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ABSTRACT
As the United States and North Korea pursue negotiations on a “denuclearization” agreement, the two countries should consider initiating cooperative measures as a way to build confidence and encourage finalization of a complete agreement. Based on lessons from the initial engagements carried out under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), initial cooperation should focus on safety and security, training, and infrastructure elimination. By offering to implement these initiatives now while negotiations are underway, the United States could gain additional insights into North Korean intentions. These early initiatives could be proposed without compromising the US maximum-pressure campaign on North Korea by using the current authorities of the CTR program and carefully designing specific exemptions that may be required for any agreed measures. If North Korea is truly interested in pursuing disarmament efforts, the initial cooperative projects would enable them to begin reaping potential benefits while negotiations continue with sanctions still in place. These initial proposals could also be expanded to include additional international partners such as Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan. Such programs and initiatives would support and supplement longer-term strategies to address North Korean weapons-of-mass-destruction challenges.
Notes
1 Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, “What to Do if the Talks with North Korea Succeed,” Washington Post, April 24, 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/were-all-preparing-for-the-trump-kim-summit-to-go-wrong-but-what-if-it-goes-right/2018/04/23/77ada258-472c-11e8-9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html?utm_term=.4d31d4dd91b6>.
2 Lynn Rusten and Richard Johnson with Steve Andreasen and Hayley Anne Severance, “Building Security through Cooperation: Report of the NTI Working Group on Cooperative Threat Reduction with North Korea,” NTI, June 2019, <www.nti.org/analysis/reports/building-security-through-cooperation-report-nti-working-group-cooperative-threat-reduction-north-korea/>.
3 Ibid., p. 2.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
6 The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018. <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.
7 See Jeffery Lewis, “The Word that Could Help the World Avoid Nuclear War,” New York Times, April 4, 2018, <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/opinion/avoid-nuclear-war-denuclearization.html>.
8 Rusten and Johnson, “Building Security through Cooperation,” p. 3.
9 Adam Mount and Andrea Berger, “Report of the International Study Group on North Korea Policy,” Federation of American Scientists, 2019, p. 1, <https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/FAS-DPRK-SG.pdf>.
10 Joseph P. Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence: Eliminating and Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 2014, p. 48.
11 Ibid., p. 49.
12 Ibid., p. 50.
13 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Sees End to North Korea Nuclear Threat despite Unclear Path,” New York Times, June 13, 2018, <www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/politics/trump-north-korea-denuclearization.html>.
14 See “Lessons Learned for North Korea,” in Rusten and Johnson, “Building Security through Cooperation,”, pp. 25–26.
15 See the author’s description of the early bilateral meetings in Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” pp. 77–78.
16 The first shipment was transferred by MAJ Rich Lally and the second by the author in July 1992, nearly a year after the first legislation was passed and the first agreements were signed. See also, “Defense’s Nuclear Agency 1947–97,” DTRA, 2002, p. 300.
17 Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” pp. 75–76.
18 Ibid., p. 53.
19 The NTI’s Security Index scores North Korean emergency-response capabilities as a 3 out of 3, as part of a layered security system to enable recovery of stolen materials, but this index does not address emergency-response safety measures.
20 Timothy W. Martin, “U.S. Officer on a Pink Phone Dials Down North Korea Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2019, <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officer-on-a-pink-phone-dials-down-north-korea-tensions-11558287392>.
21 Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” p. 55.
22 Richard Sokolsky and Yuri Lee, “North Korean Defense Conversion: New Opportunities for Inter-Korean Cooperation?” 38 North Project, April 2019, <www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/38-North-SR-1904-Sokolsky_Demilitarization-III_NK-Defense-Conversion.pdf>.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 National Committee on North Korea, “Kim Jong Un's 2019 New Year Address,” January 1, 2019, <www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf/file_view>.
25 Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” p. 84.
26 Ibid., p. 85.
27 See the International Science and Technology Center website at <www.istc.int/>.
28 Joshua H. Pollack and Scott LaFoy, “North Korea’s International Scientific Collaborations: Their Scope, Scale, and Potential Dual-Use and Military Significance,” Occasional Paper #43, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 19, 2018, <www.nonproliferation.org/op43-north-koreas-international-scientific-collaborations-their-scope-scale-and-potential-dual-use-and-military-significance/>.
29 For a more extensive review of the initial CTR efforts in Belarus, see Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” pp. 41–61.
30 For a more extensive review of the initial CTR efforts in Ukraine, see Ibid., pp. 101–29.
31 For a more extensive review of the initial CTR efforts in Kazakhstan, see Harahan, “Ibid.,” pp. 183–219.
32 See, for example, Defense Intelligence Agency, “North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength,” October 1991, <https://fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_toc.html>.
33 Benjamin Haas and Julian Borger, “North Korea ‘Destroys’ Nuclear Test Site as World’s Media Watches,” The Guardian, May 24, 2018, <www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/24/north-korea-destroys-nuclear-test-site-as-worlds-media-watches>.
34 Rusten and Johnson, “Building Security through Cooperation,” p. 48.
35 The first strategic offensive arms elimination agreements were negotiated in 1993–94, more than a year after the first agreements and projects were initiated in 1991–92. See Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” pp. 86–87.
36 Eric Beech, “North Korea’s Kim Not Ready to Denuclearize: U.S. Intelligence Agency Chief,” Reuters, June 24, 2019, <www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-northkorea-intelligence/north-koreas-kim-not-ready-to-denuclearize-us-intelligence-agency-chief-idUSKCN1TP2PA?>.
37 See several perspectives in Simon Denyer and Min Joo Kim, “North Korean Leader Says He’s Ready to Denuclearize but Warns U.S. Not to Misjudge His Patience,” Washington Post, January 1, 2019, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-koreas-kim-ready-to-meet-trump-but-warns-us-not-to-misjudge-patience/2018/12/31/bb0b7348-0d62-11e9-92b8-6dd99e2d80e1_story.html>.
38 Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” p. 361.
39 See Raymond A. Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger, Biosecurity in Putin’s Russia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2018), <www.rienner.com/uploads/5a32ffbd8e180.pdf>.
40 See Michael R. Pompeo, “On the Outcome of Summit Meeting between President Moon and Chairman Kim,” press statement, US Department of State, September 19, 2018, <www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/09/286039.htm>.
41 See the chapter on legal authorities and impediments in Rusten and Johnson, “Building Security through Cooperation,” pp. 30–31.
42 Ibid.
43 For a thorough description of the original CTR umbrella agreement negotiations see Susan Koch, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Negotiations: Lessons Learned,” in Strengthening US-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), pp. 42–43.
44 Video of the interview is available at <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/12/2019-carnegie-international-nuclear-policy-conference-event-6838>.
45 Josh Rogin “The Only Diplomatic Way Forward with North Korea,” Washington Post, July 5, 2019, p. A15.
46 Rusten and Johnson, “Building Security through Cooperation,” p. 26.
47 Denyer and Kim, “North Korean Leader Says He’s Ready.”
48 See Harahan, “With Courage and Persistence,” pp. 265–303.
49 For a discussion on the need to use North Korean scientists to assist with denuclearization efforts see Rusten and Johnson, “Building Security through Cooperation,” p. 28.
50 China Atomic Energy Authority, “China-U.S. Nuclear Security Cooperation Energizes New Type of Major-Country Ties,” April 4, 2016, <www.caea.gov.cn/english/n6759373/n6759493/c6793388/content.html>.
51 “Promising to brief the Chinese and US leadership about his talks, Putin said he thought a deal on Pyongyang's nuclear program was possible and that the way to get there was to move forward step-by-step in order to build trust.” Reuters, “Putin Says U.S. Security Guarantees Unlikely to Prompt North Korea to De-Nuclearize,” April 25, 2019, <www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-russia/putin-says-u-s-guarantees-unlikely-to-prompt-north-korea-to-de-nuclearize-idUSKCN1S02TP>.
52 Amie Ferris-Rotman, and Simon Denyer, “Putin Urges Multilateral Approach to North Korea,” Washington Post, April 26, 2019, p. A9.
53 Reuters, “Russia Calls for U.S. Dialogue with North Korea to Continue: RIA,” March 15, 2019, <www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-russia/russia-calls-for-us-dialogue-with-north-korea-to-continue-ria-idUSKCN1QW1M0>.
54 For more on Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s discussions with President Trump on North Korea, see Josh Rogin, “Trump’s Version of ‘Strategic Patience’,” Washington Post, April 26, 2019, p. A17.
55 Richard G. Lugar, “WMD Elimination Lessons Learned,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 1–2 (2016), pp. 25–29.
56 For a summary review of the failure of previous efforts to work together, see Brian Barrett, “All the Times North Korea Promised to Denuclearize,” Wired, June 12, 2018, <www.wired.com/story/north-korea-summit-denuclearize-history/>.
57 Eric Beech, “North Korea’s Kim Not Ready to Denuclearize.”
58 Nunn and Lugar, “What to Do if the Talks with North Korea Succeed.”