https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4327-9326
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ABSTRACT
Ghana provides an interesting case of a democratic developing country in which clientelism is pervasive yet vote buying is rare. Drawing on fieldwork and recent scholarship, and situated within the comparative frame that animates this special issue, I characterize clientelism in Ghana as party-centred, with resources from the public sector and privately-held commodities, and with significant factionalism within major (party) networks. Building on secondary sources, I explain how the historical development of party and electoral institutions – especially during a period of democratization in the 1990s – enabled Ghana’s two main parties to be so central in clientelist politics. Elections are won by either of two quasi-ethnic parties, so campaigns centre around maximizing turnout of likely voters as voters have limited ability to exit their party. Thus, where democratization leads to a strong party system, limited voter mobility may limit individual vote buying. The theoretical implication is that historical moments of institutional creation, rather than the mere institutions themselves, may prove consequential for the varieties of clientelism that endure.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Ward Berenschot and Ed Aspinall for inspiring and guiding this special issue of Democratization. I would also like to thank Meredith Weiss, Adam Auerbach, Ed Aspinall, and the anonymous reviewers for a wealth of careful and constructive feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
ORCID
Barry Driscoll http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4327-9326
Notes
1 Bwalya, “Unravelling Clientelism in the Zambian Electoral Campaigns”; Mares and Young, “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes”; Mares, Muntean, and Petrova, “Pressure, Favours, and Vote-Buying.”
2 Auyero, “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina”; Koter, “King Makers”; Koter, “Urban and Rural Voting Patterns in Senegal”; de Kadt and Larreguy, “Agents of the Regime?”; Also see Mares and Young, “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes” on the role of employers in clientelist relations.
3 Holland and Palmer-Rubin, “Beyond the Machine.”
4 Arghiros, Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand.
5 Purdey, Aspinall, and As’ad, “Understanding Family Politics.”
6 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia.
7 Auerbach, “Clients and Communities.”
8 Booth and Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa.
9 I define clientelism as the contingent and reciprocal exchange of rewards for political support.
10 I do not focus on the strand of this literature examining individual-level determinants.
11 Baland and Robinson, “The Political Value of Land.”
12 Kuo and Teorell, “Illicit Tactics as Substitutes”; Lehoucq and Molina, Stuffing the Ballot Box.
13 Gans-Morse et al., “Varieties of Clientelism”; Chang and Golden, “Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption.”
14 Nathan, “Does Participation Reinforce Patronage?”; Mattes, “South Africa’s Emerging Black Middle Class.”; Keefer, “Programmatic Parties.”
15 It is not my argument that a correlates approach is “wrong,” but that the approach is potentially indeterminate since the list of relevant institutions is likely considerable.
16 Rabinowitz, “More than Elections.”
17 Barkan, Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, “In Search of Honorable Membership”; Abdulai and Hickey, “The Politics of Development under Competitive Clientelism.”
18 This is despite the minimal ideological distance between the main parties. See Riedl, Authoritarian Origins Of Democratic Party Systems In Africa, 186; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, “Ghana.”
19 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook V8.” The same is shown in the index produced by Riedl, Authoritarian Origins Of Democratic Party Systems In Africa.
20 Ahwoi, “The Legal Framework for Decentralization: Issues and Challenges,” 6.
21 Yirenkyi, “The Role of Christian Churches in National Politics”; Kuperus, “Democratization, Religious Actors, and Political Influence.”
22 Goldstein and Udry, “The Profits of Power.”
23 Boafo-Arthur, “Chieftaincy in Ghana,” 132.
24 Abdulai, “Competitive Clientelism and the Political Economy of Mining in Ghana,” 33.
25 Ray, “Chief-State Relations in Ghana-Divided Sovereignty and Legitimacy,” 62; Boafo-Arthur, “Chieftaincy and Politics in Ghana since 1982”; Boafo-Arthur, “Chieftaincy in Ghana.”
26 Other survey data add to this finding. Only 5% of respondents said “personal gifts, assistance, or promises thereof from candidates” determined their vote choice in the 2000 election. Lindberg and Morrison, “Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic?,” 117.
27 Driscoll, “Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage” Also Kitschelt and Yildirim in this issue.
28 Padró i Miquel, “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies.”
29 Afrobarometer Round 5.
30 Kalter et al., “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU)[Dataset].” Data are pooled across countries. Excludes people refusing to answer those ineligible or not voting in the previous election.
31 McElwee et al., “The Missing Obama Millions”; Skelley, “Just How Many Obama 2012-Trump 2016 Voters Were There?”
32 Taylor, “Ethnic Politics and Election Campaigns in Contemporary Africa”; Resnick, “Democracy, Decentralization, and District Proliferation.”
33 Weghorst and Lindberg, “Effective Opposition Strategies”; Weghorst and Lindberg, “What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?”; Gadjanova, “Electoral Clientelism as Status Affirmation in Africa”; Harding, “Attribution And Accountability.”
34 Nichter, “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying?”; Nichter, “Conceptualizing Vote Buying.”
35 Kopecky’s expert survey found that Ghana’s judicial institutions at the ministerial level were highly politicized, while its courts (“executing institutions”) were strikingly depoliticized. See Table 2, column 3. Kopeckỳ, “Political Competition and Party Patronage.” Also Appiah and Abdulai, “Competitive Clientelism and the Politics of Core Public Sector Reform in Ghana.”
36 Africa Confidential, “Who Paid Whom for What?”; See Opoku and Sandberg, Challenges to African Entrepreneurship in the 21st Century, 65 for another example of legal protection.
37 Ghana Center for Democratic Development, “Democracy Watch”; Rahman, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Ghana.”
38 Pitcher, Party Politics And Economic Reform In Africa’s Democracies, 99.
39 Whitfield et al., The Politics Of African Industrial Policy, 240; Opoku and Sandberg, Challenges to African Entrepreneurship in the 21st Century, 59, 63.
40 Driscoll, “Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage.”
41 This category does not include staff of non-decentralized departments even if they share the assembly building. District staff, therefore, does not include teachers, police, or nurses.
42 GNI calculated at $1,550 using 2012 World Bank data.
43 World Bank, “Project Information Document (PID).”
44 Interview, “Interview with Guba District Assemblyman Charles Awoni, Ghana.”
45 Asante and Kunnath, “The Cost of Politics in Ghana.”
46 This basic observation is found throughout the work of Whitfield, Appiah, and Abdulai, among others.
47 Whitfield et al., The Politics Of African Industrial Policy, 235.
48 Nyavor, “NDPC 40-Year Development Agenda Must Be Binding on Govts. Governance Expert”; Appiah and Abdulai, “Competitive Clientelism and the Politics of Core Public Sector Reform in Ghana.”
49 Ichino and Nathan, “Primary Elections in New Democracies.”
50 The following draws on Whitfield et al., The Politics Of African Industrial Policy, 253.
51 Bob-Milliar, “Place and Party Organizations”; Bob-Milliar, “Political Party Activism in Ghana”; Bob-Milliar, “Party Factions and Power Blocs in Ghana”; Bob-Milliar, “Party Youth Activists and Low-Intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana.”
52 Asunka et al., “Electoral Fraud or Violence”; Klaus and Paller, “Defending the City, Defending Votes.”
53 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, “Ghana: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency,” 98.
54 Hirano, Snyder Jr., and Ting, “Distributive Politics with Primaries.”
55 Ghana News Agency, “Nadowli District Chief Executive Hosts NDC Foot Soldiers.”
56 Afrobaromter Round 5.
57 Cited in Bob-Milliar, “Political Party Activism in Ghana,” 677.
58 Graphic, “NDC Foot Soldiers Protest against Kumasi MCE’s Nomination.”
59 Driscoll, “Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage.”
60 In districts where the average margin in presidential elections between 2000 and 2012 was 5% or less, 20% had more than one chief executive between 2009 and 2012. By contrast, in districts where that electoral margin was greater than 5% (i.e. less competitive places), only 7% had more than one chief executive in the same period, a difference that is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
61 Cited in Driscoll, “Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage.”
62 This section will barely scratch the surface of the causes of party system institutionalization. Readers should consult the major work from which this section draws: Riedl, Authoritarian Origins Of Democratic Party Systems In Africa.
63 Goertz and Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures, 101; Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,” 586; Waldner, “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms,” 70; Zaks, “Relationships Among Rivals (RAR).”
64 Allman, The Quills Of The Porcupine.
65 Austin, Politics In Ghana, 1946–1960, 344. Nkrumah’s enduring importance in party politics can be seen in the “Nkrumahist” socialist tradition that became (mostly) subsumed within Rawlings’ PNDC and later NDC. The “Nkrumahist” tradition has stood against the “Danquah-Busia” tradition for the duration of independent Ghana, the latter typically led by educated professionals and found today in the New Patriotic Party.
66 Bening, “Evolution of the Administrative Boundaries of Ashanti, 1896–1951,” 150.
67 Schildkrout, People Of The Zongo.
68 Fridy, “A Freezing Moment in Ghana’s Party System”; Iddi, “Issues in Ghana’s Electoral Politics”.
69 Asantes are the largest Akan group.
70 Riedl, Authoritarian Origins Of Democratic Party Systems In Africa.
71 Ibid., 134.
72 Ibid., 136.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 139.
75 Ibid., 142.
76 Ibid., 143–5.
77 Ibid., 140.
78 Shefter’s work on bureaucratization is an example of this.
79 McDonnell, “Patchwork Leviathan: How Pockets of Bureaucratic Governance Flourish within Institutionally Diverse Developing States”; Asunka, “Non-Discretionary Resource Allocation as Political Investment: Evidence from Ghana”; Williams, “The Political Economy of Unfinished Development Projects: Corruption, Clientelism, or Collective Choice?”
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Barry Driscoll
Barry Driscoll is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Grinnell College. He studies states in the political economy of development in sub-Saharan Africa. His current project examines how states in many contemporary developing countries are shaped by the twin logics of competitive electoral politics and decentralized governance.