What Is the State of Russian Society After 20 Years of Putin?

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This article is the republished version of:

What Is the State of Russian Society After 20 Years of Putin?

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Notes

^1. See, for example, a discussion of the current type of government in Russia: T. Vorozheikina. “Avtoritarnyi rezhim i obshchestvo v Rossii,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas, no. 5 (2018): 89–112.

^2. See S.A. Greene. Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 3.

^3. L. Gudkov, “Protesty rutiniziruiutsia i stanoviatsia chast’iu sistemy,” in Vstrechnaya mobilizatsiia. Moskovskie protesty i regionalnye vybory-2019. Analiticheskiy doklad, ed. K. Rogova (Moscow: Liberal’naia missiia - Ekspertiza, 2019), 103–104.

^4. For more on this period of Russian civil society’s development, see T. Vorozheikina, “Grazhdanskoye obshchestvo: chto dal’she?” Otechestvennye zapiski, no. 3 (2014): https://bit.ly/3bnNwLA.

^5. See the results of the 2010–2011 study on the problems of civil society in Russia: D. Volkov, “Rost obshchestvennoi aktivnosti v Rossii: stanovlenie grazhdanskogo obshchestva ili ocherednoi tupik?,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, no. 2 (2011): 8–28.

^6. D. Volkov, “Protestnye mitingi v Rossii kontsa 2011 - nachala 2012 gg.: zapros na demokratizatsiiu politicheskikh institutov,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, no. 2 (2012): 83.

^7. Ibid., 82.

^8. V. Havel, “Sila bessil’nykh,” in Moral v politike. Khrestomatiia, ed. B.G. Kapustina (Moscow: Knizhnyi dom “Universitet,” 2004), 250–251.

^9. D. Volkov, “Protestnye mitingi v Rossii kontsa 2011 - nachala 2012 gg.: zapros na demokratizatsiiu politicheskikh institutov,” 74.

^10. For more information see: T. Vorozheikina. “Avtoritarnyi rezhim i obshchestvo v Rossii.”

^11. See: K. Rogov, “‘Krymsky sindrom’: mekhanismy avtoritarnoi mobilizatsii,” Kontrapunkt, no. 1 (2015): 1–18, https://bit.ly/2UcMPzc.

^12. L. Gudkov, Op. cit., 103–104.

^13. In an article published before the 2011 mass protests, Denis Volkov wrote: “Mass protests in Russia have still not led to change, but they have preserved the status quo by regularly relieving social tension without resolving the underlying problems” (D. Volkov, “Rost obshchestvennoi aktivnosti v Rossii: stanovlenie grazhdanskogo obshchestva ili ocherednoi tupik?,” 27).

^14. From: N. Prusenkova, “My byli tam, gde dolzhny, i delali to, chto nyzhno,” Novaia gazeta (May 6, 2019), https://bit.ly/2xq8GKj.

^15. D. Volkov and A. Kolesnikov, Samoorganizatsiia grazhdanskogo obshchestva v Moskve: motivy, vozmozhnosti i predely politizatsii (Moscow: Moskovskiy tsentr Karnegi, 2016), 10.

^16. When this program was being discussed in 2017, Mayor Sobyanin made assurances that the number of floors in new buildings in the urban redevelopment zone would be determined on an individual basis for each district and would range from 6 floors to 14 floors. Nevertheless, there are plans to build a 72-story building as part of the redevelopment program in Pokrovskoe-Streshnevo in 2019. Some Moscow residents say that there are plans to build 25-story and even 40-story buildings in their districts.

^17. D. Volkov and A. Kolesnikov, op. cit., 6.

^18. Ibid, 9.

^19. N. Chernova, “Zazhim! Vlast’ ne vidit v buntakh vrachei sistemnoi problemy - no dlia zdravookhraneniia eto katastrofa,” Novaya gazeta, (November 25, 2019), https://bit.ly/2QJ601c.

^20. Ibid.

^21. See S. Sardzhveladze, “Igor Rotenberg vzialsia za otkhody,” RBK, no. 98 (June 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JdEPrc; V. Oparyshev, “Andrei Shipelov ‘razgoniaet’ musor?”, The Moscow Post, (November 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/2Ue1iuu; B. Liauv, “Igor Chaika stanovitsia krupneishim operatorom po musoru,” Vedomosti, (April 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/3bk4udV.

^22. See L. Smirnov, “‘Musornyi skandal’: vrednye vybrosy uvelichat v desiatki raz,” Rosbalt, (February 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/2WGX5RF.

^23. See I. Gordienko, “Musornyi veter peremen,” Novaya gazeta (March 28, 2020).

^24. Aleksandr Shestun, the head of Serpukhov District who authorized a demonstration in favor of closing the landfill and was able to achieve this through an arbitrazh court, was arrested in June 2018 on charges of fraud and money laundering. In spite of the court decision, the new district administration appointed by Moscow Oblast governor Andrei Vorob’yev started again allowing use of the landfill, the capacity of which had long before been exceeded.

^25. T. Britskaia, “Khop, musorok! Gubernator, nazvavshii izbiratelei ‘shelupon’iu,’ sobralsia na tretii srok,” Novaya gazeta, (November 22, 2019), https://bit.ly/2xmXL42.

^26. “I’ve already lived my life, but I’m going to go out and stand up for our land for the sake of my eight grandchildren and 16 great-grandchildren,” said an elderly resident of a neighboring village. “How could I live in this world knowing that they built a landfill here?” Quoted from A. Shuliat’yeva, “Musor, revoliutsiia, edinstvo. Razgovory na Shiyese nakanune predpolagaemoi zachistki palatochnogo lageria,” Novaya gazeta (November 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/3dqyoyX.

^27. Ia. Varenik, “Musornyi protest v Shiyese. Bez golovy, no v litsakh,” Fontanka.ru (June 4, 2019), https://bit.ly/2xgRqat.

^28. The authorities in the Komi Republic attempted to infiltrate the group protecting Shiyes using nationalists from the organization Border of the North to turn the peaceful protest into a violent protest and to then shut down the camp in response to the violence. See T. Britskaia, “Fashiyesty. Pridvornye polittekhnologi iz Komi sdali mestnykh natsi v lizing investoru svalki, chtoby prevratit’ mirnyi protest na Shiyese v boyniu,” Novaya gazeta (November 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/2y8ddSl.

^29. Quoted from A. Shuliat’yeva, op. cit.

^30. “Lev Shlosberg: interv’iu,” Ekho Moskvy, November 21, 2019, https://bit.ly/2xjKKbB.

^31. A. Etkind, Vnutrenniaia kolonizatsiia. Imperskii opyt Rossiii (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2016).

^32. Iu. Kolyvanov, “General FSB Ivan Tkachev: ‘U nas narod truslivyi i upravliaemyi,’” OKA.FM (November 19, 2018), https://bit.ly/39c30Rr.

^33. See T. Vorozheikina, “Ne mozhet byt’ raskola elit bez davleniia snizu, no i ulichnoe davlenie samo po sebe ne privedet k transformatsii rezhima,” Vstrechnaia mobilizatsiia, 98–101.

^34. See G. Iudin, “Krizis representatsii i ego proiavleniia,” Vstrechnaia mobilizatsiia, 101–102.

^35. Iu. Levada, Fenomen vlasti v obshchestvennom soznanii: paradoksy i stereotipy vospriiatiia. Iu. Levada, Ot mnenii k ponimaniiu. Sotsiologicheskie ocherki 1993–2000 (Moscow: Moskovskaia shkola politicheskikh issledovanii, 2000), 325.

^36. I. Azar, “Bunt na korable pustyni. Kalmyki vosstali protiv mera iz ‘DNR’ i gubernator-kikboksera: reportazh is Elisty,” Novaia gazeta, (November 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/3draGmg.

^37. K. Rogov, “Informatsionnyi razryv: otnoshenie k protestam kak dolgosrochnyi vyzov,” Vstrechnaia mobilizatsiia, 76.

^38. D. Volkov, “Sotsiologiia protesta,” Vstrechnaia mobilizatsiia, 74.

^39. Eight people were sentenced to prison terms under charges of using force against police officers (Article 318 of Russia’s Criminal Code). One person—Vladislav Sinits—was sentenced to five years for threatening police officers and their relatives, while another—Konstantin Kotov—was sentenced to four years for repeatedly violating the established order for holding demonstrations. Four people charged under Article 318 are in a pretrial detention center. In three cases, including the most outrageous ones—the cases of Pavel Ustinov and Egor Zhukov—the accused were given suspended sentences.

^40. K. Rogov, “Informatsionnyi razryv,” 77.

^41. N. Frolova, “Pochemu rossiianam nravitsia ideia velikoi derzhavy i chto oni dumaiut o stranakh Baltii? Interv’iu s sotsiologom Denisom Volkovym,” Delfi (November 14, 2019), https://bit.ly/3doEaBa.

^42. S.A. Greene, op. cit., 54.

^43. Ibid., 220.