In pursuit of purity: populist nationalism and the racialization of difference

ABSTRACT

Based on multi-sited fieldwork amongst leaders and supporters of populist radical right parties in the UK and Hungary, this article examines how the boundaries of the nation were reinforced and reimagined in the context of the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015. Examining processes of racialization propagated by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Hungarian Jobbik party, it suggests that the figure of the Muslim migrant served to rejuvenate violent imaginaries of ethno-racial and religious-civilizational difference. UKIP did not seek to reinforce national identity around a whiteness that was explicitly racially marked, but rather referred to culture grounded in (Judeo) Christian civilization as a basis of inclusion and exclusion. In contrast, in Hungary, supporters emphasized ethnic criteria for inclusion, thus challenging the basic values and principles underlying liberal democracy. In both contexts, anti-immigration discourses claiming the protection of ethno-racial or cultural purity, served a similar function; to re-territorialize white identities.

KEYWORDS:

• Racialization
• nationalism
• populism
• migration
• UKIP
• Jobbik

Acknowledgments

Thank you to the anonymous reviewers for guidance on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank colleagues at Centre for Research on Extremism for intellectual exchange, support and inspiration.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. A major focus in the literature has been on the effects of global capitalism and state transformation on the rise of neo-nationalism (Holmes 2000; Kalb and Halmai 2011), linking the rise of PRR parties to working-class and gendered resentment of economic and cultural displacement (Goodwin 2014; Pirro 2014). Other scholars have critiqued the ‘losers of modernization’ thesis showing how supporters can be drawn to PRR parties for a variety of reasons, including the affirmation of belonging, masculinity and personal loyalties (Kimmel 2013 and Mudde2007; Müller 2016).

2. Jobbik obtained 19 percent of the votes in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election.

3. Cologne police said that there had been 553 criminal complaints stemming from that night, about 40% of which relate to sexual assaults (http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/12/europe/germany-cologne-migrants-tensions/).

4. In February 2018, the Fidesz billboard campaign portrays opposition leaders Bernadett Szél (Politics Can Be Different), Ferenc Gyurcsány (Democratic Coalition), Gábor Vona (Jobbik) and Gergely Karácsony (Dialogue for Hungary) holding wirecutters in George Soros’s embrace.