Abstract
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) approaches systematically evaluate the likelihood, impacts, and risk of adverse events. QRA using fault tree analysis (FTA) is based on the assumptions that failure events have crisp probabilities and they are statistically independent. The crisp probabilities of the events are often absent, which leads to data uncertainty. However, the independence assumption leads to model uncertainty. Experts’ knowledge can be utilized to obtain unknown failure data; however, this process itself is subject to different issues such as imprecision, incompleteness, and lack of consensus. For this reason, to minimize the overall uncertainty in QRA, in addition to addressing the uncertainties in the knowledge, it is equally important to combine the opinions of multiple experts and update prior beliefs based on new evidence. In this article, a novel methodology is proposed for QRA by combining fuzzy set theory and evidence theory with Bayesian networks to describe the uncertainties, aggregate experts’ opinions, and update prior probabilities when new evidences become available. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the most critical events in the FTA. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been demonstrated via application to a practical system.
Acknowledgment
The research of Sohag Kabir was partly funded by the DEIS project (Grant Agreement 732242).
Nomenclature
BBA | = | basic belief assignment |
BIM | = | birnbaum importance measure |
BE | = | basic event |
Bel | = | belief measure |
Bet | = | the pignistic probability function in the belief structure |
BN | = | Bayesian network |
BT | = | bow-tie model |
CSB | = | chemical Safety Board |
CP | = | crisp possibility |
CPT | = | conditional probability tables |
D-S | = | Dempster-Shafer theory |
E | = | evidence |
ETA | = | event tree analysis |
F | = | failure |
FMEA | = | failure mode and effect analysis |
FP | = | failure probability |
FT | = | fault tree |
FTA | = | fault tree analysis |
Hazmat | = | hazardous material |
HAZOP | = | hazard and operability study |
HTHA | = | high temperature hydrogen attack |
I | = | importance measures |
IE | = | intermediate event |
LOPA | = | layer of protection analysis |
P | = | the probability of an input event |
= | probability density function | |
pl | = | plausibility measure |
QRA | = | quantitative risk assessment |
RPB | = | release prevention barrier |
RoV | = | ratio of variation |
S | = | success |
SA | = | sensitivity analysis |
TE | = | top event |
Symbols
= | decision matrix | |
= | the column vector of decision matrix regarding to jth attributes | |
= | the row of decision matrix representing alternative | |
= | the projected outcomes of attributes j | |
m | = | the number of evaluated alternative |
n | = | the number of criteria |
= | the set of projected outcomes of criterion j | |
= | the degree of diversification | |
= | the objective weight of criteria j | |
= | the normalized value regarding to criteria n from alternative m | |
= | the weight of each alternative | |
= | the lower boundary of triangular fuzzy number | |
= | the most likely boundary of triangular fuzzy number | |
= | the upper boundary of triangular fuzzy number | |
= | fuzzy membership function having g vectors | |
= | the output variable in fuzzy membership function | |
X* | = | the defuzzified output of fuzzy membership function |
N | = | the number of elements using in Dempster-Shafer theory |
= | the set of N elements in Dempster-Shafer theory | |
PS | = | the power set |
= | the belief mass | |
= | the negation of a hypothesis | |
U | = | the set of event used in BN |
= | posterior probability of BE | |
= | prior probability of BE |