https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9159-5024
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ABSTRACT
Virtually all authoritarian regimes have legislatures, and their role in bolstering regimes has been highlighted in recent research. Yet, the strength of authoritarian legislatures has received relatively little attention, although it can differ remarkably across regimes. This study utilizes an index of legislative strength to analyse parliaments in authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010. The empirical findings highlight that three factors are particularly important in predicting legislative strength, namely the level of personalism and the existence of an opposition and elections. However, beyond these factors, it appears that stronger legislatures are not generally associated with less authoritarian control over legislative and electoral processes. Yet, the findings also illustrate significant differences between de facto and de jure powers and across time periods. More competitive electoral and legislative procedures are linked to more de facto powers and stronger legislatures particularly after 1990. The findings contribute to our understanding of the institutional landscape in authoritarian regimes and provide a basis for future research on the effects of legislative strength.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Chen Xi, Pierre F. Landry, James F. Downes, Zheng Ruoting and two anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions for revising the manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Gandhi, Political Institutions; Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain.”
2 Geddes, “Democratization After Twenty Years.”
3 Adiputri, “Empowerment of Parliament”; Egreteau, “Towards Legislative Institutionalisation.”
4 Wilson and Woldense, “Contested or Established?”
5 Bonvecchi and Simison, “Legislative Institutions and Performance.”
6 Wilson and Woldense, “Contested or established.”
7 Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism.”
8 Gandhi and Przeworski, “Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion.”
9 Gandhi, Political Institutions; Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
10 Truex, Making Autocracy Work; Manion, Information for Autocrats; Williamson and Magaloni, “Legislatures and Policymaking.”
11 Gandhi, Political Institutions.
12 Wright and Escribá-Folch, “Authoritarian Institutions.”
13 Bonvecchi and Simison, “Legislative Institutions and Performance”; Koeker, “Why Dictators Veto.”
14 Svolik, “Power Sharing.”
15 Grundholm, “Taking it Personal”; Magaloni, “Credible Power-sharing.”
16 Svolik, “Politics of Authoritarian Rule.”
17 Boix and Svolik, “Foundations of Limited Authoritarian.”
18 Truex, “The Returns to Office”; Lust-Okar, “Elections under authoritarianism.”
19 Noble, “Authoritarian Amendments”; Lü, Liu, and Li, “Policy Coalition Building.”
20 Bonvecchi and Simison, “Legislative Institutions and Performance.”
21 Gandhi, Political Institutions; Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain.”
22 Brownlee, Authoritarianism; Gandhi, Political Institutions.
23 Opalo, Legislative Development in Africa.
24 Collord, “Political Economy of Institutions”; Opalo, Legislative Development in Africa.
25 Gandhi, Political Institutions; Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain”; Woo and Conrad, “Differential Effects.”
26 Opalo, Legislative Development in Africa.
27 Bonvecchi and Simison, “Legislative Institutions and Performance.”
28 Collord, “Political Economy of Institutions,” 14.
29 Fish and Kroenig, Handbook of National Legislatures.
30 Wilson and Woldense, “Contested or Established?”
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 590.
33 Bonvecchi and Simison, “Legislative Institutions and Performance.”
34 Wilson and Woldense, “Contested or Established,” 590.
35 Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik, “Legislatures and Legislative Politics,” 3.
36 Schuler, “Position Taking.”
37 Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies.”
38 Gandhi, Political Institutions.
39 Albrecht, “Opposition Support Authoritarianism.”
40 Malesky and Schuler, “Nodding or Needling.”
41 Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics; Koehler, “Authoritarian Elections in Egypt.”
42 Malesky and Schuler, “Nodding or Needling.”
43 Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 55.
44 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, How Dictatorships Work.
45 Grundholm, “Taking it Personal”; Roessler, “The Enemy Within.”
46 Opalo, Legislative Development in Africa.
47 Collord, “Political Economy of Institutions.”
48 Stratmann and Baur, “Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation”; Krol, “Amending Legislatures.”
49 Collord, “Political Economy of Institutions.”
50 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, How Dictatorships Work.
51 Wilson and Woldense, “Contested or Established?”
52 Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook v8.
53 Przeworski, Political Institutions and Political Events.
54 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, How Dictatorships Work.
55 Geddes, “Democratization After Twenty Years”; Grundholm, “Taking it Personal.”
56 Haber and Menaldo, “Natural Resources.”
57 Fish and Kroenig, “Handbook of National Legislatures.”
58 Haber and Menaldo, “Natural Resources.”
59 Gandhi, Political Institutions.
60 Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes”; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
61 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 5.
62 Mayhew, Congress; Ferejohn, “Incumbent Performance.”
63 Collord, “Political Economy of Institutions”; Opalo, Legislative Development in Africa.
64 Woo and Conrad, “Differential Effects of ‘Democratic’ Institutions.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Felix Wiebrecht
Felix Wiebrecht is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Government and Public Administration at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include authoritarianism, legislatures, and consultative institutions.