The Survival Strategies of the North Korean Elite

ABSTRACT

For decades a host of observers have periodically declared that North Korea is on the verge of collapse. Yet in practice the regime has demonstrated considerable resilience and will most likely last for a long time to come. This article explores both the factors posing a potential threat to the regime’s stability (above all, its contiguity with rich, free, and attractive South Korea) and the factors contributing to its stability (the cohesiveness of elites). North Korea’s policy during the period since 2011 is analyzed as a set of measures that are primarily designed to help neutralize external and internal threats to the regime’s stability. Although a sudden collapse of the Kim family regime is hypothetically possible, it is more probable that the it retain control of the country for the foreseeable future.

KEYWORDS:

• North Korea
• KPDR
• reforms
• political stability
• elites

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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