On Humility and Ethical Development in Matteo Ricci’s On Friendship

ABSTRACT

In this article, I discuss the role of friendship in ethical development by focusing on the virtue of humility in Matteo Ricci’s (1552–1610) first work written in Chinese, On Friendship (Jiaoyou Lun 交友論). My overarching argument is that, since humility is a disposition or virtue that leads a person to being open to seeking or receiving help and guidance from others, it can facilitate ethical development by taking into account both the equal and unequal ethical status between friends. Moreover, since in non-Chinese scholarship this work has been neglected or misinterpreted if discussed at all, I also attempt to show why On Friendship should be more widely studied and its importance more widely recognized.

KEYWORDS:

• Matteo Ricci
• On Friendship
• humility
• equal and unequal friendships
• ethical development

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

^1. Friedman, “Friendship and Moral Growth,” 10.

^2. Confucius, Analects 1.8 and 2.5. Hereafter citations include the number of the book or chapter, and of the part. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1157b36; hereafter abbreviated as NE; Aristotle, The Eudemian Ethics, 1240b2.

^3. Tan, “Mentor or Friend,” 99.

^4. Ricci, On Friendship; hereafter abbreviated as Maxims, citing the number of the maxim.

^5. Shi, “Equalizing Confucianism,” 121–27; Zou, “Translation and Dissemination,” 49–55.

^6. See, for example, Laven, Mission to China, 106; Liu, “Preparation for Proselytizing,” 176, 181; Mungello, Curious Land, 110.

^7. Billings, “Introduction,” 12.

^8. See Alfano, Lynch, and Tanesini, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility.

^9. Bloomfield, “Humility Is Not a Virtue,” 36–37.

^10. Billings, “Introduction,” 5.

^11. Billings, “Sources and Notes,” 157–65; Harbsmeier, “Matteo Ricci on Friendship,” 175–212.

^12. According to Shi and Zou, the Jiaoyou Lun stirred the curiosity of Chinese readers because it attempts to harmonize Western and Confucian notions of friendship, with the former also supplementing the latter. For example, Shi refers to Analects 12.24 and 16.4 as comparable to Maxims 67 and 68 because they all refer to the importance of goodness and virtue in choosing friends. Both Shi and Zou highlight that Chinese readers find the Western concept of equality, particularly its Christian interpretation, notable. As Shi observes, although the Jiaoyou Lun was not directly mentioned in their writings, the concept of equality and the importance of friendship conveyed in Ricci’s text influenced the writings of important thinkers during the Qing dynasty, such as Wang Tao (王韜, 1828–97) and Tan Sitong (譚嗣同, 1865–98). These thinkers were familiar with the concept because of their interaction with religious missionaries or their exposure to Western studies. Moreover, a study by Wu argues that Li Zhi’s (李贄, 1527–1602) ideas were partly influenced by Matteo Ricci. Li Zhi was one of the Ming dynasty thinkers who re-evaluated and elevated the status of friendship in Chinese society. See Shi, “Equalizing Confucianism,” 121–27; Zou, “The Translation and Dissemination,” 49–55; Wu, “Comparing the Views of Matteo Ricci and Li Zhi,” 75–86.

Confucius, Analects 12.24: Master Zeng said, “The gentleman acquires friends by means of cultural refinement, and then relies upon his friends for support in becoming Good”; Analects 16.4: Confucius said, “Beneficial types of friendship number three, as do harmful types of friendship. Befriending the upright, those who are true to their word, or those of broad learning—these are the beneficial types of friendship. Befriending clever flatterers, skillful dissemblers, or the smoothly glib—these are the harmful types of friendship”; Ricci, Maxim 67: If someone lives in a dye shop and is intimate with dyers, he will be near the taint of the dye, and it will be hard to avoid polluting his body. If someone makes friends with wicked people, he will constantly see and hear shameful things; he will undoubtedly grow accustomed to them; and he will defile his heart with them. Maxim 68: If, by chance, I happen to encounter a wise friend, even if we only clap hands once and part, it is never so little that it does not reinforce my will to do good.

^13. Lo, “My Second Self,” 230–31.

^14. Ricci, Maxims 16 and 56. The full version appears in the following pages.

^15. Ibid., Maxim 57: “A world without friends is a world without joy.”

^16. There are friends who can hinder ethical development and even make other people worse. In this case, leaving a friend is justified because if the wickedness of a friend cannot be changed, it might just influence the good friend and will turn him into a bad person. As Ricci also states in Maxim 33, “if we tolerate the vices of a friend, then those vices become our own vices.”

^17. There are other examples in the Maxims that portray friendship as a reciprocal human relationship, such as friendships that entail the exchange of material as well as immaterial support between friends, with both obtainting benefits from it. Maxim 3 is the most straightforward on reciprocity: “mutual need and mutual support are the reasons to make friends.”

^18. Joubert, A Selection from his Thoughts, 163.

^19. Telfer, “Friendship,” 224.

^20. Mencius, Mengzi, 3A4 provides an instruction about the roles of humans: “between father and children there is affection; between ruler and ministers there is righteousness; between husband and wife there is distinction; between elder and younger there is precedence; and between friends there is faithfulness.” Hereafter I cite the number of the book or chapter, and part. Also see Vervoorn, “Friendship in Ancient China,” 1–2.

^21. Harbsmeier, “Matteo Ricci on Friendship,” 196–97; Cicero, “De Amicitia,” 129.

^22. Confucius, Analects, 12.22.

^23. Wong, “Universalism versus Love with Distinctions,” 269 or note 6.

^24. Mencius, Mengzi, 7A45.

^25. For instance, Confucius states the duties towards parents in Analects 2.5. It is also stated in conjunction with the virtue of filial piety (xiao 孝): “When your parents are alive, serve them in accordance with the rites; when they pass away, bury them in accordance with the rites and sacrifice to them in accordance with the rites.”

^26. Here are some of the maxims where Ricci mentions some of the duties, responsibilities, or obligations of friendship: Maxim 19: “Proper friends do not always agree with their friends, nor do they always disagree with their friends, but rather agree with them when they are reasonable and disagree with them when they are unreasonable. Direct speech is therefore the only responsibility of friendship.” Maxim 46: “The obligation of friends extends as far as virtuous conduct will allow and no further.” Maxim 53: “If you do not support a friend in a crisis, then when you will fall into a crisis yourself there will be no one to help.” Maxim 64: ‘Someone who comes to see me in my hour of glory only when invited, and who comes to see me in my hour of trouble even when not invited—now, that is a friend” (emphasis is in the original.)

^27. See, for example, Aristotle, NE, 1157b33–7; and Confucius, Analects 1.8 and 9.25.

^28. Aristotle, NE, 1156a6–22.

^29. Ibid., 1156a22–5.

^30. Hosne, “Shaping Virtuous Friendship,” 7–9. It is important to note that there are varying responses to the embeddedness of Christianity in the text. Billings describes it as essentially secular (“Introduction,” 11); Liu claims that Ricci “does not invoke the Christian tradition of friendship” (“The Preparation for Proselytizing,” 171); Dongfeng Xu argues in Friendship and Hospitality, 63, that “On Friendship does not present Christianity as its most dominant and manifest theme, though Christian understanding of love and friendship is certainly embedded in the book.”

^31. The understanding that friendship is a relationship that springs from personal choice is not entirely new to the Chinese, although it is explicit in Ricci’s text. For instance, in “The Fifth Relationship,” 1617, Norman Kutcher describes friendship in the context of the Confucian five cardinal relationships as voluntary and freely chosen, making it the most powerful relationship.

^32. Aristotle, NE, 11556b11–2.

^33. Ibid., 1157b33–37.

^34. Zhu Xi, Sishu Zhangju Jizhu, 50: 友所以輔仁, 不如己, 則無益而有損.

^35. Shi, “Equalizing Confucianism,” 123; Zou, “The Translation and Dissemination,” 52.

^36. Billings, “Introduction,” 12; Mungello, Curious Land, 110.

^37. Tan, “Mentor or Friend,” 99.

^38. Ibid., 114–15.

^39. Ibid., 107.

^40. This point is most clearly implied in Maxims 69 and 70, wherein the goal of friendship is to teach and learn from each other.

^41. Aristotle, NE, 1131a36.

^42. Ibid., 1158b24–6.

^43. Ibid., 1159b1–2; Also see Tan, “Mentor or Friend,” 105.

^44. Aristotle, NE,1157b35–6.

^45. The latter part of this definition somehow extends Nancy Snow’s definition of humility “as the disposition to allow the awareness of and concern about your limitations to have a realistic influence on your attitudes and behavior” (“Humility,” 210). On the one hand, my definition emphasizes acceptance, which is more than being aware of one’s limitations. On the other hand, being open to seeking or receiving help from others is an expression of concern about one’s limitations.

^46. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II, q.161, a.5, ad 2.

^47. Here, I follow Pinsent who affirms the validity of Aquinas’s understanding of humility in a secular context: “it is proper and good for human persons to relate to other persons as second persons, and the damage to relationships from the species of pride, underline how humility is also valuable in a more general and secular sense” (“Aquinas on Humility and Relational Greatness,” 209).

^48. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II, q.162, a.4.

^49. In Maxim 5, Ricci states: “When life is peaceful and without trouble, it is difficult to distinguish the true from the false friend. Only when difficulties arise do the true feelings of a friend reveal themselves. For in a time of crisis, true friends will draw closer, and false friends will become increasingly scarce.” Also see Lo, “My Second Self,” 231.

^50. Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” 188.

^51. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II, q.161, a.1, ad 2.

^52. In addition to the Biblical verses, this understanding of humility is also found in Aquinas: “humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others” (Summa Theologiae II–II, q.161, a.1, ad 2). See also Snow “Theories of Humility,” 9; Bloomfield, “Humility Is Not a Virtue,” 37–38.

^53. Ricci, True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, paras. 477 and 484.

Additional information

Funding

The research for this article was supported by the 2021 China International Postdoctoral Exchange Fellowship (博士后国际交流计划引进项目 YJ20210278).

Notes on contributors

Mark Kevin S. Cabural

Mark Kevin S. Cabural is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Philosophy, Xiamen University, China. His research interests include Comparative Philosophy, Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophies, Ethics, and Political Philosophy.