Kant and the Two Principles of Publicity

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to argue that the principle of “publicity” constitutes a fundamental idea in Kant’s political thought. Publicity provides a central insight that binds together various strands of Kant’s political writings (on issues as diverse as the question of Enlightenment, the right of revolution, historical teleology, reflective judgment, cosmopolitan citizenship, democratic peace, and republican government), and moreover, it offers a much-needed cornerstone for a systematic exposition of his nonexistent political philosophy. Apart from some eminent examples, publicity has been a rather neglected topic in the ever-expanding literature on Kant’s political ideas. Revisiting this notion will make us more attentive to his evocation of the “spirit of republicanism” over and above the letter of the law, and might prompt us to reconsider Kant’s reputation as a classical representative of liberal political thought. Indeed, it should inspire us to situate Kant’s appeal for the “public use of reason” in the vicinity of the republican ideal of political liberty.

KEYWORDS:

• Immanuel Kant
• principle of publicity
• public use of reason
• republican spirit

Notes

1. The examples are numerous. For some general discussion, see Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy; Riley, Kant’s Political Philosophy; Williams, ed., Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy; Beiner and Booth, eds., Kant and Political Philosophy; Flikschuh, “Kant”; Ellis, Kant’s Political Theory.

2. For a misplaced appraisal of Kant’s principle of publicity, based partly on the confused rendering of its affirmative version, see Davis, “Kantian ‘Publicity’ and Political Justice.” He argues that by virtue of making publicity a transcendental condition of justice, Kant actually permits extreme degrees of secrecy and suppression in politics, and adds: “The second version of the publicity principle is unfortunate because Kant has, on the most generous interpretation, duplicated his initial, and clearer, statement” (416).

3. García-Marzá, “Kant’s Principle of Publicity,” 96.

4. It is not possible to explore in detail all the relevant material of Kant’s work. I have therefore chosen to focus particularly on Kant’s political writings which to my mind contain his most pertinent insights regarding the realm of politics sui generis. I believe that other ideas and insights can be integrated into this interpretive frame of publicity, but this cannot be demonstrated here. The authors and texts I have singled out are the ones that more or less explicitly touch on the topic of publicity in Kant, which is my main concern here. I am well aware that this sample is far from exhaustive, yet it seems to be representative enough to help to emphasize my point.

5. Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 112 [8:22]. All quotations from Kant’s texts are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, citing page number, which is followed by the standard German reference of the Prussian Academy edition in the following manner: [volume number: page number].

6. Kant, Correspondence, 290 [23:495].

7. Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 113 [8:23].

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 110 [8:19].

10. It might be contested whether “the highest task for mankind” is envisaged in relation to establishing a perfect civil constitution, or an essentially religious community (or both). There is a considerable debate about the meaning of the Kantian expression “Kingdom of God” (resp. “Kingdom of Ends”) which I cannot undertake to clarify here. In this connection, it has been argued that Kant’s political thought serves ultimately as a preparatory ground for his theory of religion, so that the political organization of human society (“the state”) becomes an unavoidable (yet always imperfect) context for the emergence of a genuinely universal religion (“the invisible church”)—both of them essentially requiring public characteristics. For the early discussion of this issue which defends the claim that Kant’s political philosophy cannot be fully understood unless we approach it through the spectacles of his philosophy of religion, see Palmquist, “‘The Kingdom of God Is at Hand!’”

11. Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 112, 115.

12. Ibid., 113, 115.

13. Rawls clearly recognizes the implications that the Kantian notion of publicity could have for considerations of justice. In his theory, publicity is listed among the formal conditions of a conception of right: “The point of the publicity condition is to have the parties evaluate conceptions of justice as publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral constitutions of social life.” Rawls, Theory of Justice, 133. He also expresses the Kantian hope that the persistence of the rightful condition by itself generates and reinforces the moral behaviour of the individuals involved: “When the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them.” Ibid., 177. One should note, however, that later Rawls describes Kant as holding a “comprehensive moral doctrine”—a position ultimately incompatible with the modern liberal pluralism. Also, his appropriation of the Kantian framework, especially his reworking of the categorical imperative into the so-called CI-procedure is questionable, see Budde, “Rawls on Kant,” 339–58.

14. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 346 [8:379].

15. Ibid., 347 [8:381].

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 347–48 [8:382].

18. Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of Enlightenment,” 51–80, 77.

19. O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason,” 427–28.

20. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 351 [8:386].

21. Ibid., 339 [8:371].

22. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 381 [6:227].

23. Ibid., 409 [6:256].

24. Ibid., 480 [6:340].

25. Ibid. With respect to autocracy and aristocracy, Kant claims that “in their case it is at least possible for them to adopt a kind of government in conformity with the spirit of a representative system.” Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 324 [8:352]. Democracy in the literal sense, however, is necessarily a despotism; moreover, in the absence of any representation (the body of citizens is simultaneously the legislator and the executor of its own will) it is, strictly speaking, without form.

26. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 91 [27:300]. Compare the same idea, in a slight variation: “Of every action that conforms to the law but is not done for the sake of the law, one can say that it is morally good only in accordance with the letter but not the spirit (the disposition) [of the law].” Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 198 [5:72].

27. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 303 [8:305].

28. In an alternative formulation: “A state can already govern itself in a republican way even though, by its present constitution, it possesses a despotic ruling power [Herrschermacht].” Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 340 [8:372].

29. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 306 [7:91].

30. Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 20 [8:39].

31. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 302, 297 [8:304, 8:297].

32. Ibid.

33. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 351 [8:386].

34. Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, esp. chap. 5.

35. Ibid., 184.

36. Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy, 152, 159, note 75.

37. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 297 [8:298].

38. Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 461 [6:318].

39. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 302 [8:303].

40. Ibid., 302 [8:304].

41. Kant, “Perpetual Peace;” 325 [8:352].

42. Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 18 [8:37].

43. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 303 [8:305].

44. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 351 [8:386].

45. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 297 [8:298].

46. Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of Enlightenment,” 59.

47. O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason,” 424.

48. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 348 [8:382].

49. Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 19 [8:38].

50. Ibid., 18 [8:37].

51. I believe these two rationalities could be legitimately juxtaposed with the well-known Weberian division between means-rational (or instrumental) and value-rational modes of behaviour.

52. Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 303 [8:305].

53. Laursen, “Scepticism and Intellectual Freedom,” 440, note 1. It is indicative that in two recent book-length studies of Kant’s political philosophy (Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy; and Ripstein, Force and Freedom) the notion of publicity makes no appearance at all. This trend seems to have been reversed recently: see Deligiorgi, “Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication”; and Ellis, Kant’s Politics. However, compare Ellis’s claim that “no satisfactory account of Kant’s formal principles of publicity exists, despite the fact that Kant’s concept of publicity itself has been a popular topic in recent years” (105).

54. Laursen, “The Subversive Kant,” 596.

55. Ibid., 599. Laursen thus appears to downplay another, and in my view decisive, aspect of Kant’s notion of the Enlightenment, namely, his appeal to Selbstdenken, to thinking for oneself as an act of courage and a work of duty on the part of the individual.

56. Laursen, “Scepticism and Intellectual Freedom,” 440, 454.

57. O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, ix, 33, 34.

58. To recall, the end of political morality is to ensure the moral legality of human interactions. Of course, one cannot legislate morality directly; instead, what one can, and indeed should, do, is to legislate morally. Again, we may notice here the difference that operates between the letter and the spirit of the laws.

59. Deligiorgi, “Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication,” 146, 148.

60. Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” 111 [8:21].

61. Ellis, Kant’s Politics, 12, 106–7.

62. Indeed, when Foucault famously recalls Kant’s prescription that the enlightened use of reason must be universal, free, and public, he adds that, whereas one can readily see how it can be universal and free, the problem is precisely how to assure reason’s public aspect. Enlightenment, from this viewpoint, now appears as a political problem: “The question, in any event, is that of knowing how the use of reason can take the public form that it requires, how the audacity to know can be exercised in broad daylight, while individuals are obeying as scrupulously as possible.” Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 37 (emphasis added). Foucault himself, I believe, has tried to tackle this problem in his late reflections on the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, “speaking truth to power.” See Foucault, Fearless Speech.

63. Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of Enlightenment,” 69.

64. Skinner, “The Paradoxes of Political Liberty,” 205.

Additional information

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Jüri Lipping

Jüri Lipping is an independent scholar and translator, associated with the University of Tartu, Estonia. His research interests include post-foundational political thought, continental philosophy, the concept of the political, and the idea of the tragic. His article “Conceptual Affinities around the Political: The Case of Laclau and Schmitt,” was published in Telos 187 (2019): 31–50.