Global governance in forestry: a cross-national analysis

ABSTRACT

On the one hand, researchers argue that global governance in forestry is fragmented and ineffective. On the other hand, some argue that global forestry governance is key to reducing forest loss related to climate change issues. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for a sample of 155 nations, this research tests the association between one type of global governance, the number of ratifications of environmental treaties that include obligations to reduce forest loss for each nation, and forest loss from 2001 to 2014. As a whole, it appears that despite a lack of unification of multilateral environmental treaties that address forest loss and the absence of a global forestry convention, multilateral forestry treaties are effective at reducing forest loss. While there are several important programs and initiatives from global forestry governance treaties impact forest loss, the effect is relatively small compared to other factors.

KEYWORDS:

• Global governance
• forest loss
• cross-national

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the Center for United Nations Constitutional Research (CUNCR) for providing me with the resident fellowship necessary to conduct this research. I also want to personally thank John Shandra, Otto Spijkers, Shahr-yar Sharei, and Andrew Hargrove for their help with comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The nations in the sample include: Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Aruba; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burundi; Cabo Verde; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Latvia; Lebanon; Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia, FYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Sao Tome and Principe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Vietnam; Zambia; Zimbabwe.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Center for United Nations Constitutional Research (CUNCR) [resident fellowship].