![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This article examines the adverse impact of clientelist relations between political parties and campaign donors on parties’ relations with voters. Clientelism is generally conceptualized as a vertical, pyramid structure, whereby resources are distributed from politicians to voters at the base through brokers or programmatic politics. As Gherghina and VolintiruFootnote1contend, what is often overlooked is that in tandem with this vertical relationship with voters there is a complementary horizontal relationship with party donors. Parties with a weak organizational base focus on relations with party donors, such as private contractors, at the expense of their relationship with voters. Drawing on fieldwork conducted during East Timor’s 2017 parliamentary elections, I engage with Gherghina and Volintiru’s framework to argue that a bi-dimensional approach is integral to both understanding electoral outcomes and economic trajectories in developing country contexts. In East Timor, despite a decade of rampant patronage politics, the incumbent CNRT party’s prioritization of their relationship with party donors cost them the election. In turn, this focus on party donors has distorted policy and public spending priorities, with severe implications for future development.
Acknowledgements
The project is the final leg of a four-country study led by Ed Aspinall and a team of two US based researchers, Allen Hicken, and Meredith Weiss. Research has already been concluded by those researchers in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. The East Timor component of this research was conducted in partnership with the East Timorese NGO Belun, with the valuable assistance of their national Early Warning, Early Response (EWER) programme network of volunteer conflict monitors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Gherghina and Volintiru, A New Model of Clientelism.
2 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters and Clientelism, 438.
3 Bardhan and Mookherjee, Political Clientelism and Capture.
4 Weiss, “Going to the Ground,” 270.
5 Manzetti and Wilson, Corrupt Governments, 954.
6 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages,” 8.
7 Anderson et al., Clientelism in Indian villages, 1751.
8 Grzymala-Busse, Beyond Clientelism.
9 Berenschot, Informal democratization.
10 Ibid.
11 Aspinall, When Brokers Betray.
12 Gherghina and Volintiru, A New Model of Clientelism, 123.
13 Ibid.,121.
14 Ibid., 126.
15 Shoesmith, “Timor-Leste,” 325.
16 Gherghina and Volintiru, A New Model of Clientelism.
17 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters and Clientelism.
18 An earlier article by the research team was published out of this data for the Journal of Democracy’ “Timor-Leste Votes: Parties and Patronage.”
20 Traube, Cosmology and Social Life.
21 Cummins, Democracy or Democrazy?
22 The Asia Foundation, “Timor-Leste 2016 Tatoli.”
23 Veenendaal, “Democracy in Microstates,” 19.
24 The first election, in 2001, was for a Constituent Assembly. It became a parliament through a clause inserted in the constitution.
25 See, for example, Audit Chamber, “Millennium Development Infrastructure Fund.”
26 Scambary, In Search of White Elephants.
27 Shoesmith, Timor-Leste, 330.
28 Tempo Semanal, Pakote Referendum.
29 Everett, Oil in Timor-Leste.
30 World Bank and Ministry of Finance, Timor-Leste Public Expenditure Review.
31 Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi, Peace, Prosperity and Safety Nets, 288.
32 European Union, Election Observation Mission.
33 Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi, Peace, Prosperity and Safety Nets.
34 La’o Hamutuk, The National Impact.
35 European Union, Election Observation Mission.
36 Ibid.
37 Scambary, “The Road to Nowhere.”
38 Scambary, In Search of White Elephants, 296.
39 European Union, Election Observation Mission.
40 Interview with CNE election observer, July 28.
41 Interview with senior KHUNTO party campaigner, July 27, 2017.
42 East Timor Anti-Corruption Commission, Corruption Perception Survey.
43 See, for example, International Republican Institute, National Public Opinion Survey.
44 Aspinall et al., Timor-Leste Votes, 160.
45 Interview with FRETILIN village coordinator, July 20, 2017.
46 Interview with CNRT municipal coordinator, July 25, 2017.
47 International Republican Institute, National Public Opinion Survey.
48 Berenschot, Brokers, Voters and Clientelism.
49 Aspinall, When Brokers Betray, 554.
50 Krishna, “Politics in the Middle,” 145.
51 Scambary, The Role of Local Authorities.
52 Interview with village chief, July 20, 2017.
53 Aspinall et al., Timor-Leste Votes, 163.
54 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages.”
55 Aspinall, When Brokers Betray, 548.
56 Focus group with four national researchers, Dili, July 29, 2017.
57 Ibid.
58 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages,” 9.
59 This observation is drawn from multiple private conversations with government and donor officials while working on this project as a consultant on three different occasions.
60 Gherghina and Volintiru, A New Model of Clientelism, 123.
61 Deloitte, Review of Electricity Timor-Leste.
62 World Bank and RDTL Ministry of Finance, Public Expenditure Review.
63 Audit Chamber, Millennium Development Infrastructure Fund.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters and Clientelism, 183.
67 Beck, Oecusse Economic and Trade Potential.
68 Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters and Clientelism.
69 Berenschot, Brokers, Voters and Clientelism.
70 Khemani, Buying Votes.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
James Scambary
Dr. James Scambary is a research fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Melbourne, and a visiting fellow in the Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, Canberra. Since 2006, James has been researching the intersections between conflict, peacebuilding, informal governance and organized crime in East Timor. In addition to academic research and teaching roles, James has performed research consultancy roles for a range of agencies including the World Bank and the New York Social Science Research Council.