A dynamic game model for the study of food safety regulation based on sampling probability and penalty intensity

ABSTRACT

By constructing a dynamic game model, this article explores the ‘optimal regulation’ and the food safety regulatory mechanism to be adopted when the food safety regulatory authority has to implement a certain level of regulation. In the short term, the actual quality of food can be improved by increasing the probability of sampling or the intensity of punishment. However, in the long term, the optimal path is to improve the production technology of sellers. A moderate level of supervision makes regulation more effective, while a threshold level of regulation can reduce welfare.

KEYWORDS:

• Dynamic game
• food safety regulation
• sampling probability
• penalty intensity

JEL CLASSIFICATION:

• K20
• K32

Acknowledgments

We thank the General Project of the National Social Science Foundation of China (21BJY032) for funding.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the the National Social Science Foundation of China [21BJY032].