The Stalin plaque in Vienna: hiding and showing history

ABSTRACT

The Stalin plaque in Vienna is one of the last memorials dedicated to the Soviet dictator in Europe to endure until today. It was unveiled upon the initiative of the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) on 21 December 1949. Numerous petitions to remove it remain unheeded, but a second, explanatory plaque was added in 2012. This paper looks back at the early post-war years in order to understand the origins of this memorial. It discusses how the complex relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the KPÖ and the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) in the early post-war years influenced the history of the Stalin plaque. Austria’s defiance of complete de-stalinization is the result of local and national politics of memory and diverting interpretations of foreign policy developments. In political debates and in press reports about the non-removal of the plaque different reasons are offered. Arguments pointing to the peculiarities of Austrian politics of memory regarding controversial issues and also local (Viennese) priorities are dissected in this article. Another often quoted explanation for the memorial’s longevity is the alleged indifference of Viennese locals towards Stalin. These propositions are explored and contextualized in the political conflicts of memory in Austria.

KEYWORDS:

• Stalin
• Vienna
• memorial
• 1949
• 1913
• KPÖ
• de-stalinization

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful advice and comments. She would also like to thank the organizers and participants of the ‘Sites of Memory of Socialism and Communism in Europe’ conference in Münchenwiler, Switzerland, for their comments on a previous version of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Original text: “Die Tafel in der Schönbrunner Schlossstrasse stellt jedoch das einzige Denkmal für Stalin in ‘Westeuropa’ dar, sofern man Österreich dazu rechnet, und damit ist sie ein Kuriosum.” John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 92. All translations are my own.

2. Kriza, “Memorial as a Magnifying Glass;” and Leidinger and Moritz, Russisches Wien.

3. The following is based on: Tucker, “The Rise of Stalin,” 347–8.

4. Dubin, “The Stalin Myth;” and Tumarkin, “Long Life of Stalinism,” 1049.

5. I thank the anonymous reviewers of this paper for this information.

6. Czepczyński, Cultural Landscapes, 65.

7. Forest and Johnson, “Monumental Politics,” 283.

8. Czepczyński, Cultural Landscapes, 57.

9. Tumarkin, “Long Life of Stalinism,” 1047–48.

10. Stuhlpfarrer, “Österreich;” and Uhl, “Of Heroes and Victims.”

11. Forest and Johnson note the tendency in memory studies to present case studies as “unique”: “Monumental Politics,” 272.

12. Until the end of the Cold War, Stalin’s birth year was assumed to be 1879. Sources unearthed after 1991 suggest he might have been a year older. This discrepancy has caused confusion in some articles discussing the Stalin plaque, which assume it was placed in 1948, as this would have been Stalin’s genuine 70th birthday.

13. Tass, “Otkrytie pamiatnoi doski na zdanii.”

14. Quoted in: Leidinger and Moritz, Russisches Wien, 184.

15. Quoted in: “Westeuropas einziges Stalin-Denkmal steht in Wien,” Der Standard,March 5, 2003 (Henceforth quoted as: Der Standard, 2003).

16. Piotrowski, “The Soviet Union,” 251.

17. Piotrowski, “The Soviet Union,” 256–62; and Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich, 194–6.

18. Mueller, “Stalin, Renner,” 134–6.

19. Mueller, “Stalin, Renner,” 141–2; and Piotrowski, “The Soviet Union,” 256–66.

20. Gehler, “From Non-alignment to Neutrality,” 104–6.

21. Ibid., 107.

22. The unexpected developments in Tito’s Yugoslavia and the unpredictable outcome of Federal Germany’s decision to join NATO and to have its own army affected the Soviet Union’s strategies towards Austria in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Cf. Gehler, “From Non-alignment to Neutrality;” and Larson, “Crisis Prevention.”

23. This is not to say they did not share any goals. De-nazification was, for instance, an aim both parties shared, cf. Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich, 169.

24. The following is based on the results of Wolfgang Mueller’s archival research found in: Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich, 194ff.

25. All Allies attempted to tie loose ends before their troops withdrew from Austria and the discussions about the date of withdrawal and the creation of the State Treaty were deeply affected by the lack of trust among the Allies. Zhdanov’s claim that the USSR wanted a speedy withdrawal has to be placed in this context of negotiation and suspicion and not seen as evidence of a genuine plan to do so. Larson, “Crisis Prevention;” and Bischof, “Making of a Cold Warrior.”

26. In 1945 and 1949, parliamentary elections brought the KPÖ only roughly 5% of the votes. Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right, 15; and Mueller, “Stalin, Renner,” 154.

27. Mueller, “Stalin, Renner,” 154; Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich, 22–7; and Piotrowski, “The Soviet Union,” 260. The other neutral country between Germany and Italy is Switzerland.

28. Piotrowski, “The Soviet Union,” 255. He contrasts this with the tendency of the US occupiers to treat certain parties with suspicion, even hampering the influence of the SPÖ in some areas (cf. 256).

29. The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the SPÖ were ruling Austria together in a coalition government at the time.

30. Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich, 235.

31. “Aber Stalin ist auch der Marschall, der Generalissimus, der Vorsitzende des Ministerrates der Sowjetunion, einer Großmacht und einer Besatzungsmacht in Österreich, die entschieden Wert darauf legt, dass über ihr faktisches Staatsoberhaupt nichts anderes als sehr Schmeichelhaftes gesagt werde. Dieser Gegensatz zwischen einer historischen Rolle, um die Kampf und Hass war, und einem Machtbereich, in dem heute nur gelobt werden darf, macht nichts anderes möglich, als das Datum einfach zu verzeichnen.” “Stalins 70. Geburtstag,” Arbeiter Zeitung, December 21, 1949.

32. Another country with a rare case of a surviving Stalin plaque is the Czech Republic. The country removed most Stalin memorials during de-stalinization in the 1960s; however, a small bas-relief of Stalin remains in the small village of Studenec. The Czech case is another good example of how local politics of memory often defy transnational trends. (I thank Stanislav Holubec for pointing out the Studenec memorial to me.) Cf.: Campbell, “Empty Pedestals?”; and Richter, “Stalin Survives Village Poll.”

33. Cf.: John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 92; Leidinger and Moritz, Russisches Wien, 183.

34. Connerton,  “Seven Types of Forgetting.”, 59–71. 

35. Healy and Tumarkin, “Social Memory and Historical Justice: Introduction.”, 1007–18.

36. Czepczyński, Cultural Landscapes, 57.

37. Marschik and Spitaler, “Einleitung,” 9.

38. Cf.: Tass, “Otkrytie pamiatnoi doski na zdanii.”

39. A short-lived “Stalin revival” in the 1970s is described in: John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 101.

40. Hamann, “Vor hundert Jahren kam Stalin nach Wien;” and “Stalin-Gedenktafel,” https://www.wien.gv.at/wiki/index.php/Stalin-Gedenktafel June 14, 2017.

41. Gepp, “Drei Russen in Wien.” Gepp also quotes the Head of the Memorial Sites Department at the Interior Ministry, Barbara Schätz, as recently claiming that the Stalin memorial is protected by Article 19 of the Treaty. Similar arguments are also found in: Der Standard, 2003; John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 102.

42. Online at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000265 (accessed 29 July 2015).

43. Cf.: John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 102; Gepp, “Gedenktafel.”

44. Palm, “Wo kaufte Stalin in Meidling ein?” In response to Palm’s claim, the historian Wolfgang Müller published an article clarifying why the State Treaty does not hinder the plaque’s removal, while confronting Palm’s harmless representation of Stalin by describing the magnitude of his crimes. Müller, “Stalin-Nostalgie.”

45. “Wacht SP endlich auf? Zusatztafel für Stalin-Gedenktafel,” www.Wien-heute.at, August 4, 2011 (accessed 10 April 2014).

46. Hübner, Johannes; Rosenkrantz, Michael, “14,781/J XXIV. GP – Anfrage,” May 21, 2013. Online at: www.parlament.gv.at (accessed 5 April 2014).

47. Before and after signing the petition regarding the Stalin plaque, Hübner was part of delegations to Moscow (2008 and 2016), to Chechnya (2012) and to Crimea after its occupation by Russia (2014). Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right, 166–75. It is impossible to guess Hübner’s motivation in suggesting that Russia be asked permission to remove the plaque. A possible motive could be that this was a PR strategy to either force the SPÖ to defend keeping the plaque, to finally remove it, or for Russia to present itself in a positive light by (again) asking for its removal.

48. Spindelegger, Michael. “14,496/AB XXIV. GP – Anfragebeantwortung,” July 19, 2013. Online at: www.parlament.gv.at (accessed 5 April 2014).

49. Der Standard, 2003.

50. OTS (Original Text Service) is part of Austria Presse Agentur.

51. “‘Man müsse die Verantwortlichen wohl nicht eigens darauf hinweisen, sondern setze es als bekannt voraus, welche Rolle diesem Herrn Stalin, dem hier gedacht werde, in der Geschichte zukomme und welche Verbrechen das Objekt des in Bronze und Marmor gehaltenen städtischen Gedenkens in seinem politischen Wirkungskreis zu verantworten habe. Umso verwerflicher sei die bisherige Weigerung, diesen Schandfleck zu entfernen’, so Kickl. ‘Für die FPÖ ist die Verurteilung von Verbrechern und Massenmördern wie Hitler und Stalin eine Selbstverständlichkeit und es gibt auch keine Handlung, aus der etwas anderes abgleitet werden kann. Die SPÖ ist in Sachen Stalin-Gedenkstätte jedoch seit Jahrzehnten säumig. […]’, sagte Kickl.” FPÖ-Kickl: Erwarte Entfernung von Stalin-Gedenktafel in Wien durch Rot-Grün. Tafel für Diktator und Massenmörder ist Schandfleck. OTS, May 27, 2011. Online at: http://www.ots.at (accessed 5 April 2014).

52. Uhl, “Of Heroes and Victims,” 198.

53. Cf.: http://www.Wien-heute.at, 2011.

54. “Gemeinderat der Bundeshauptstadt Wien 19. Wahlperiode 22. Sitzung,” April 27, 2012, 6. Online at: https://www.wien.gv.at/mdb/gr/2012/gr-022-w-2012-04-27.pdf (accessed 12 May 2014).

55. “Wiener Donaupark: Che-Guevara-Büste unter Protest enthüllt,” Der Standard, October 9, 2008.

56. The original text is in German and English, but the English version on the new plaque is shorter than the German text. My translation is from the German. I thank the anonymous reviewer for suggestions on the translation.

57. Menkovic, Politische Gedenkkultur, 154.

58. Uhl, “Of Heroes and Victims,” 188. Interestingly, this was also the FPÖ’s suggestion after the Che Guevara bust was inaugurated: instead of asking to remove it, they asked for an explanatory plaque. “Che-Guevara-Büste in Wien verunstaltet,” Krone, April 28, 2009.

59. Cf. John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 92; and Der Standard, 2003.

60. Herzog, Vienna is Different, 1.

61. For these and more examples, cf. the minutes of City Council meetings at: https://www.wien.gv.at/infodat/ (accessed 28 July 2015). In 2015 a political platform that included KPÖ, Pirate and Green Party members was created under the name “Wien anders”.

62. They write: ‘[A]lthough it [seems] as if the Viennese, true to their laissez-faire mentality, have come to terms with this memorial site’.(“[E]s [scheint] aber […], als hätten sich die WienerInnen ihrer laissez-faire-Mentalität entsprechend mit diesem Gedächtnisort arrangiert.”) By now the Red Army memorial has regained significance as parts of the population of Vienna not only tolerate it, but embrace it as a symbol of freedom from fascism. Marschik and Spitaler, “Einleitung,” 9.

63. John, “Stalin in Schönbrunn,” 92. For the quote see the beginning of this paper.

64. Nemecky is quoted in: Der Standard, 2003.

65. Boris Dubin’s study about Stalin’s image in Russia shows how different images of Stalin – as a tyrant and/or as the victor of the Second World War – prevail in Russia in an atmosphere of growing indifference towards him. This multiple approach towards Stalin – to underline his crimes, his accomplishments, or both; or to remain indifferent towards him – is somewhat reminiscent of the Austrian case. Dubin, “The Stalin Myth,” 48–53.

66. Kriza, “Memorial as a Magnifying Glass,” 406–26.

67. Morton, Thunder at Twilight; Montefiore, The Young Stalin; Boyd, Waiting for Sunrise; Illies, 1913 – Der Sommer des Jahrhunderts; and Emmerson, 1913: The World Before the Great War.

68. Kriza, “Memorial as a Magnifying Glass,” 414.

69. Palm, “Wo kaufte Stalin in Meidling ein?;” Kriza, “Memorial as a Magnifying Glass,” 414–6; Laqueur, Stalin, 8; and Smith, Young Stalin, 276.

70. All these sources have been mentioned in this paper except: Günther Berger, “Stalin in Meidling” [undated]. Online in: http://www.austria-mundi.org/stalin.html (accessed 12 May 2014).

71. Kriza, “Memorial as a Magnifying Glass,” 425–6.

72. The opaqueness of Austrian-Soviet and Austrian-Russian relations is scrutinized in emerging reports that reveal the complexity and apparent ideological contradictoriness of these political relations. Recent research shows how during the Cold War, in order to bolster neutralist sentiment, to split the Right and to weaken ‘bourgeois’ parties such as the SPÖ and the ÖVP, the USSR was involved in covert support of right-wing groups in Austria and not only in supporting the KPÖ. In the twenty-first century, FPÖ initiatives to strengthen ties with Putin’s Russia have been increasingly welcomed by the Russian government as the FPÖ has begun to regain political influence from 2016 onwards. Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right, 15–16, 152, 165–75.

73. This narrative was part of the unveiling and the justification of the plaque, but the (simplifying) overemphasis of the Soviet Union’s ‘helping hand’ in Austrian independence and democracy is also part of Russian foreign-relations narratives until today. Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right, 167.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elisa Kriza

Elisa Kriza is a postdoctoral researcher at the Faculty of Humanities and Cultural Studies at the University of Bamberg, Germany. Her work focuses on memory culture, political literature and cultural interpretations of human rights. Among her publications about Stalinism and its victims are the book Alexander Solzhenitsyn: Cold War Icon, Gulag Author, Russian Nationalist? (ibidem Press, 2014), the article ‘The Memorial as a Magnifying Glass: Interpreting the Stalin Plaque in Vienna’ (German Life and Letters 68, no. 3 [2015]) and the book chapter ‘From Utopia to Dystopia? Bukharin and the Soviet Constitution of 1936ʹ published in the book ‘Discursive Framings of Human Rights: Negotiating Agency and Victimhood’ (Routledge, 2016).