Honest Broker or Status-Seeker: Russia’s Policy in Libya

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Russia’s actions in Libya in the context of its pursuit of great power status. Drawing on a theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory, which had been developed and popularized in IR by the scholars Larson and Shevchenko, the article argues that Russia’s Libya policy consists of two strategies. First, it pursues social creativity through versatile diplomacy, which has positioned it as an invaluable mediator. Moreover, Russia relies also on social competition by supporting Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. While these strategies raised Russia’s profile, the ultimate success of status-seeking strategies depends on the recognition by the higher-status holders.

Acknowledgments

The author expresses his gratitude to the editorial office of Problems of Post-Communism, and to three anonymous referees whose valuable suggestions and comments helped improve this manuscript. Moreover, he would like to extend his thanks to the experts and scholars whom he had interviewed and consulted while researching this paper. In particular, he is grateful to Dr. Andrej Krickovic (Senior Research Fellow and Associate Professor at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics University, Moscow, Russia) for his valuable comments on an early version of this manuscript. The author would also like to thank Dr. Gustaaf Geeraerts (Professor Emeritus at Vrije Universiteit Brussel) for his helpful advice, and Mr. Ciwan M. Can for his suggestions.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. In the words of one Russian expert, Russia “partially returned” to the region. The scale of its return to the Middle East is often blown out of proportion (Stepanova 2018, 98).

2. Interview with Mr. Alexey Khlebnikov, Middle East expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, October 23, 2020.

3. Russia’s pursuit of status and its obsession with developing a valid post-Soviet identity as a great power are important topics. Several prominent scholars wrote about this. See among others: Clunan (2009, 2019), Lo (2002), and Mankoff (2009).

4. Russian politicians deny any official connections between the state and private military companies like Wagner (President of Russia 2020a).

5. Interview with Dr. Andrej Krickovic, Senior Research Fellow and Associate Professor at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics University, Moscow, Russia, November 6, 2020.

6. It is important to note that Larson and Shevchenko explain why they believe other existing theoretical frameworks—for instance neorealism and neoliberalism—do not provide satisfactory explanation for Russia’s lack of cooperation with the West. See more in Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 63–95.

7. Interview with Dr. Andrej Krickovic, November 6, 2020.

8. Interview with Dr. Andrej Krickovic, November 6, 2020.

9. Interview with Mr. Alexey Khlebnikov, October 23, 2020.

10. Interview with Mr. Alexey Khlebnikov, October 23, 2020.

11. Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, and before that in Georgia in 2008, were subject to criticism and accusations of revisionist politics. Moscow’s claim of defense of international order, and especially its own alleged observance of these rules, are, unsurprisingly, questioned. Most tellingly, critics point out the blatant violations such as the 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent intervention and destabilization of eastern Ukraine, which represented the “frontal challenge to the post–Cold War European regional order” (Allison 2014, 1255). Rather than being a protector of international law, Russia is denounced by some scholars and observers as a revisionist power that believes it is “at war with the United States, its allies, and the multilateral institutions” (McFaul 2021). Among the diverse literature on this, see for instance Roy Allison (2014), Walter Russell Mead (2014), and Michael McFaul (2021).

12. Richard Sakwa also posits that Putin made significant effort to stabilize borders and signed treaties with most of its neighbors except for Japan (Sakwa 2019, 13).

13. Interview with Dr. Andrej Krickovic, November 6, 2020.

14. For instance, Russia and Egypt further developed their ties after Egyptian military overthrew democratically elected President Morsi in 2013. For more see Ramani (2019) and Aziz (2018).

15. Interview with Dr. Andrej Krickovic, November 6, 2020.

16. Kimberly Marten points out that the term “mercenary” has pejorative connotation. For that reason, some experts refer to them as “private military companies” (PMCs). See Marten 2019, 181–204.

17. The United States Department of Defense believed that by Fall 2020 there were some five thousand pro-Turkish Syrian fighters in Libya. For more on this see Magdy 2020b.

18. Interview with Mr. Alexey Khlebnikov, October 23, 2020.

19. It is worth noting that Russia was excluded from the early peace-finding discussions in post-Gaddafi Libya, including the so-called Contact Group on Libya, which consisted of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as Italy, Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait (Grove 2011; Stepanova 2018, 92.).