![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Nonproliferation systems comprise agreements designed to work in concert to manage specific security risks. New technologies, however, are exacerbating these risks by perforating controls and evading regulations while revealing limitations in the utility of these tools for managing threats from emerging dual-use technologies. This article first looks at how regime augmentation and control-list modernization have worked as solutions to past challenges for nonproliferation systems. Second, it argues that new drivers of this risk are creating near-unmanageable conditions. These drivers include the increased rate of production of novel technologies; the digital format of newer technologies, as well as the digitization of existing weapons technologies, platforms, and systems; and the diffusion and latency these drivers facilitate. Finally, the article assesses the feasibility of control-list modernization as a solution to risks posed by rapidly emerging and evolving dual-use technologies today. It argues that nonproliferation efforts should endeavor to preserve the control systems currently in place while simultaneously pursuing complementary measures to mitigate the effects of the digital diffusion of dual-use technologies.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Dr. Alexander Montgomery for his thoughtful insights and suggestions on multiple drafts this paper, as well as Dr. Justin V. Anderson, Dr. Gerald Epstein, and Dr. Natasha Bajema for their helpful comments. She thanks Mr. Nicholas Winstead and Mr. Adam Twardowski for their impeccable research assistance. Additionally, she is grateful to the Stanley Center for Peace and Security, which supported earlier work foundational to this paper.
Notes
1 Amy J. Nelson, “Arms Control as Uncertainty Management,” Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, April 23, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.13016/M2Z31NR8B>.
2 One example of the application of existing international law to new technologies is the discussion of whether a cyberattack amounts to an act of war as the latter is defined by the United Nations Charter.
3 The NPT recognizes five nuclear-weapon states. Another four states are in possession of nuclear weapons outside the regime. UN News, “UN Chief Launches New Disarmament Agenda ‘to secure our world and our future,’” May 24, 2018, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1010551>.
4 Matthew Furman and Yonatan Lupu, “Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2016), pp. 530–39, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw013>.
5 “Multilateral Nuclear Supply Principles of the Zangger Committee,” working paper submitted at the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, NY, April 27 to May 22 2020, NPT/CONF.2020/WP.1, <https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.1>.
6 Initially, the items on the NSG’s Dual-Use List included everything on the Zangger “trigger list”—so called because the items would “trigger” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight—and the implementation of nuclear-security safeguards as a prerequisite for export. Although the Zangger Committee updated the Zangger list regularly, the NSG’s trigger list wasn’t as well maintained and didn’t track emerging technologies.
7 Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group at a Glance,” last reviewed August 2017, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG>.
8 The resulting 1992 version of the NSG’s Dual-Use List more closely resembled the updated Zangger list.
9 IAEA, “Additional Protocol,” n.d., <www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol>.
10 Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. Having never withdrawn from the treaty, Iran was found in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement by the IAEA in 2005, having developed the capacity for a nuclear-weapons program, which was later curbed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
11 Notably, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and resumed sanctions that had been lifted under the agreement. The United States subsequently announced termination of sanctions waivers on cooperative nuclear projects with Iran in 2019, at which point Iran began exceeding the limits that the JCPOA had imposed on its nuclear program.
12 John Gershman and Wade Huntley, “North Korea and the NPT,” Institute for Policy Studies, October 2, 2005, <https://fpif.org/north_korea_the_npt/>; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria Nuclear Overview,” April 23, 2018, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/syria-nuclear/>.
13 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, December 19, 1995, <www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2019/12/WA-DOC-19-Public-Docs-Vol-I-Founding-Documents.pdf>. Established in 1995 in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not a legally binding treaty and has 41 participating states.
14 States that participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement voluntarily implement national policies (domestic regulations and export controls) that prevent the sale of certain items to end-user countries that have a history of behavior not conducive to maintaining international security and human-rights standards. Member states must also exchange data biannually on deliveries of conventional arms to nonmember countries.
15 The software is capable of monitoring individuals’ activity and thus intruding on their privacy.
16 Alfred Ng, “Facebook Puts a Bounty on Apps that Abuse Your Data,” CNET, April 10, 2018, <www.cnet.com/news/facebook-launches-bug-bounty-program-to-report-data-thieves/>.
17 Tami Abdollah, “US Fails to Renegotiate Arms Control Rule for Hacking Tools,” Associated Press, December 19, 2016, <https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-hacking-international-news-politics-vienna-c0e437b2e24c4b68bb7063f03ce892b5?>.
18 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Wassenaar Arrangement,” last modified July 31, 2018, <www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/wassenaar-arrangement/>.
19 Not including manned aircraft.
20 The MTCR’s Equipment and Technology Control Annex is its list of controlled items. MTCR Category I items include complete missiles and rockets, major subsystems, and production facilities. There is a strong presumption of denial for the export of these items and a total prohibition on exporting production technology. Category II items include specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and subcomponents for missiles and rockets. Their export requires end-use certification or verification.
21 Arms Control Association, “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance,” last modified March 2021, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr>.
22 India was denied membership in the MTCR when Italy blocked consensus, but it endeavors to adhere to the requirements of the regime despite lack of membership. It joined the Hague Code of Conduct in 2016.
23 Arms Control Association, “Missile Technology Control Regime.”
24 John Mintz, “Grand Jury Probes Boeing’s Rocket Deal with Russia, Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 2, 1999, <www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/03/02/grand-jury-probes-boeings-rocket-deal-with-russia-ukraine/fc093255-2d93-4051-b4c2-2e4dff7337a3/>.
25 Lethal “drones” are in Category I of the MTCR annex.
26 William Alberque, “Revitalising Arms Control: The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC),” International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2021, p. 11.
27 Aaron Mehta, “White House Rolls out Armed Drone Declaration,” Defense News, October 5, 2016, <www.defensenews.com/articles/white-house-rolls-out-armed-drone-declaration>. In addition to the United States, the signers are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
28 US Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),” October 16, 2017, <www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2017/274817.htm>.
29 UAV-related goods that appear on Wassenaar’s Dual-Use List are less sensitive than those that appear on either its Munitions List or MTCR’s Equipment and Technology Annex.
30 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “The Convention on Certain Chemical Weapons,” n.d., <www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/>.
31 Sarah Kreps, Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
32 Nicholas Cropper, “CRISPR Is Making Bioweapons More Accessible,” American Security Project, April 29, 2020, <www.americansecurityproject.org/crispr-is-making-bioweapons-more-accessible/>.
33 Along with China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
34 UN General Assembly, “Letter Dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” A/69/723, 2015, <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/69/723>.
35 Sarah McKune, “An Analysis of the International Code of Conduct for Information Security,” Citizen Lab, September, 28, 2015, <https://citizenlab.ca/2015/09/international-code-of-conduct/#27>.
36 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. and Russia Sign Pact to Create Communication Link on Cyber Security,” Washington Post, June 17, 2013, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-and-russia-sign-pact-to-create-communication-link-on-cyber-security/2013/06/17/ca57ea04-d788-11e2-9df4-895344c13c30_story.html?utm_term=.b0d19c601713>.
37 The Trump administration subsequently walked back from these endeavors and cooperation with Russia in the cyber domain in general.
38 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States,” September 25, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states>.
39 Adam Segal, “The New Cyber Brief: The New Old Threat of Chinese Industrial Cyber Espionage,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2018, <www.cfr.org/blog/new-cyber-brief-new-old-threat-chinese-industrial-cyber-espionage>.
40 White House, “International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World,” May 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf>.
41 Another question is whether commercial crimes associated with cyber espionage are on par with direct security threats.
42 Michèle Flournoy and Michael Sulmeyer, “Battlefield Internet: A Plan for Securing Cyberspace,” Foreign Affairs, October 2018, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-08-14/battlefield-internet>.
43 Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Competing Nuclear Norms,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 30, 2020, <https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/the-nuclear-ban-treaty-and-competing-nuclear-norms/>.
44 Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2000).
45 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Technology and Innovation Report 2021,” 2021, <https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tir2020_en.pdf>
46 Matthew R. Keller, “The CIA’s Pioneering Role in Public Venture Capital Initiatives,” in Fred Block and Matthew Keller, eds., State of Innovation: The U.S. Government’s Role in Technology Development (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), pp. 109–32.
47 Open-source and dual-use technologies are, by definition, in the public sphere or publicly available. For dual-use technologies, the availability of that information depends on the proprietary nature and classification level of the technology.
48 Brad Allenby, “Emerging Technologies and the Future of Humanity,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 6 (2015), p. 32.
49 Ashlyn Anderson and Amy J. Nelson, “How to Build an Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, February 11, 2016, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2016-02-11/how-build-alliance>.
50 Matthew Hallex, “Digital Manufacturing and Missile Proliferation,” Federation of American Scientists, May 21, 2013, https://fas.org/pir-pubs/digital-manufacturing-and-missile-proliferation/.
51 Jamie Ellis, “Chinese Cyber Espionage: A Complementary Method to Aid PLA Modernization,” MA diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, pp. 106–09.
52 Interestingly, in 1992 and 1993, the American Association for the Advancement of Science convened a series of workshops to address the proliferation of advanced weaponry. The first resulting volume, published in 1992, was titled The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations and Responses. When the second volume was published in 1993, the editors adopted the word “diffusion” in lieu of “proliferation” and titled the volume The Diffusion of Advanced Weaponry: Technologies, Regional Implications, and Responses. As weapons become increasingly technology laden, “diffusion” has become the appropriate term for describing the spread of weaponry.
53 Zachary Davis, Ronald Lehman, and Michael Nacht, eds., Strategic Latency and World Power: How Technology Is Changing Our Concepts of Security (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2014).
54 Davis et al., Strategic Latency and World Power, p. 15.
55 On 3D printing, see the following for an example: Laura Bechthold, Veronika Fischer, Andre Hainzlmaier, Daniel Hugenroth, Ljudmila Ivanova, Kristina Kroth, Benedikt Römer, Edyta Sikorska, and Vincent Sitzmann, “3D Printing: A Qualitative Assessment of Applications, Recent Trends and the Technology’s Future Potential,” Studien Zum Deutschen Innovationssystem [Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation], November 17, 2015, <https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwefisdi/172015.htm>.
56 Alexander H. Montgomery, “Double or Nothing? The Effects of the Diffusion of Dual-Use Enabling Technologies on Strategic Stability,” Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, July 2020, <https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2020-07/Dual_use_tech_Strategic_stability_072720.pdf>.
57 Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, “Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2017, <www.sipri.org/publications/2017/other-publications/mapping-development-autonomy-weapon-systems>.
58 Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
59 Eric Arnett, “Technology and Military Doctrine: Criteria for Evaluation,” in W. Thomas Wander, Eric Arnett, and Paul Bracken, eds., The Diffusion of Advanced Weaponry: Technologies, Regional Implications, and Response (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1994), p. 17.
60 Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).
61 Richard Cupitt, “Undermining Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: International Governance on the Cheap,” Stimson Center, October 27, 2021, <www.stimson.org/2021/undermining-efforts-to-prevent-the-proliferation-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction-international-governance-on-the-cheap/>.
62 Tony Vavila, Marc J. Epstein, and Robert D. Shelton, Making Innovation Work (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education/FT Press, 2013), pp. 1, 3–6.
63 Deutsche Welle, “Germany Announces New Global Arms Control Project,” January 1, 2018, <www.dw.com/en/germany-announces-new-global-arms-control-project/a-46533071>.
64 Giulia Neaher, David A. Bray, Julian Mueller-Kaler, and Benjamin Schatz, “Standardizing the Future: How Can the United States Navigate the Geopolitics of International Technology Standards?” Atlantic Council, October, 2021, pp. 5, 7.
65 Justin V. Anderson and Amy J. Nelson, “The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-Bound Success,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2019), pp. 90–122, <www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-2/Anderson.pdf>.
66 Nelson, “Arms Control as Uncertainty Management.”
67 This work has already begun. See, for example, Boulanin and Verbruggen, Mapping the Development.
68 Govindan Parayil, “Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation and Technological Change,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1991), pp. 78–89, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1053837200003412>; Ammon Salter and Oliver Alexy, “The Nature of Innovation,” in Mark Dodgson, David M. Gann, and Nelson Phillips, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Innovation Management (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 26–52.; W. Brian Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves (New York: Free Press, 2011), p. 1.
69 Jeffrey A. Isaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, “Predicting Military Innovation,” Documented Briefing DB-242-A, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, <www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB242.html>; Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power; Goldman and Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.
70 Jacob Blackford, “Multilateral Nuclear Export Controls after the A.Q. Khan Network,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 2, 2005, <www.isis-online.org/publications/expcontrol/multilateralexportcontrols.pdf>.
71 Montgomery, “Double or Nothing.”
72 See, for example, Zachary Davis, “Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield: An Initial Survey of Potential Implications for Deterrence, Stability, and Strategic Surprise,” Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, March 2019, <https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR-AI_BattlefieldWEB.pdf>; Boulanin and Verbruggen, “Mapping the Development.”
73 Davis et al., Strategic Latency and World Power, p. 6.
74 John P. Caves, Jr. and W. Seth Carus, “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030,” National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 1, 2014, pp. 5–6, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA617232>.
75 Alexey Arbatov, “An Unnoticed Crisis: The End of History for Nuclear Arms Control?” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 16, 2015, <https://carnegiemoscow.org/2015/06/16/unnoticed-crisis-end-of-history-for-nuclear-arms-control-pub-60408>; Łukasz Kulesa, “The Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and Its impact on European Security,” EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, No. 66 (January 2020), <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/eunpdc_no_66_kulesa.pdf>; Benjamin Hautecouverture, Isabelle Facon, Philippe Gros, Emmanuelle Maitre, Bruno Racine, Dominique David, Emmanuel Puig, and Zacharie Gross, “The End of Arms Control?” Note de la FRS n°10/2019, Paris, May 14, 2019, <www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/end-arms-control-2019>.