“We will not make the bomb because we do not want to make the bomb”: understanding the technopolitical regime that drives the Brazilian nuclear program

ABSTRACT

This article examines the centrality of uranium-enrichment centrifuges to the Brazilian nuclear program, arguing that these machines enabled the emergence of a technopolitical regime that invokes the trope of nuclear autonomy to advance policy and technological prescriptions. In order to understand the evolution of Brazil’s nuclear activities, the article addresses the dynamics within this technopolitical regime and its interactions with policy actors and other groups in society. This analysis is useful to identify aspects that have characterized Brazilian nuclear policy since the 1980s, such as: the promotion of self-regulation as the primary nonproliferation commitment, the crucial role played by the navy in the development of nuclear technology, the fluctuation of financial resources allocated to the nuclear program, and the difficulties of relying on public funds for a long-term technological project.

KEYWORDS:

• Brazil
• uranium enrichment
• centrifuges
• nonproliferation
• naval nuclear program

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Matias Spektor, the supervisor of the PhD dissertation that resulted in this article, as well as Togzhan Kassenova, Marcelo Câmara, Stephen Herzog, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any organization. Likewise, responsibility for any error or omission lies solely with the author.

ORCID

Renata H. Dalaqua http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9819-4776

Notes

1 Gabrielle Hecht, “Technology, Politics, and National Identity in France,” in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, eds., Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 258.

2 See, for instance, Maria R. Rublee “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2010), pp. 49–70; Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, “The Role of an Epistemic Community in Argentina and Brazil’s Creation of a Joint Safeguards Agreement,” in Jeffrey W. Knopf, ed., International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2015), pp. 229–49; Rodrigo Mallea, Matias Spektor, and Nicholas Wheeler, eds., The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil (Washington and Rio de Janeiro: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and FGV, 2015).

3 See, for instance, Minister Nelson Jobim’s statement during a public hearing in the Senate: “Audiência Pública conjunta da Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional e Comissão de Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovação, Comunicação e Informática, 27 de agosto de 2009,” Diário do Senado Federal, Brasília, October 2, 2009, p. 1116.

4 Nick Gillard, “Foreign Assistance in Brazil’s Nuclear Programme,” Proliferation Case Study Series, King’s College London, 2016, p. 14, <http://projectalpha.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2016/03/20160106_-_Brazil_proliferation_case_study_amended_-_Project_Alpha.pdf>.

5 Leandro da Silva Batista Pereira, “Vitória na Derrota: Álvaro Alberto e as Origens da Política Nuclear Brasileira,” MA diss., FGV, 2013, p. 109.

6 Interview with Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva by Marly Motta, Matias Spektor, Tatiana Coutto, and Lucas Nascimento, October 13 and December 15, 2010, in Carlo Patti, ed., O programa nuclear brasileiro: uma história oral (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2014), <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/13733>

7 Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control Working Paper, Stanford University, 1997, p. 5.

8 For a review of Brazil’s foreign policy in the early 1970s, including the country’s opposition to the NPT and the defense of the right to conduct PNEs, see Carlo Patti, “Brazil in the Global Nuclear Order (1945–2010),” PhD diss., University of Florence, 2012.

9 Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,” Foreign Policy, No. 23 (1976), pp. 155–201.

10 Michael D. Zentner, G.L. Coles, and Robert Talbert, “Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis,” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2005, p. 48, <http://fissilematerials.org/library/zen05.pdf>.

11 According to Zentner, Coles, and Talbert, “the high proportion of carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) required in relation to UF₆ results in high specific-energy consumption and substantial requirements for removal of waste heat.” Zentner et al., “Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis,” p. 52.

12 See interview with Carlos Syllus Martins Pinto by Tatiana Coutto e Lucas Nascimento, July 22, 2010, and interview with Leonam dos Santos Guimarães by Marly Motta, Tatiana Coutto e Lucas Nascimento, Rio de Janeiro, February 8, 2010, in Patti, O programa nuclear brasileiro: uma história oral.

13 William Glenn Gray, “Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US–German Feud over Brazil,” International History Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2012), pp. 449–74.

14 IAEA, INFCIRC/237, 1976.

15 João Luiz Campos, João Luiz Campos, José Salvador Coelho, José Wellington Lemos, Renato Yadoya, and Ricardo V. Consiglio, ”Pesquisas sobre enriquecimento de urânio realizadas no Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear/Nuclebrás,” paper presented at I Congresso Geral de Energia Nuclear, Rio de Janeiro, March 17–20, 1986, <www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/17/086/17086466.pdf>.

16 Both terminologies for this program, “autonomous” and “parallel,” have political connotations. The term “autonomous” is preferred by those who were part of the effort; the adjective “parallel” is usually associated with a critical view of the project. This dichotomy becomes evident when interacting with the employees of the nuclear sector in Brazil. Moreover, there are explicit references to this semantic dispute in the biography of Rex Nazaré: Débora Motta, Rex Nazaré: uma vida dedicada à energia nuclear (Rio de Janeiro: FAPERJ, 2014), p. 156. In order to provide an academic treatment of the subject, the present article will use both terms, always referring to the program as “autonomous/parallel.”

17 João Roberto Martins Filho, “O projeto do submarino nuclear,” Contexto Internacional, No. 2 (2011), p. 238.

18 Rex Nazaré Alves, statement delivered at the 13th session of the Oversight and Control Committee, December 14, 1988, Brasília.

19 Martins Filho, “O projeto do submarino nuclear,” p. 284; Motta, Rex Nazaré, p. 148.

20 José Sarney, announcement made on September 4 1987, Brasília, <www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/jose-sarney/discursos/1987/76.pdf>.

21 Sarney, announcement, 1987. See also Folha de S. Paulo, “Testes são possíveis há dois anos,” August 10, 1986, p. 12; Folha de S. Paulo. “A Holanda pede relatório sobre a base de Cachimbo,” August 21, 1986, p. 9.

22 UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/41/11, October 27, 1986. Note that, at the time of Sarney’s speech, since all the conditions listed in Article 28 of the treaty (“Entry into Force”) had not been met, Brazil did not consider the Tlatelolco Treaty to be operational. Brazil did not implement the treaty until September 16, 1994. See Renata H. Dalaqua, “Achieving Nuclear Zero: Brazil’s Contribution to the International Efforts against Nuclear Weapons,” CPDOC/FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 2015, <http://ri.fgv.br/en/news/2015-08-06/center-international-relations-presents-two-articles-brazil-and-global-nuclear-order>.

23 As Argentina and Brazil returned to civilian governments, in 1983 and 1985, respectively, cooperation among the two countries in the nuclear area intensified. In November 1985, Presidents José Sarney of Brazil and Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina met in the border city of Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, and signed the Joint Declaration on Regional Nuclear Policy. In the following years, Argentina and Brazil pursued a bilateral nuclear agenda, with technical exchanges, political consultations, and high-level visits. This process would lead to the establishment of ABACC—the Brazilian–Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials—in 1991. For a detailed history, see Mallea et al., The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation.

24 Sarney, announcement, 1987.

25 Unlike international regimes, the concept of “technopolitical regime” does not refer to norms that affect state behavior in a given area of international relations. Although a comparative analysis of the two concepts is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that they constitute different analytical tools. While an analysis of international regimes tends to focus on states and foreign-policy positions, an examination of technopolitical regimes typically focuses on technologists and the use of technology to enact political goals, a practice that Hecht calls “technopolitics.” See Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998),

26 Ibid., p. 163.

27 Hecht, “Technology, Politics, and National Identity in France,” p. 258.

28 Folha de S. Paulo, “Não vamos fazer a bomba, diz Nazareth,” September 5, 1987.

29 Since the late 1970s, the Brazilian Navy has been interested in developing a naval nuclear reactor to be used in a submarine. However, for most of the period analyzed in this paper, the submarine project was dormant. In 2008, during the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the submarine program was restructured through a cooperation agreement with France. Although behind schedule, the construction of one nuclear-powered submarine is underway. The estimated date for completion is 2028. See Martins Filho, “O projeto do submarino nuclear”; Mônica Herz, Layla Dawood, and Victor Coutinho Lage, “Brazilian Nuclear Policy during the Workers’ Party Years,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 5–6 (2016), pp. 559–73; Mônica Herz, Layla Dawood, and Victor Coutinho Lage, “A Nuclear Submarine in the South Atlantic: The Framing of Threats and Deterrence,” Contexto Internacional, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2017), pp. 329–50.

30 COPESP was created by Decree 93,439, of October 17, 1986. In 1995, its name changed to CTMSP. Currently, the center is responsible for the development of the Nuclear Program of the Brazilian Navy.

31 Estado de S. Paulo, “Sucesso, o segredo exclusivo de militar,” September 5, 1987, p. A1.

32 Different sources present different numbers for the expenditure of the jet-nozzle project. According to a 1986 report of the Brazilian Nuclear Program Evaluation Commission, the construction of the NUCLEI plant, in Resende, cost $280 million dollars. See Comissão de Avaliação do Programa Nuclear Brasileiro, Relatório ao Presidente da República, April 17, 1986, p. 22.

33 The civilians were: Abreu Sodré, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Jorge Bornhausen, Minister of Education; Almir Pazzianoto, Minister of Labor; Deni Schwartz, Minister of Urban Development; and Maílson da Nóbrega, Deputy Minister of Finance. The military representatives were: Henrique Sabóia, Minister of the navy; Octávio Júlio Moreira Lima, Minister of the Air Force; Ivan de Souza Mendes, Minister of the National Information Service (SNI); and Bayma Dennis, Minister of the Military Cabinet.

34 Folha de S. Paulo, “Decisão aumenta a importância de contra-almirante,” September 5, 1987.

35 Interview with Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva by Marly Motta, Matias Spektor, Tatiana Coutto, and Lucas Nascimento on October 13 and December 15, 2010, in Patti, O programa nuclear brasileiro.

36 Dalton Moreira, “Sabóia diz que a Marinha é o ‘pai da criança’,” Folha de S. Paulo, September 5, 1987.

37 Estado de S. Paulo, “Um elogio à rebeldia intransigente,” September 5, 1987.

38 Folha de S. Paulo, “Programa paralelo, a solução encontrada,” September 5, 1987.

39 Ibid.

40 In the original: “Tecnologia própria é independência.” See André Luis Ferreira Marques and Othon Pinheiro da Silva, “Enriquecimento de urânio no Brasil: Desenvolvimento da tecnologia por ultracentrifugação,” Economia & Energia, No. 54 (2006), <http://ecen.com/eee54/eee54p/enriquec_uranio_brasil.htm>.

41 Itty Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories,” Osiris, No. 21 (2006), pp. 49–65.

42 Although obsolete, the centrifuges purchased by Admiral Álvaro Alberto may have contributed to studies relating to isotope separation. In addition, there was the import of 200 kg of UF₆ from China and the acquisition of parts abroad for the composition of the machines. See Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” pp. 12–13.

43 Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories,” p. 58.

44 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, Senado, Brasília, 1988.

45 Folha de S. Paulo, “Collor vai lacrar o poço da Serra do Cachimbo,” September 18, 1990, p. A-7; Isto É Senhor, “Buraco lacrado,” September 1990, pp. 23–24.

46 Celso Castro and Maria Celina D’Araujo, “Introdução,” in Celso Castro and Maria Celina D’Araujo, eds., Militares e política na Nova República (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2001), p. 26.

47 Tânia Malheiros and Robson Pereira, “Uso de energia nuclear é reavaliado,” Estado de S. Paulo, 21 June, 1992.

48 Tânia Malheiros, “Maximiano da Fonseca critica fiscalização da AIEA,” Estado de S. Paulo, October 12, 1993.

49 Decreto, January 5, 1994. Authorizes INB to incorporate its subsidiaries NUCLEI, Urânio, and Nuclemon <www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret_sn/1994/decreto-42432-5-janeiro-1994-578837-publicacaooriginal-101704-pe.html>.

50 Decreto Legislativo No. 29, December 13, 1994.

51 Since 1962, the state has had a monopoly over nuclear minerals and materials in Brazil. Likewise, activities involving nuclear materials (research, mining, enrichment and reprocessing, industrialization, and trade) have been a state prerogative for several decades. These principles are also included in the 1988 Constitution.

52 Martins Filho, “O projeto do submarino nuclear,” p. 292.

53 Exposição de Motivos Interministerial n° 32, November 20, 1998.

54 Ibid.

55 INB, Contrato n.° 2/00/007, firmado com o CTMSP, July 11, 2000.

56 Ibid., clause 13.

57 Ibid., clauses 13 and 14.

58 Alfredo Tranjan Filho, “Disponibilidade do urânio, exploração, comercialização e sustentabilidade da geração nucleo-elétrica no Brasil,” slide presentation, 2008, <http://las-ans.org.br/pdf/2008/Institucional%20INB_junho%202008%20Alfredo%20Trajan.pdf>.

59 Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, “As inspeções nucleares no Brasil e o mictório público francês,” Economia & Energia, No. 44 (2004), <http://ecen.com/eee44/eee44p/inpecoes_nucleares_othon.htm>.

60 Ibid.

61 Gabrielle Kohlmeier, “Brazil May Permit Broader Inspections,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 5 (June 2004) <www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Brazil>.

62 Peter Slevin, “Brazil Shielding Uranium Facility; Nation Seeks to Keep Its Proprietary Data from U.N. Inspectors,” Washington Post, April 4, 2004, p. A01.

63 White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair–National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 11, 2004.

64 From a normative standpoint, the Brazilian position demands a balance between nonproliferation obligations and nuclear disarmament: absent progress concerning the disarmament of nuclear countries, Brazil will not accept additional instruments for nonproliferation. There is a practical concern that the Additional Protocol will expose the nuclear program to industrial espionage, as well as create more difficulties for the application of safeguards in the naval fuel cycle. Moreover, some say that the Additional Protocol would be incompatible with the bilateral verification system centered around ABACC. See Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), pp. 61–62.

65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Nota da Missão Permanente do Brasil junto à Organização dos Estados Americanos—Informações sobre o Programa Nuclear Brasileiro (CP12536),” April 6, 2004.

66 Ibid.

67 Augusto Botelho, statement delivered on March 25, 2004, Diário do Senado Federal, Brasília, March 26, 2004.

68 It should be noted that, in the previous year, 2003, Minister of Science and Technology Roberto Amaral stated during an interview that Brazil should seek to obtain all nuclear knowledge and know-how, including knowledge for the production of a nuclear device. After the malaise caused by the statement, the minister refuted it and said there had been a misunderstanding.

69 Marcelo Carneiro, “O grande mistério atômico,” Veja, October 20, 2004; Gary Milhollin and Liz Palmer, “Brazil’s Nuclear Puzzle,” Science, October 22, 2004.

70 David Fite and Sharon Squassoni, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 35, No. 8 (October 2005), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Brazil>.

71 Claire Applegarth, “Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 9, (November 2004), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Brazil>.

72 For more on the safeguards developed in that period, see Orpet Peixoto and Hugo Vicens, “Innovative Tools Applied to Enhanced Safeguards Approaches at Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities,” Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 2007, <www.abacc.org.br/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/06/INNOVATIVE-TOOLS-APPLIED-TO-ENHANCED-SAFEGUARDS-INMM-2007.pdf>.

73 Ricardo Balthazar, “Agência atômica examina condições para inspeções na planta de Resende,” Valor Econômico, October 19, 2004, <www.valor.com.br/arquivo/435503/agencia-atomica-examina-condicoes-para-inspecoes-na-planta-de-resende>.

74 According to one news account, Powell said, “I was waiting for someone to ask about the visas problem and no one talked about it, but I talked several times about the nuclear issue.” Estado de S. Paulo, “Powell se diz surpreso com pauta nuclear,” Estadão, October 5, 2004, <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,powell-se-diz-surpreso-com-pauta-nuclear,20041005p37879>.

75 Eurípedes Alcântara, “O mal é o terror: entrevista com Colin Powell,” Veja, October 13, 2004, p. 14.

76 Alexandre Mata Tortoriello, “Brasil não pode ser comparado ao Irã, diz Powell,” BBC Brasil, October 6, 2004, <www.bbc.com/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2004/10/041006_powell3rg.shtml>.

77 Applegarth, “Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection.”

78 CNEN, Relatório de gestão do exercício de 2014.

79 INB, Contrato n.° 2/00/007, firmado com o CTMSP, July 11, 2000. See also Ramona Ordoñez, “País produzirá urânio enriquecido,” O Globo, July 11, 2000, p. 8.

80 The information was obtained on January 10, 2017, via an online request filed at the Citizen Information System (E-SIC).

81 CNEN, Relatório de gestão do exercício de 2005.

82 Clarissa Thomé, “Brasil inaugura unidade para enriquecer urânio,” Estado de S. Paulo, June 5, 2006, p. A18.

83 INB, Relatório anual 2012.

84 INB, Relatório de gestão do exercício de 2015, <http://www.inb.gov.br/Portals/0/Arquivos/rel_gestao_2015.pdf>.

85 The information was obtained on July 8, 2016, via an online request filed at the Citizen Information System (E-SIC).

86 INB, Aditamento n°5 ao contrato INB n.° 2/00/007, November 20, 2008.

87 Empresa De Pesquisa Energética, “Plano Nacional de Energia 2030,” Rio de Janeiro, 2008.

88 Bernardo Mendes Barata, “INB avança no enriquecimento,” Brasil Nuclear, 2013, <www.aben.com.br/revista-brasil-nuclear/edicao-n-40/industria_1>.

89 Public Hearing of the Senate’s Committee on Science, Technology, Innovation, Communication and Information Technology, Brasília, October 25, 2007.

90 JFRJ, Sentença referente ao processo n° 0510926-86.2015.4.02.5101, Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 2016, <http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/desmembramentos/rio-de-janeiro/documentos/sentenca-radioatividade>.