Dynamic institutionalization: the foundations of Japan’s radioactive problem

ABSTRACT

Many have suggested that the true purpose behind Japan’s development of a closed nuclear-fuel cycle is to maintain the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons. However, closer examination of the development of Japan’s nuclear industry shows that, although Japan possesses advanced nuclear technologies, there has been no deliberate strategy to create a nuclear-weapon option. There is no “nuclear hedge.” To illustrate this point, this article presents a framework called “dynamic institutionalization” to explain the origins of Japan’s nuclear policies and the different sets of institutionalized pressures and constraints that have perpetuated these policies over time. Japan’s continued development of closed fuel-cycle technologies is primarily driven by domestic politics and the lack of a permanent spent-fuel management solution. On the other hand, Japan’s institutionalized nuclear forbearance is driven by the calculation that, as long as US extended deterrence remains credible, Japan’s security is best guaranteed through reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. By analytically untangling the policy of closed fuel-cycle development from the rationale for nuclear forbearance, this article provides a more nuanced view of the relationships between the domestic and international variables shaping Japan’s nuclear policies.

KEYWORDS:

• Japan
• fuel cycle
• nuclear hedging
• dynamic institutionalization
• extended deterrence

Notes

1 The closed fuel-cycle involves reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear power plants to separate trace quantities of fissile uranium and plutonium. This fissile material is then either fabricated into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel to be used in commercial nuclear reactors, or used in specialized fast breeder reactors to “breed” additional plutonium from uranium-238. This additional plutonium can then be fabricated into fuel rods for use in commercial reactors. By contrast, the open fuel cycle simply involves the permanent disposal of spent fuel after use in nuclear reactors. For an overview of the closed fuel-cycle process in Japan, see Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL), “Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” <www.jnfl.co.jp/en/business/cycle/>.

2 In this article, I adopt Scott Sagan’s definition of “nuclear hedging,” which is a “deliberate action by a government to make a nuclear weapons program easier in the future.” Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 14 (2011), p. 240.

3 Tatsujiro Suzuki and Masa Takubo, “Japan’s New Policy on Its Plutonium Stockpile,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, August 20, 2018, <fissilematerials.org/blog/2018/08/japans_new_policy_on_its_.html>.

4 Matthew Bunn, Steve Fetter, John P. Holdren, and Bob van der Zwaan, The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2003); “Japanese Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Delayed Yet Again,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 23, 2017, <asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japanese-nuclear-fuel-reprocessing-plant-delayed-yet-again>.

5 I define “forbearance” as having the capability to develop nuclear weapons but having a specific intention not to do so.

6 Examples include: Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond ‘Allergy’ and Breakout,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), pp. 233–64; James L. Schoff, “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan,” and James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 99–113, 115–132; Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 218–53; Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, eds., Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

7 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993), p. 64.

8 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000); Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2008), pp. 420–50.

9 Matake Kamiya, review of Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2011), p. 337.

10 Examples include: Tatsujiro Suzuki, “The Fast Reactor and Its Fuel Cycle Developments in Japan: Can Japan Unlock Its Development Path?,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2009), pp. 68–76; Masafumi Takubo and Frank von Hippel, “Ending Reprocessing in Japan: An Alternative Approach to Managing Japan’s Spent Nuclear Fuel and Separated Plutonium,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, November 2013, <fissilematerials.org/library/rr12.pdf>; James M. Acton, Wagging the Plutonium Dog: Japanese Domestic Politics and Its International Security Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), <carnegieendowment.org/files/Plutonium_Dog_final.pdf>; Masafumi Takubo, “Wake up, Stop Dreaming: Reassessing Japan’s Reprocessing Program,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2008), pp. 71–94.

11 This article places particular emphasis on political “lock-in” dynamics that keep policies in place even after the original rationales no longer exist, and the importance of sequencing in the institutionalization of Japan’s nuclear policies. For a concise overview of historical institutionalism, see Orfeo Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 2 (2011), pp. 367–99. For an example of how “lock-in” dynamics helped light-water reactors dominate the nuclear-power market, see Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1990), pp. 541–67.

12 For a similar approach that examines Japan’s institutional barriers to developing nuclear weapons, see Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2011), pp. 154–89; Akira Kurosaki, “Nuclear Energy and Nuclear-Weapon Potential: A Historical Analysis of Japan in the 1960s,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 24, Nos. 1–2 (2017), pp. 47–65.

13 For an overview of modern Japanese grand strategy, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). For more on Japan’s efforts to mitigate dependence on foreign technology, see Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

14 “Gray-zone” tactics aim to change the status quo without escalating armed conflict. See Scott W. Harold, Yoshiaki Nakagawa, Junichi Fukuda, John A. Davis, Keiko Kono, Dean Cheng, and Kazuto Suzuki, The US-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF379/RAND_CF379.pdf>.

15 Japanese Law Translation, Ministry of Justice, “Atomic Energy Basic Act (Act No. 186 of December 19, 1955),” <www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2233&vm=04&re=02>.

16 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Genshiryoku no kenkyū, kaihatsu oyobi riyō ni kansuru chōki keikaku” [Long term plan on nuclear research, development, and use], <www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/tyoki/tyoki1956/chokei.htm>.

17 Takubo and von Hippel, “Ending Reprocessing in Japan,” p. 9.

18 William R. Nester, Japanese Industrial Targeting: The Neomercantilist Path to Economic Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 132–33.

19 For the text of the agreement, see: “Japan–United States: Agreement on Reprocessing Nuclear Material of US Origin,” International Legal Materials, Vol. 16, No. 5 (1977), pp. 1017–20.

20 For the text of the agreement, agreed minutes, and implementing agreement, see “Proposed Agreement between the United States and Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” November 1987, <www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0413/ML041350444.pdf>. For more on the US Congress’s role in the agreement, see Yu Takeda, “US Nonproliferation Policy, Nuclear Cooperation, and Congress: Revision of the US-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 1987–88,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 24, Nos. 1–2, (2017), pp. 67–81.

21 Kazunari Hanawa, “US-Japan Nuclear Pact Renewed, but with Quick Repeal Option,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 17, 2018, <asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/US-Japan-nuclear-pact-renewed-but-with-quick-repeal-option>.

22 Suzuki, “The Fast Reactor and Its Fuel Cycle Developments in Japan,” p. 70.

23 Frank von Hippel, “Overview: The Rise and Fall of Plutonium Breeder Reactors,” in Thomas B. Cochran, Harold A. Feiveson, Walt Patterson, Gennadi Pshakin, M.V. Ramana, Mycle Schneider, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Frank von Hippel, eds., “Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, February 2010, <fissilematerials.org/library/rr08.pdf>, pp. 6–10.

24 Takubo and von Hippel, “Ending Reprocessing in Japan,” p. 9; “Monju Prototype Reactor, Once a Key Cog in Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy, to Be Scrapped,” Japan Times, December 21, 2016, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/12/21/national/monju-prototype-reactor-key-cog-japans-nuclear-energy-policy-scrapped/>.

25 JAEC, “Genshiryoku riyō ni kansuru kihon-teki kangaekata (an)” [Basic plan on the use of nuclear power (draft)], April 26, 2017, <www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2017/siryo18/siryo1-1.pdf>.

26 Japanese Law Translation, Ministry of Justice, “Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material, and Reactors (Act No. 116 of June 10, 1957),” <www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1941&vm=04&re=02>.

27 The law specifically notes that “approval of the application will not hinder the planned development and utilization of nuclear energy.” Ibid.; Takubo and von Hippel, “Ending Reprocessing in Japan,” p. 6.

28 Hitoshi Yoshioka, “The Development of Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Technology,” in , Shigeru Nakayama, Kunio Gotō, and Hitoshi Yoshioka, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan, Vol. 4 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001), pp. 239–41, 251.

29 Daniel P. Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), chapter 5.

30 Takubo, “Wake up, Stop Dreaming,” p. 76.

31 Acton, “Wagging the Plutonium Dog,” p. 17.

32 Tadahiro Katsuta and Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Japan’s Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, <http://ipfmlibrary.org/rr02.pdf>.

33 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of International Affairs and Communications, “Japan Statistical Yearbook 2017,” <www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/66nenkan/index.htm>.

34 Todd Crowell, “Why Japan’s Rokkasho Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Lives on,” The Diplomat, April 18, 2016, <thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-japans-rokkasho-nuclear-reprocessing-plant-lives-on/>.

35 Acton, “Wagging the Plutonium Dog,” p. 10.

36 Ibid., pp. 9–12.

37 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 118–22.

38 Acton, “Wagging the Plutonium Dog,” pp. 13–15.

39 EEC, Government of Japan, “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment,” September 14, 2012. Provisional translation available at <www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/presentation/wcms_195560.pdf>.

40 “Jiei-ken han’inara kakuheiki hoyū mo ka” [Nuclear weapons also permissible under self defense], Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 1957.

41 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2007), p. 305. As Richard Samuels notes, Article 9 prohibited military capabilities beyond “minimum necessary defense,” but, because that term was never clearly defined, it was possible to claim that nuclear weapons would fall under that threshold. Samuels, Securing Japan, p. 47.

42 Taka Daitoku, “The Construction of a Virtual Nuclear State: Japan’s Realistic Approach to an Emerging Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 1964–1970,” October 2014, p. 11.

43 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

44 For more on these veto players, see Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation,” pp. 163–66.

45 Kurosaki, “Nuclear Energy and Nuclear-Weapon Potential,” pp. 59–61.

46 “Memorandum of Conversation,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, Vol. 22 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), Document 362.

47 “Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968, Vol. 29, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), Document 37.

48 Yukinori Komine, Negotiating the US-Japan Alliance: Japan Confidential (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 47.

49 “Memorandum of Conversation,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968, Vol. 29, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), Document 41.

50 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Joint Statement Following Meetings with the Prime Minister of Japan,” American Presidency Project, January 13, 1965, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-following-meetings-with-the-prime-minister-japan>.

51 Japanese ratification of the NPT did not occur until 1976. Masakatsu Ota, “Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its Ambivalence and Coherence under the US Umbrella,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), pp. 203–04.

52 Japan Defense Agency, “National Defense Program Outline,” 1976.

53 Komine, Negotiating the US-Japan Alliance, pp. 35–38.

54 Ayako Kusunoki, “The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy,” Journal of American–East Asian Relations, Vol. 15, Special Volume: “Cold War across the Pacific” (2008), pp. 48–49.

55 “Intelligence Note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary Rusk,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968, Vol. 29, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), Document 113.

56 Daitoku, “The Construction of a Virtual Nuclear State,” pp. 31–32.

57 “‘Kaku busō kanōdaga motenu’ Satō naikaku ga 68, 70-nen ni himitsu kenkyū hōkoku-sho” [“Nuclear arms possible, but won’t be obtained” Satō cabinet’s secret report in 1960 and 1970], Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1994.

58 “Nihon no kaku seisaku ni kansuru kiso-teki kenkyū <yōshi>” [Basic studies of Japan’s nuclear policy (summary)], Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1994.

59 “Kaku busō kenkyū hōkoku-sho <yōshi>” [Nuclear arms research report (summary)], Asahi Shimbun, February 20, 2003.

60 IAEA, “The Texts of Instruments Connected with the Agency’s Supply of Uranium to Japan,” INFCIRC/3, April 1959.

61 IAEA, “The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III 1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/255, March 1978.

62 Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Safeguards Activities in Japan,” October 17, 2016, <www.nsr.go.jp/data/000142853.pdf>, pp. 16–20, 28–29.

63 Ibid.

64 Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2002–03), pp. 63–67. Notably, however, while this antinuclear national identity has manifested in Japan’s often constructive participation within the NPT review process, these ideals are constrained by Japan’s reliance on the US nuclear deterrent, as evidenced by Japan withholding support for the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

65 “Jiyūtō ozawa ichirō-shi ‘kaku busō wa kantan’ chūgoku-gawa ni gunbi zōkyō o kensei” [Liberal Party’s Ozawa Ichiro, “Nuclear weapons are easy,” urges restraint in Chinese military buildup], Asahi Shimbun, April 7, 2002.

66 Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan,” p. 229.

67 These policy makers included Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, Vice President Richard Cheney, Senator John McCain, and former Secretary of Defense William Perry. Ibid., p. 238.

68 Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Allowing Nuclear Weapons in Japan Could Defuse North Korean Threat, Say Some Policy Makers,” Reuters, September 6, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-japan/allowing-nuclear-weapons-in-japan-could-defuse-north-korean-threat-say-some-policy-makers-idUSKCN1BH1FO>; Anna Fifield, “South Korea’s Defense Minister Suggests Bringing Back Tactical US Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, September 4, 2017, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-koreas-defense-minister-raises-the-idea-of-bringing-back-tactical-us-nuclear-weapons/2017/09/04/7a468314-9155-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html>.

69 “Japan Map Shows Possible Permanent Sites for Nuclear Waste,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 28, 2017, <asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/Japan-map-shows-possible-permanent-sites-for-nuclear-waste>.

70 Peter Bungate, “Plotting Japan’s Energy Future,” The Diplomat, July 12, 2018, <thediplomat.com/2018/07/plotting-japans-energy-future/>.