The Smiling Buddha effect: Canadian and US policy after India's 1974 nuclear test

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced a serious threat only a few years after it came into force in 1970. India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) in May 1974 rocked the nuclear-nonproliferation regime and cast doubt on the prospects of the NPT. Yet during the two years following the PNE, several significant countries ratified the treaty. Why did states that had been notable holdouts, like Italy, Japan, and South Korea, ratify the treaty soon after the Indian nuclear test? This article finds that the PNE galvanized pro-NPT forces in the United States and Canada, leading to changes in nonproliferation policy. In particular, it led them to threaten to withhold access to nuclear technology and materials unless the holdouts ratified the NPT. It also motivated Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to change his secret advice to Japan that the United States did not want Japan to ratify the NPT in order to keep the People’s Republic of China unsure about Japan’s nuclear intentions.

KEYWORDS:

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• nonproliferation
• history
• ratification
• diplomacy
• Canada
• Italy
• Japan
• South Korea

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a fellowship from the Stanton Foundation, a Franklin Grant from the American Philosophical Society, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT’s) Security Studies Program. I would like to thank James Cameron, Owen Cote, Fiona Cunningham, Hassan Elbahtimy, Jennifer Erickson, Mayumi Fukushima, Eliza Gheorghe, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Liviu Horovitz, Se Young Jang, Ulrich Kuehn, Zoe Levornik, Julia Macdonald, Timothy McDonnell, Nick Miller, Steve Miller, Vipin Narang, Rachel Odell, Reid Pauly, Benoît Pelopidas, Or Rabinowitz, Jay Sarkar, Scott Sagan, and Nina Tannenwald.

Notes

1 Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science, No. 14 (2011), p. 227. See also Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan Lupu, “Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2016), pp. 530–39.

2 Sagan, “Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” p. 239. The last decade has seen much more attention to this issue, including work cited below as well as Jo-Ansie Van Wyk and Anna-Mart Van Wyk. “From the Nuclear Laager to the Non-proliferation Club: South Africa and the NPT”, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2015), pp. 32–46; Robin Möser, ““The Major Prize”: Apartheid South Africa’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1988–91,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26, Nos. 5–6 (2019), pp. 559–73; Anuar Ayazbekov, “Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2014), pp. 149–68; Mariana Budjeryn, “The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Nuclear Disarmement of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, 1990–1994,” PhD diss., Central European University, 2016; Matias Spektor, “The Evolution of Brazil's Nuclear Intentions,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 5–6 (2016), pp. 635–52.

3 The test was supposedly initially code-named Smiling Buddha by Indian nuclear scientists. See George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), for an account of the Indian nuclear program.

4 “Memorandum of Conversation [Energy; North Sea Oil; Foreign Assistance; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; CSCE; Trade Bill,” July 7, 1974, Wilson Center Digital Archive [WCDA], <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119774>.

5 Andrew J. Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 77, No. 4 (2015), pp. 983–97; Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Dane Swango, “The United States and the Role of Nuclear Co-operation and Assistance in the Design of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 210–29; Daniel Verdier, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2008), pp. 439–76; Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar, “Leaders and Laggards: When and Why Do Countries Sign the NPT?” Research Group in International Security Working Paper 16, McGill University.

6 Or Rabinowitz and Jayita Sarkar, “‘It Isn’t Over until the Fuel Cell Sings’: A Reassessment of US and French Pledges of Nuclear Assistance in the 1970s,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, Nos. 1–2 (2018) pp. 1–26, argues for transformative shifts in the nonproliferation regime in the wake of the Indian test but does not focus on the NPT. Similarly, Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2018), on nuclear dominoes and the effect of the Indian nuclear test on US nonproliferation policy, ignores the issue of NPT ratification.

7 Just one recent example is UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the 2015 NPT Review Conference: <www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3551.doc.htm>. See also Way and Sasikumar, Leaders and Laggards, p. 1.

8 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, <www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>.

9 Verdier, Multilateralism, p. 443; Coe and Vaynman, Collusion, p. 992.

10 Way and Sasikumar, Leaders and Laggards, p. 4.

11 Coe and Vaynman, Collusion, do mention a change in nonproliferation preferences in the 1960s.

12 Swango, The United States and the Role of Nuclear Cooperation, p. 224.

13 Ibid.

14 Matthew Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 181–208.

15 Samuel J. Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2001), p. 235.

16 James Cameron and Or Rabinowitz, “Eight Lost Years? Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6 (2016), p. 14.

17 Including Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999); Seung-Young Kim, “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2001), pp. 53–80; Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2018); Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” International Organization, Vol. 68, No. 4 (2014), pp. 913–44; Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2018); Thazha Varkey Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press 2000); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press 2007); Verdier, Multilateralism; Way and Sasikumar, Leaders and Laggards.

18 “Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document No. 64, January 21, 1965, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d64>.

19 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2012), p. 99.

20 Hal Brands, “Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and US National Security Policy,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2006), pp. 104, 107, original emphasis.

21 Isabelle Anstey, “Negotiating Nuclear Control: The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group in the 1970s,” International History Review, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2018), pp. 975–95; Malcolm M. Craig, America, Britain and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme, 1974–1980: A Dream of Nightmare Proportions (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017); Miller, Stopping the Bomb; Rabinowtiz and Sarkar, Fuel Cell Sings, Jayita Sarkar, “U.S. Policy to Curb West European Nuclear Exports 1974–1978,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2019), pp. 110–49; Peter Tzeng, “Nuclear Leverage: US Intervention in Sensitive Technology Transfers in the 1970s,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013), pp. 473–92.

22 Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, p. 117.

23 Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, January 29, 1969, Nixon–Ford Administrations, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–76, Vol. E-2, doc. 5.

24 NSDM 6, February 5, 1969, Nixon–Ford Administrations, FRUS, 1969–76, Vol. E-2, doc. 8.

25 National Security Study Memorandum [NSSM] 202, May 23, 1974, Nixon–Ford Administrations, FRUS, 1969–76, Vol. E-14, doc. 50.

26 Ibid.

27 Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meeting [SASM], July 12, 1974, 4.05 p.m., NARA, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–77, Box 4 [Transcripts]. Another initiative included here was a Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) to coordinate supplier-state policy toward further restricting access to nuclear technology. One interpretation is that the NSG was aimed at suppliers and the NPT ratification efforts were aimed at recipients of nuclear technology.

28 Department of State Memorandum for Major General Brent Scowcroft, White House, Briefing Paper on Non-Proliferation, August 21, 1974, RG 59, PPC [Policy Planning Council, Winston Lord's Papers], Box 349.

29 George Springsteen, “Transcript, Under Secretary Sisco’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting, Friday, 21 June 1974,” in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 467, Document 3, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb467/docs/doc%203%20Sisco.pdf>.

30 Craig, America, Britain, and Pakistan, p. 24

31 William Burr, “A Scheme of ‘Control’: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974–1976,” International History Review Vol. 3, No. 2 (2014), p. 261.

32 Robert W. Morrison, Canada’s Nuclear Export Policy (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1978), pp. 60, 62.

33 Constance D. Hunt, “Canadian Policy and the Export of Nuclear Energy,” University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1977), p. 82.

34 CIA Staff Notes: Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations, March 18, 1975, CREST CIA-RDP79T00865A000600040001-2.

35 Memorandum of Conversation, “Indian Nuclear Explosion; World Food Conference; Pacific Coast Tankers; NATO Declaration; Middle East; Trade Bill,” June 18, 1974, WCDA, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119772>.

36 SASM, August 2, 1974, 3.00 p.m., RG 59, Transcripts.

37 Briefing Memo for Analytic Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy, July 31, 1974, from Fred Ikle and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 467, “Declassified Documents Show Henry Kissinger’s Major Role in the 1974 Initiative that Created the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb467/docs/doc%206%207-31-74%20PPS-ACDA%20paper%20for%20staff%20meeting.pdf>.

38 The parliaments of both West Germany and the Netherlands had approved ratification of the NPT before India’s nuclear test. So, despite claims that the United States successfully encouraged these states to ratify, they were not the targets of US policy. See Walker, Nuclear Power; Cameron and Rabinowitz, Eight Lost Years; Miller, Stopping the Bomb.

39 Leopoldo Nuti, “‘Me Too Please’: Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1975,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1993), p. 137.

40 “German and Italian NPT Ratification and Indian NPT Nuclear Explosion,” Telegram from Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, May 31, 1974, AAD, 1974BONN08718

41 “Italy and the NPT—Thomson's Views,” Telegram from US IAEA Amb Porter to Secretary of State, January 20, 1975, 1975IAEAV00466.

42 Leopoldo Nuti, “Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” in Elisabetta Bini and Igor Londaro, eds., Nuclear Italy: An International History of Italian Nuclear Policies during the Cold War (Trieste: Edizioni Universita di Trieste, 2017), p. 135.

43 Memorandum of Conversation on “NPT” between Carl Lahusen (German Embassy) and Robert Miller (ACDA), June 12, 1974, NARA, RG 59 [Central Foreign Policy Files] P-Reel [Printouts], Box 63A, P740063-0040.

44 “German and Italian NPT Ratification and Indian NPT Nuclear Explosion,” Telegram from Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, May 31, 1974, AAD, 1974BONN08718.

45 SASM, August 8, 1974, 3.00 p.m., RG 59, Transcripts.

46 “German and Italian NPT Ratification and Indian NPT Nuclear Explosion.”

47 Prior to the Indian test, the United States had entered into discussions with Egypt and Israel (neither members of the NPT) to supply them with nuclear reactors and fuel. The nuclear cooperation agreements were announced in June, after the Indian test, and quickly became the subject of controversy, both in the US and around the world.

48 “Italy and the NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Rome to Secretary of State, December 20, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974ROME17604.

49 “Italian NPT Ratification,” Telegram from Secretary of State to US Embassy in Rome, February 7, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE028268.

50 “Primin Trudeau’s European Tour,” Telegram from Embassy in Ottawa to Secretary of State, February 20, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975OTTAWA00613.

51 “Trudeau Visit to Rome: Economic Issues,” Telegram from Embassy in Rome to Secretary of State, March 12, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975ROME03625.

52 “Prime Minister Trudeau’s Visit to Rome; Political Aspects of Conversations with GOI; NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Rome to Secretary of State, March 11, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975ROME03531.

53 “Possible Approach to Secretary on Italian Nuclear Program,” Telegram from Secretary of State to US Embassy Moscow, October 26, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974STATE236247.

54 “Italian Ratification of NPT” [Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy in Rome, January 15, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE009355].

55 Ibid.

56 “Italy and NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Rome to Secretary of State, February 5, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975ROME01711.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Nuti, Italy as a Hedging State?, p. 138.

61 “Italy, the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement,” Telegram from Embassy in Rome to Secretary of State, April 18, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975ROME05798.

62 “Call by Italian Ambassador,” Telegram from Secretary of State to US Mission to IAEA, July 18, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE166751.

63 Daniel I. Okimoto, “Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy: The Problem of the NPT,” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1975), pp. 313—27.

64 “May 21 EA Press Summary,” Telegram from Secretary of State to East Asian Embassies, May 22, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974STATE106677.

65 “Japan and International Nuclear Developments,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, June 28, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974TOKYO08528].

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 “GOJ Views on Ratifying NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, July 9, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974TOKYO08952.

69 Department of State Action Memorandum, “US Approach to GOJ on NPT,” from Philip Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, February 20, 1975, RG 59, PPC, Box 368.

70 Joseph Frankel, “Domestic Politics of Japan’s Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1977), p. 257.

71 John E. Endicott, “The 1975–76 Debate over Ratification of the NPT in Japan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1977), p. 291; Frankel, Domestic Politics, p. 263.

72 SASM, August 8, 1974, 3.00 p.m., RG 59, Transcripts.

73 Ibid.

74 “NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, July 31, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974TOKYO09967.

75 Briefing Memo for Analytic Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy.

76 “Japan and NPT,” Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy in Tokyo, February 25, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE041780.

77 “Japanese NPT Ratification,” Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy in Tokyo, September 13, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE218169.

78 John W Finney, “U.S. Atom Aid in Mideast Tied to Facility Inspection,” New York Times, October 2, 1974, p. 1.

79 John W Finney, “Sale of Reactors to Egypt and Israel Is Now in Doubt,” New York Times, December 17, 1974, p. 77.

80 “Miki Visit Paper: NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, July 11, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975TOKYO09291.

81 “Japan and NPT: GOJ Push for Ratification,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, February 4, 1976, NARA, AAD, 1976TOKYO01718.

82 Ibid.

83 “Japan and NPT,” Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy in Tokyo, February 13, 1976, NARA, AAD, 1976STATE035684.

84 Frankel, Domestic Politics, p. 258.

85 Meeting with Eisaku Sato, Japanese Prime Minister, on Friday, January 7, 1972 9:30am in San Clemente, in Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security and Economic Relations, 1960–1976, Digital National Security Archive, Accession Number: JU01500.

86 Nixon may have thought that Sato would be predisposed in favor of this policy, as Sato had a reputation for being pro-nuclear and had in fact forcefully told US President Lyndon Johnson, “if the Chi-Coms have nuclear weapons, the Japanese should also have them” (quoted in Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, p. 64).

87 FRUS, 1969–76, Vol. E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–72, Document 58, Conversation between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 13, 1972, 11.43 a.m. to 1.18 p.m.

88 [Private Message for Eisaku Sato from President Nixon], February 20, 1973, in Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1977–1992, Digital National Security Archive, Accession Number JA00056.

89 Memorandum of Conversation on “Japanese Ratification of NPT,” March 5, 1974, NARA, RG 59, P-Reel, Box 20D, P740020-1862.

90 Memorandum of Conversation on “Japanese Ratification of NPT,” September 5, 1974, NARA, RG 59, P-Reel, Box 101C, P740101-1385.

91 Ibid.

92 Department of State Action Memorandum, “US Approach to GOJ on NPT,” from Philip Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, February 20, 1975, NARA, RG 59, PPC, Box 368.

93 Ibid.

94 Henry Kissinger to Gerald Ford, “Your Visit to Japan,” undated, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974–76, Box 2, Gerald Ford Library.

95 “Miki Visit Paper: NPT,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, July 11, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975TOKYO09291.

96 “Japan and NPT,” Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy in Tokyo, February 25, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE041780.

97 “Japan and NPT: GOJ Push for Ratification,” Telegram from Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, February 4, 1976, NARA, AAD, 1976TOKYO01718.

98 The other three issues were the application of the third Non-Nuclear Principle (not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan) as it related to the US basing or stationing nuclear weapons in Japan, US deterrence credibility, and the extent of vertical nonproliferation, or disarmament by the NWS.

99 Shuko Ogawa, “The Long and Winding Road: Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy,” Noma-Reischauer Prize master’s thesis in East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 2003.

100 Robert J. Reardon, “Nuclear Bargaining: Using Carrots and Sticks in Nuclear Counter-Proliferation,” PhD diss., MIT, 2010, p. 223.

101 James V. Young and William W. Stueck. Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean–American Relations. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press 2003), p. 19; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 2nd edn. (New York: Basic Books, 2001) p. 70.

102 “Korean Ratification of NPT,” Telegram from US Mission to IAEA to Secretary of State, August 13, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974IAEAV07090.

103 “Canadian Pressure for ROK Ratification of NPT,” Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassies in Seoul, Ottawa, and IAEA Vienna, January 24, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975STATE016913.

104 United States Senate Joint Resolution 51, S.J. Res 51, March 7, 1975, <www.congress.gov/bill/94th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/51>.

105 Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, p. 258; Miller, Secret Success, p. 934.

106 Lyong Choi, “The First Nuclear Crisis in the Korean Peninsula, 1975–76,” Cold War History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2014), p. 76. Hong similarly notes that “South Korean ratification came only after a U.S. congressional resolution calling for the U.S. EX–IM Bank to defer its approval of loans for the construction of the Kori-2 reactor.” Sung Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” in Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra Vogel, eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 499.

107 Morrison, Canada’s Nuclear Export Policy, p. 62.

108 “Canadian Nuclear Reactor Program in Korea,” Telegram from Embassy in Seoul to Secretary of State, November 14, 1974, NARA, AAD, 1974SEOUL07604.

109 Se Young Jang, “Bringing Seoul into the Nonproliferation Regime: The Effect of ROK–Canada Reactor Deals on South Korea’s Ratification of the NPT,” Nuclear Proliferation International History Project Working Paper #10, 2017, p. 22.

110 Choi argues that, at the time, the ROK government thought that this letter was a result of American concerns about the ROK nuclear program (Choi, First Nuclear Crisis, p. 75 note 13).

111 “Korea and NPT,” Telegram from US Mission to IAEA to Secretary of State, January 22, 1975, NARA, AAD, 1975IAEAV00525.

112 Jang, Bringing Seoul in, pp. 26–27.

113 Reardon, Nuclear Bargaining, p. 231.

114 Fuhrmann, Taking a Walk; Swango, United States and the Role of Nuclear Cooperation.