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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the drivers of US–Russian cooperation in the disarmament of Syria’s declared chemical weapons (CW) in 2013–14, emphasizing the primary importance of credible coercion vis-à-vis the Syrian government. It identifies additional significant drivers—including the resonance of institutional memory of cooperation through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs; continued interest alignment for Russia through consensus on a hybrid disarmament framework; and constructive relationships among senior officials on both sides—while also showing the relevance of Russian sensitivities to status, the prospects of a new round of Syria peace talks planned at the time (“Geneva II”), and expectations of positive “spillover” from narrow cooperation on Syrian CW into other areas of US–Russian relations. The article further traces and explains the unravelling of internal consensus within the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the Syrian CW file between 2014 and the present day, analyzing growing frictions over the Fact-Finding Mission, the Joint Investigative Mechanism, and the Investigation and Identification Team. Disagreements within the OPCW over these issues became increasingly viewed as inextricably linked to the broader geopolitical Russia–West confrontation. Finally, the article probes the resultant implications for prospects of universalizing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and making progress toward a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East.
Notes
1 The first part of the article, which summarizes the joint US–Russian efforts to demilitarize Syria’s declared chemical weapons in 2013–14, draws heavily on Chapter 5 of the author’s doctoral thesis: Hanna Notte, “Russian–American Cooperation in the Middle East: An Analysis of Moscow’s Interests, Leverage, and Strategies of Linkage,” PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2017.
2 Beyond implications for the MEWMDFZ effort, the Syria CW episode also has repercussions for efforts to eliminate WMD more broadly (bilaterally and multilaterally), but these go beyond the scope of this article. Similarly, while tracing and explaining the erosion of internal OPCW consensus over the Syrian CW file from 2014 until the present day, as well as addressing the institutional and political fallout from this erosion, the article does not claim to answer a principal question: Why has deterrence of CW use in Syria failed repeatedly since 2014? To address this question comprehensively would require assessing not only the credibility of coercive threats to Syria under both the Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump administrations, but also the Syrian government’s domestic calculus and regime-survival considerations, the calculus of armed actors on the ground, and the role of assurances provided by external actors involved in the Syrian crisis. Wyn Bowen, Jeffrey Knopf, and Matthew Moran, “Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence and the Limits of the ‘Resolve Plus Bombs’ Formula,” unpublished manuscript prepared for a workshop entitled “Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons,” March 13, 2019, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, DC; Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend, “Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria,” Global Public Policy Institute, February 17, 2019, <www.gppi.net/2019/02/17/the-logic-of-chemical-weapons-use-in-syria>. For a broader analysis of how, beyond Syria, today’s shifting security environment challenges the ways in which norms, taboos, denial of benefit, and deterrence restrain CW use and proliferation, see Rebecca Hersman and Suzanne Claeys, “Rigid Structures, Evolving Threat: Preventing the Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons,” CSIS, December 18, 2019, <www.csis.org/analysis/rigid-structures-evolving-threat-preventing-proliferation-and-use-chemical-weapons>.
3 William C. Potter and Sarah Bidgood, eds., Once and Future Partners: The US, Russia, and Nuclear Non-proliferation (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 21.
4 Interviews with Russian sources were conducted in 2015–16, in March 2019, and in June 2019, all in Moscow. Interviews with US, OPCW, and UN sources were conducted in 2015–16, in Washington, DC, and Beirut and via phone. All Russian, OPCW, and UN sources preferred to speak without attribution. As a result, only US sources are occasionally named in this article.
5 Since Syria was not yet a signatory to the CWC at that time, the investigation was launched under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism. That mechanism originated with UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/37C (November 30, 1987), which requests the secretary-general to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any member state concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.
6 Remarks by the president to the White House Press Corps, August 12, 2012, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>. The US administration issued multiple versions of a red-line threat at the time, including private warnings to the Syrian government in July 2012 and remarks by President Obama at a veterans’ conference on July 23, 2012. See Bowen et al., “Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence and the Limits of the ‘Resolve Plus Bombs’ Formula.”
7 Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, September 14, 2013, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm>.
8 UNSCR 2118, S/RES/2118, September 27, 2013, <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf>; OPCW Executive Council Decision on the Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, September 27, 2013, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf>.
9 For details on the maritime operation: Philipp C. Bleek and Nicholas J. Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Implications for Addressing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 1–2 (2016), pp. 197–230.
10 Russia also sent over 130 armoured Ural Kamaz trucks and BTR-80 personnel carriers along with other equipment (kitchen trucks, tents, etc.) for the removal operation: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons,” April 23, 2018, <www.mid.ru/organizacia-po-zapreseniu-himiceskogo-oruzia/-/asset_publisher/km9HkaXMTium/content/id/3185750?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_km9HkaXMTium&_101_INSTANCE_km9HkaXMTium_languageId=en_GB>. The full extent and nature of Russian involvement beyond, such as technical advice provided to the Syrian government, or the provision of dual-use assets that other Joint Mission participants were unwilling to provide, remain unknown. The bulk of financial support for the demilitarization effort came from the United States.
11 Rose Gottemoeller, under secretary of state for arms control and international security (2012–16), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 27, 2016.
12 Former Russian official (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, April 12, 2016.
13 Sergey Ryabkov, speech at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference 2014, November 21, 2014, <http://ceness-russia.org/eng/conf2014/materials/1059/>.
14 Igor Ivanov, “Oshibka na oshibke” [Mistake after mistake], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 2, 2013, <https://rg.ru/2013/09/01/agressia-poln.html>.
15 Sergey Shoigu, “Interview with Russian TV Channel Rossiya 24” (in Russian), August 15, 2016, <www.vesti.ru/videos/show/vid/688903/cid/5/#>.
16 Vladimir Putin, “Russia in a Changing World” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 27, 2012, <https://rg.ru/2012/02/27/putin-politika.html>.
17 The above section relies upon interviews with multiple Russian experts and officials in Moscow, conducted in 2015–16.
18 Russian diplomat (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, October 20, 2016.
19 According to several reports, Syria first publicly admitted its possession of chemical weapons in July 2012. Karim Makdisi and Coralle P. Hindawi, “Creative Diplomacy amidst a Brutal Conflict: Analyzing the OPCW–UN Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme,” Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, September 2016.
20 “Interview with G. M. Gatilov,” Associated Press, August 24, 2012, <www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/146022>.
21 Sputnik, “Syrian Chemical Weapons Under Control—FM Lavrov,” February 2, 2013, <https://sputniknews.com/russia/20130202179187200-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Under-Control-FM-Lavrov/>.
22 “Sergey V. Lavrov with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan Nasser Judeh,” November 6, 2012, <www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/jo/-/asset_publisher/bjowS9H8QFIj/content/id/136130>.
23 Bleek and Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”
24 Rebecca Hersman, deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction (2009–15), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 29, 2016.
25 Russian diplomats (names withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, March 5, 2019. One noted that the Assad government “had a gun to its head.”
26 Russian diplomat (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, October 5, 2016.
27 Robert Einhorn, “Prospects for US–Russian Non-proliferation Cooperation,” Brookings, February 2016. On lab-to-lab cooperation between US and Russian scientists towards these objectives, see Siegfried S. Hecker, ed., Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers (Los Alamos, NM: Bathtub Row Press, 2016).
28 The CTR effort shifted from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union to a broader program seeking to keep WMD away from rogue proliferators. It also grew from a Department of Defense (DOD)-centred effort to include projects funded by the State Department, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Homeland Security. Mary B.D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 2014, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf>.
29 For a comprehensive history of the American and Soviet Union’s chemical weapons programs, see “The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)—Fact Sheets,” <www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/chemical/>.
30 Nikitin and Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction.”
31 For further background on these exchanges, see Bleek and Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” In parallel to these exchanges, a strategic integration group was set up at the Pentagon in January 2013 to work on the technical requirements of a prospective Syria CW removal and destruction operation.
32 Former defense official in the US government (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, by phone, July 2016.
33 Nikitin and Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction.”
34 Patrick Terrell, deputy director, CBRN Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2010–15), personal interview with the author via Skype, July 21, 2016.
35 Multiple US sources who directly participated in, or had intimate knowledge of, the bilateral exchanges, personal interviews with the author, Washington, DC and via phone, summer 2016.
36 On most issues in the negotiations, consensus was reached quickly, except regarding the time schedules for removal and destruction, the invocation of Chapter 7 in Resolution 2118, and the question of whether Syrian production facilities could be converted into aircraft hangers.
37 Multiple US sources who directly participated in, or had intimate knowledge of, the bilateral exchanges, personal interviews with the author, Washington, DC and via phone, summer 2016.
38 Gottemoeller, June 27, 2016.
39 Bleek and Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons.”
40 William J. Burns, deputy secretary of state (2011–14), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 29, 2016.
41 Karim Makdisi and Coralle P. Hindawi, “The Syrian Chemical Weapons Disarmament Process in Context: Narratives of Coercion, Consent, and Everything in Between,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 8 (2017), p. 1697.
42 As per UNSCR 2118, the Security Council “decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”
43 Elizabeth A. Jones, acting assistant secretary of state for the Near East (2012–14), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 21, 2016.
44 Sergey Lavrov, “Remarks at UN National Security Council, 7038th Meeting,” September 27, 2013 (emphasis added), <www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm>.
45 Further to paragraph 9 of UNSCR 2118, in which the Council called on the Syrian government to conclude modality agreements with the UN and OPCW, the latter on October 16, 2013, jointly proposed a draft tripartite Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA) to the Syrian government.
46 The Syrian government’s insistence on consent in disarmament—successful given the backing of Russia—is noteworthy, since post-Cold-War approaches by the international community to disarmament have been largely coercive: in Iraq in the 1990s leading up to 2003; in Libya after 2003; and vis-à-vis Iran. For a nuanced discussion on the coercive versus consensual dimensions of these disarmament processes, see Makdisi and Hindawi, “The Syrian Chemical Weapons Disarmament Process in Context.”
47 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, October 8, 2013, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/10/215200.htm>.
48 “Sergey Lavrov to a Mass Media Question,” September 2, 2013, <http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/4d7aaab2ce01eaff44257be600233995!OpenDocument>.
49 “S.V. Lavrov at the Opening of the International Conference on Syria,” January 22, 2014, <www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/79666>.
50 Hersman, June 29, 2016.
51 Source from the Joint Mission (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Beirut, September 14, 2016.
52 The OPCW marked the completion of destruction of the Russian CW stockpile in October 2017. The United States’ destruction process remains ongoing.
53 “Report: UNODA and OPCW, Workshop on the Lessons Learned from the International Maritime Operation to Remove and Transport the Syrian Chemical Materials in Furtherance of Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and Relevant OPCW Executive Council Decisions,” OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, March 9–11, 2015; “Operation RECSYR—Lessons Learned: A Norwegian Perspective.” None of these documents is in the public domain; they were kindly sent to the author by officials interviewed.
54 Danish and Norwegian officials (names withheld by request), personal interviews with the author, conducted by phone, July and August 2016. Notwithstanding the largely successful de-linkage, one way in which bilateral frictions did shape cooperation was regarding the prospects for a joint NATO–Russia mission in the maritime operation. In early 2014, as the United States was putting together the security envelope for the Cape Ray, there were consultations as to whether Russia could participate under the auspices of a NATO–Russia mission. While NATO did not consider the Russian element to be substantively necessary, it was intended to be a symbolic gesture of wanting to pursue cooperation. However, following events in Crimea, NATO walked away from the project, which left the Russian side disappointed, according to US officials interviewed.
55 Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
56 Ibid., p. 246.
57 The Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act was adopted as a response to the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Russian prison. Magnitsky had uncovered large-scale embezzlement on the part of Russian law-enforcement and tax-collection officials. It was alleged that he had been denied medical care and tortured. The bill specified that individuals connected to Sergey Magnitsky’s death should be placed on a visa-ban list and their assets in the United States frozen. Ibid., p. 252.
58 Statement by the White House Press Secretary, August 7, 2013, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/07/statement-press-secretary-president-s-travel-russia>.
59 Robert Legvold, Return to Cold War (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2016).
60 Russian expert (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, April 21, 2016.
61 “Sergey Lavrov during His Joint Press Conference with John Kerry,” September 14, 2013, <http://rusemb.org.uk/foreignpolicy/1295>.
62 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Poimali na slove” [They took him at his word], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 11, 2013, <https://rg.ru/2013/09/11/lukyanov.html>.
63 Russian expert (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, April 4, 2016.
64 Celeste Wallander, Special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council (2012–17), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016.
65 Multiple Russian sources (names withheld by request), personal interviews with the author, Moscow, September 2016.
66 Izvestia, “My—chempiony mira” [We are the champions of peace], October 30, 2013, <http://izvestia.ru/news/559838>.
67 US source (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 5, 2016.
68 Jones, June 21, 2016.
69 Michael McFaul, US ambassador to Russia (2012–14), personal interview with the author, via Skype, August 29 and September 26, 2016.
70 US source (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 29, 2016.
71 Russian source (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, October 20, 2016.
72 “Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons,” 2018.
73 Alexander Shulgin, “Vystupleniya i otvety na voprosy uchastnikov press-konferentsii ‘Kto zhe ispol'zuet khimicheskoe oruzhie v Sirii?’, organizovannoy Postoyannym predstavitel'stvom Rossii pri OZKHO” [Presentation and answers to participants’ questions at the press conference “Who Uses Chemical Weapons in Syria?,” organised by Russia’s permanent representative to the OPCW], The Hague, July 12, 2019, <www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3721609>; Sergey Lavrov, “Remarks at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference on Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation in Arms Control and Nonproliferation in the Context of Changes in the Global Security Architecture,” November 8, 2019, <www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3891674?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB>.
74 UNSCR 2235, S/RES/2235 (2015), August 7, 2015, <https://undocs.org/S/RES/2235(2015)>.
75 Aron Lund, “Mission Impossible? Investigating the Khan Sheikhoun Nerve Gas Attack in Syria,” Century Foundation, July 25, 2017.
76 The JIM issued seven reports in total, which have found both the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces responsible for CW use in various instances.
77 Anton Utkin, “The End of OPCW–UN Mechanism. What Stands Behind the Russian ‘No’?” Russian International Affairs Council, June 20, 2018.
78 Russian International Affairs Council, “Chemical Weapons in Syria: Russia's Position and the New US Accusations,” roundtable, February 7, 2018, video, <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/news/riac-chemical-weapons-in-syria-russia-s-position-and-the-new-us-accusations/>.
79 Russian diplomats (names withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, June 28, 2019.
80 Lavrov, “Remarks at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference.”
81 Former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were targeted with the nerve agent Novichok in Salisbury, UK in March 2018. Skripal and his daughter recovered after intensive care in hospital. A UK investigation blamed Russian agents for the Novichok attack, identifying two suspects using the names Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov. Both deny any involvement. Russian officials interviewed in 2019 have also emphasized the United States’ delay in disarming its own CW stockpile as an additional grievance.
82 Maxim Grigoriev, “Organizatsiya Belyie Kaski: Posobniki Terroristov i Istochniki Dezinformatsii” [The White Helmets: terrorist enablers and sources of disinformation], Foundation for the Study of Democracy, 2019 (in Russian) <https://cloud.mail.ru/public/2fHo/oHNqTM6eP>.
83 Yet, more recently, Maxim Grigoriev spoke alongside Alexander Shulgin at a press conference in The Hague following the conclusion of the Ninety First Session of the OPCW Executive Council, sharing his latest investigations into the April 2018 Douma CW attack.
84 For further background on the Douma report controversy, see Brian Whitaker, “The Douma Chemical Weapons Investigation and the Role of Ian Henderson,” Medium, January 2, 2020, <https://medium.com/@Brian_Whit/the-douma-chemical-weapons-investigation-and-the-role-of-ian-henderson-ab44399a9070>. For a Russian analysis, see Marianna Belenkaya, “S khlorom chto-to nakhimichili—WikiLeaks ne nashel khimoruzhiya v Dume” [The chlorine was tampered with—WikiLeaks did not find chemical weapons in Duma], Kommersant, December 16, 2019, <www.kommersant.ru/doc/4196356>. “Arria-Formula” meetings are informal, confidential gatherings that enable interested Security Council members to have a frank and private exchange of views, within a flexible procedural framework, with persons whom the inviting members of the Council believe it would be beneficial to hear and/or to whom they may wish to convey a message.
85 See “Security Council Members Voice Concern over Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, Call for Development of New Investigative Mechanism,” UN Security Council Meetings Coverage, SC/13174, January 23, 2018 <www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13174.doc.htm>. Russia’s draft resolution, which was first introduced in the Council on November 16, 2017, received favourable votes only from Bolivia, China, Kazakhstan, and Russia. For the full text see “Plurinational State of Bolivia: Draft Resolution,” S/2017/968, November 16, 2017, <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_968.pdf>.
86 Utkin, “The End of OPCW—UN mechanism.”
87 The IIT was established by the OPCW Conference of the State Parties at the Fourth Special Session with Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated June 27, 2018). Full text: <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-SS-4/en/css4dec3_e_.doc.pdf>.
88 The most recent expression of this position came in Alexander Shulgin’s remarks at the Ninety-Second Session of the OPCW Executive Council, The Hague, on October 8, 2019, in which he also bemoaned that the IIT was operating in a “non-transparent” way and “almost autonomously and outside the control of this governing body.”
89 Tass, “OPCW’s Attributive Mechanism Directed against Russia—Diplomat,” October 13, 2018, <https://tass.com/world/1025813>.
90 The OPCW’s “Declaration Assessment Team” (DAT) continues to engage the Syrian government on the accuracy and completeness of its initial declarations. In addition, the OPCW has conducted a “Structured Dialogue” with the Syrian government on this and other issues since October 2018. Challenge inspections can be conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article IX of the CWC.
91 For an analysis of the potential risks of the IIT, based on the United Kingdom’s June 2018 proposal, see Oliver Meier and Ralf Trapp, “Playing Politics with Chemical Weapons? The UK’s Initiative on Chemical Weapons Accountability,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/06/playing-politics-with-chemical-weapons-the-uks-initiative-on-chemical-weapons-accountability/>.
92 OPCW, “OPCW Releases First Report by Investigation and Identification Team,” April 8, 2020, News Release, <www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-report-investigation-and-identification-team>.
93 Tass, “Postpredstvo RF: doklad sledovatelei OZKhO po intsidentam v Sirii ne vyzyvaet doveriya” [Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation: The report of the OPCW investigators on incidents in Syria is not credible], April 8, 2020, <https://tass.ru/politika/8193985>; Tass, “Zakharova: vyvody doklada OZKhO po atakam v Sirii v 2017 godu sostavleny po zakazu Zapada” [Zakharova: The conclusions of the OPCW report on attacks in Syria in 2017 were compiled by order of the West), April 9, 2020, <https://tass.ru/politika/8206123>.
94 Russian Federation, “On Measures to Prevent Chemical Terrorism,” OPCW Review Conference 4th Session, RC-4/NAT.75, November 30, 2018, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/04/rc4nat75%28e%29.pdf>; Statement by H.E. Ambassador Alexander Shulgin, permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the OPCW, 92nd Session of the OPCW Executive Council, October 8, 2019, <www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3844035?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB>.
95 General Assembly, First Committee, 74th Session, 23rd Meeting, “Approving 3 Drafts, Disarmament Committee Addresses Chemical, Biological Weapons Treaties, How Best to Keep Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction,” November 4, 2019, <www.un.org/press/en/2019/gadis3641.doc.htm>.
96 Aside from conducting off-the-record interviews in Moscow in March and June 2019, the author also participated in a number of closed workshops and conferences dedicated to the Syrian CW issue, held in Washington, DC and Vienna in 2019, at which the legacy of the Syria CW episode was debated. For two competing assessments, see Derek Chollet, “Obama’s Red Line, Revisited,” Politico, July 19, 2016; Business Insider, “Top Obama Administration Officials Admit Deal to Remove Chemical Weapons from Syria Failed,” April 10, 2017, <www.businessinsider.de/obama-2013-chemical-weapon-deal-failure-syria-2017-4?r=US&IR=T>.
97 Emphasis added. The Russian government has argued that changes in and additions to the initial declarations to the OPCW are a routine practice that many CWC member states have made use of.
98 Former Russian arms-control official (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, March 5, 2019. According to that official, the focus on verifying the “completeness” rather than “accuracy” of Syria’s initial declarations violates Part IV of the CWC, Article 37.
99 Russian diplomat (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, March 5, 2019.
100 Russian diplomats (names withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, June 28, 2019.
101 Tass, “Russia Initiates UNSC Draft Resolution Calling for Restoring Cooperation within OPCW,” May 17, 2019, <https://tass.com/world/1058699>; “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Opening Remarks at a Meeting with OPCW Technical Secretariat Director-General Fernando Arias Gonzalez,” April 2, 2019, <www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3597785?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB>.
102 OPCW, “Conference of the States Parties Adopts Decisions to Amend Chemical Weapons Convention Annex,” November 27, 2019 <www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2019/11/conference-states-parties-adopts-decisions-amend-chemical-weapons>.
103 Stefano Constanzi and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Updating the CWC: How We Got Here and What Is Next,” Arms Control Today, April 2020, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/features/updating-cwc-we-got-here-what-next>.
104 Jacob Greene, “Rethinking a WMD-Free Middle East: Start with Chemical Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2013.
105 60th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Dialogue, Disarmament and Regional and Global Security, Istanbul, November 1–5, 2013: Working Group 7, Report: “From CW Disarmament in Syria to a Middle East Free from CW,” <https://pugwashconferences.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/201311_istanbul_wg7_report.pdf>.
106 Russian diplomats (names withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, June 28, 2019.
107 Russian diplomat (name withheld by request), personal interview with the author, Moscow, March 5, 2019.
108 Nikki Haley, remarks, Emergency UNSC Briefing on Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, April 9, 2018.
109 Hersman and Claeys, “Rigid Structures, Evolving Threat”; Jack O. Nassetta and Ethan P. Fecht, “All the World Is Staged: An Analysis of Social Media Influence Operations against US Counterproliferation Efforts in Syria,” CNS Occasional Paper No. 37, September 2018, </www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/op37-all-the-world-is-staged.pdf>.
110 CNA, “Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options after New START,” March 2019, <www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2019-U-019494.pdf>.
111 “Establishing Regional Conditions Conducive to a Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems,” Working paper by the United States, available in NPT Briefing Book (2019 Edn) King's College London and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies <www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/npt-briefing-book-2019-full.pdf>.
112 In this context, mere dialogue is not sufficient for the preservation of institutional memory. In a recent opinion piece, Rose Gottemoeller warns that, though enough of a “residual relationship” among US, European, and Russian arms control practitioners continues to exist, “we should be concerned … that they may revert to the talk shops of the Cold War, with few opportunities to work together on practical projects.” Rose Gottemoeller, “Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean for the Rest of Us?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 29, 2020. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/29/russia-is-updating-their-nuclear-weapons-what-does-that-mean-for-rest-of-us-pub-80895>.
113 Hecker, Doomed to Cooperate.