Constructions of noncompliance: narratives and contexts in the case of administrative corruption

Abstract

Authorities depict noncompliance by public officials (POs) as a problematic deviation they seek to address by several means. This article discusses the problem as a situation where the public’s reframing opportunities guide POs toward the acceptance of noncompliant behavior. This novel approach is underpinned by a behavioral model of decision-making processes. The pre-decision-making processes of POs are altered by actors who reframe efforts through narratives that affect the way POs make sense of a situation, their evaluation of the appropriateness of alternative actions, and their willingness to accept rule breaking. We use administrative corruption as a case of noncompliance to design a survey experiment applied to POs in a local government in Mexico. The survey adapts rationalizations of administrative corruption to test how narrative frames affect PO decision making, where a zone of noncompliance becomes acceptable.

Acknowledgments

Authors thanks contributions made by participants in the Public Administration Division Seminar 2019 and the IWPP 2018, Pittsburgh. Special thanks to Ana Rojas, Tania Romero, Eduardo Saucedo, Erika García, Veronica Jasso, Liza Fernandez, Luis Vega, and Prof. María del Pilar Fuerte Celis (CentroGeo) and Prof. Alfonso Miranda (CIDE-PANEL) for helping at different stages of the survey production.

Disclosure statement

The authors report no conflict of interest.

Data availability statement

Survey data is available at the Data Repository of the National Laboratory of Public Policy at the Center for Research and Economics Teaching. www.lnpp.mx

Notes

1 Parties agreed to publish information according to the Access to Public Informacion Act and to the Personal Data Proteccion Act. Data is publish in the Data Repository of the National Laboratory of Public Policy. lnpp.mx.

2 A third scientific partner selected a sample used by authorities to request respondent participation. Both parties agreed to share and disclose the dataset publicly, withholding names and any other item that may compromise confidentiality.

3 The survey included a 51st department to identify respondents who did not meet the minimum substitution criteria, which were same gender and same tier in the hierarchy. Respondents in the 51st represent 2.1% of the sample, accounting for cases where criteria were impossible to meet.

4 The control group is the comparison parameter in the models; it serves as the reference group.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Oliver Meza

Oliver Meza ([email protected]) is research professor in the public administration division at CIDE-Center for Research and Teachings in Economics. He received his PhD at the CIDE’s program in Public Policy and Institutional Analysis. His current research examines the behavior and decision-making process of public officials in local governments and their role in the policy processes.

Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga ([email protected]) is an assistant professor at CIDE's Drug Policy Program and a Catadrático-CONACYT at Mexico's National Council of Science and Technology. He received his PhD in political science at the Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University. His current research examines the political psychology of violence and corruption. He is also interested in the origins of vigilante action and the impact of the war on drugs across the continent.