently, the Ukrainian state and regular forces ended up accepting a higher degree of autonomy, in terms of command and control, on the part of the volunteer battalions than they otherwise probably would have preferred. This outcome contributed significantly to saving the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state in 2014–2015, but may also have created conditions for challenges to the same state further down the road.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Olexandr Samarskiy, Ilmari Käihkö, Paul D’Anieri, and Nils Petter Gleditsch for comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Notes
1. In particular, the personal memoirs of five volunteer fighters and three fighters for the regular forces have been used (respectively: Zinenko Citation2016; Orel Citation2016; Sova Citation2017; Voland Citation2016; Vyriy Citation2016; Mamalui Citation2016; Palval and Muzyka Citation2016).
2. According to the authoritative US Marine Corps’ doctrine manual, FMFM-1 Warfighting, the strategic level is about winning wars, the tactical level is about winning battles and engagements, and the intermediate operational level is about “where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle – and when, where, and under what conditions to refuse battle in support of higher aims” (http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf).
3. General impression from author’s discussions with battalion commanders and regulars in Kiev and Donbas in September 2016.
4. Anonymous battalion commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
5. Anonymous Azov battalion fighter, personal interview, 2016.
6. Anonymous battalion commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
7. Author’s interviews with volunteer battalion commanders in Kiev and Donbas in September 2016.
8. Anonymous battalion fighter, personal interview, 2016.
9. Anonymous battalion commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
10. Anonymous battalion sub-commander, personal interview, 2016.
11. Anna Kovalenko, personal interview, 2016.
12. Azov battalion fighter, personal interview, 2016.
13. Anonymous battalion commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
14. Anonymous Azov and Dnipro-1 battalion fighters, personal interviews, 2016.
16. Anonymous battalion commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
17. See http://www.google.no/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwj-rvnAmOXUAhVBDJoKHaGcCC4QFgglMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww2.ohchr.org%2Fenglish%2Fdocs%2Fdarfurreport.doc&usg=AFQjCNEOxn1cB4f0ewFHcLwn4RnHt5kb1Q, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/034/2004/en/, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?c=87&su=93, and https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/absolute_impunity_iraq_report.pdf, retrieved 18 May 2018.
18. Anonymous Donbas battalion fighter, personal interview, 2016.
19. Interview with former Deputy Minister of Defence, Ihor Kabanenko, Kiev, September 2016.
20. Author’s personal observations in September 2016.
21. Anonymous commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
22. Anonymous battalion commander-in-chief, personal interview, 2016.
23. Interview with former Deputy Minister of Defense, Ihor Kabanenko, Kiev, September 2016.