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ABSTRACT
Researchers have recently proposed a new approach to nuclear-arms-control verification, dubbed “deferred verification.” The concept forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and of nuclear weapons or components in classified form. To implement this concept, a state first divides its nuclear program into a closed segment and an open segment. The total fissile-material inventory in the closed segment, which includes the weapon complex, is known and declared with very high accuracy. Essentially no inspections take place in the closed segment. In contrast, inspectors have access to the open segment, which includes in particular the civilian nuclear sector. The fissile-material inventory in the open segment is known with less accuracy, but uncertainties can be reduced over time using nuclear-archaeology methods. Deferred verification relies primarily on established safeguards techniques and avoids many unresolved verification challenges, such as the need for information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements. At the same time, deferred verification faces some unique challenges. Here, we explore some of these challenges and offer possible solutions; to do so, we examine possible noncompliance strategies in which a state would seek to withhold a higher-than-declared inventory.
Notes
1 Pavel Podvig and Joseph Rodgers, Deferred Verification: Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2017), <unidir.org>. This concept is also explored in Pavel Podvig, “Deferred Verification: Verifiable Declarations of Fissile-Material Stocks for Disarmament Purposes,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26, No. 3–4 (2019), doi:10.1080/10736700.2019.1628414.
2 “Group of Governmental Experts to Make Recommendations on Possible Aspects that Could Contribute to but Not Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices,” A/70/81, United Nations General Assembly, May 7, 2015. For country perspectives, see Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, Companion Volume to the Global Fissile Material Report 2008, October 2008, <www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr08cv.pdf>.
3 Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian, “Denuclearizing North Korea: A Verified, Phased Approach,” Science, Vol. 361, No. 6406 (2018), pp. 981–83.
4 The material required to make the fuel for these reactors could be withdrawn from the closed segment; it is even possible that the fuel itself be fabricated within the closed segment. Before first criticality, however, the fueled reactor along with the boat or ship would have to be transferred to the open segment because, once operational, the core inventory would no longer be accurately known. It is likely that the naval fuel cycle would require special verification and monitoring arrangements.
5 Alexander Glaser, “Facilitating Nuclear Disarmament: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2012), pp. 125–35.
6 The host could also attempt to ship the stockpile outside the country. Overall, the transfer of undeclared materials or items to a third party is a qualitatively different challenge that is relevant for other verification approaches also and simply hands over the “problem” from one state to another.
7 Podvig and Rodgers, Deferred Verification, p. 10.
8 It is likely that all countries have accountancy systems in place to enable such updates. The United States uses the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) and has been sharing best practices with other weapon states; see <www.energy.gov/nnsa/nuclear-materials-management-and-safeguards-system-nmmss>.
9 Sébastien Philippe, Alexander Glaser, and Edward Felten, “Cryptographic Escrow of Nuclear Warhead Inventories for Early Commitment and Non-intrusive Verification,” paper presented at 58th INMM Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, CA, July 16–20, 2017; A. Glaser, “Unmaking the Bomb: Verifying Limits on the Stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons,” in P. Corden, T. Fainberg, D. Hafemeister, and A. Macfarlane, eds., Nuclear Weapons and Related Security Issues AIP Conference Proceedings 1898, 2017, pp. 020006.
10 Podvig and Rodgers, Deferred Verification, p. 16.
11 Mark Hibbs, “Iran and the Evolution of Safeguards,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 16, 2015.
12 Steve Fetter, “Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 3 (1993), pp. 237–59.
13 Thomas W. Wood, Bruce D. Reid, Christopher M. Toomey, Kannan Krishnaswami, Kimberly A. Burns, Larry O. Casazza, Don S. Daly, and Leesa L. Duckworth, “The Future of Nuclear Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons Fissile Material,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2014), pp. 4–26.
14 Glaser, “Facilitating Nuclear Disarmament.”
15 Joseph Rodgers, “A Pilot Deferred Verification Project in Russia and the United States,” paper presented at 72nd First Committee Side Event: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks, UNIDIR, United Nations, New York, October 9, 2017.
16 Sébastien Philippe, “Safeguarding the Military Naval Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2014), pp. 40–52.
17 There is also the concern that a stockpile could be temporarily removed before inspectors confirm the cleanout of the site. Undeclared materials or items could then be moved back onto the site. This scenario is not considered here in more detail.
18 See for example, ICEYE radar-satellite constellation, <www.iceye.com>; Capella Space radar-satellite constellation, <www.capellaspace.com>; WorldView Legion high-resolution optical constellation, <www.wired.com>; Planet near-infrared and video constellation, <planet.com>.
19 Attempts to transfer shielded materials across the perimeter could be detected with systems that are sensitive to depressed radiation backgrounds, which could trigger a follow-on inspection. For a detection system that could perform such a task, see “PPPL Researchers Develop MINDS Anti-terrorism Device,” PPPL Factsheet, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, Princeton, NJ, March 2011. If such passive systems are considered inadequate, the use of x-radiography scanners could be considered. Brian Henderson, “Analysis of the Frequency and Detectability of Objects Resembling Nuclear/Radiological Threats in Commercial Cargo,” Physics and Society, January 15, 2019, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.03753.pdf>.