https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5466-9602
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ABSTRACT
This article provides an empirical overview of political polarization in Korea from 2004 to 2021 based on a wealth of longitudinal surveys. We consider elite as well as mass polarization, document the extent of ideological polarization in terms of standard left-right measures, and consider more specific forms of polarization, including affective polarization and the specific issues that are proving divisive. We find that polarization in the country has increased over time, but not among the electorate as a whole. Rather partisan identifiers and party activists of the two main parties have shown a movement towards the extremes in terms of ideology, issue positions, and aversion towards the other party. For both legislators and the voting public, the substantive scope of political polarization is widening, encompassing not only foreign policy but also economic issues that had not seen strong signs of partisan divergence in the past.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2018- LAB-1250002) and by the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Chair. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 4th Annual Workshop of the Korea Inequality Research Lab (KIRL) held on August 30th-31st, 2022. We would like to express thanks to Timo Fleckenstein, Eunyoung Ha, Woo Chang Kang, Cheol-Sung Lee, Frederick Solt, Jong-sung You, and other KIRL participants for their valuable feedback. We also appreciate comments from Edward Goldring, Ji Yeon (Jean) Hong, Jai Kwan Jung, Jung Kim, and Nae-Young Lee.
Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC) at https://www.ksdcdb.kr/data/, reference numbers [1487, 1868, 2078, 2392, 2533, 2677, 2710].
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Lachat, “The Impact of Party Polarization on Ideological Voting”; Levendusky, “Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters.”
2 Layman et al., “Party Polarization in American Politics.”
3 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center; McCarty, Polarization; Jeong. “South Korean Identity,” 3.
4 Iyengar et al., “Affective Polarization in the United States.”
5 McCoy et al., “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy.”
6 Slater and Arugay, “Polarizing Figures.”
7 Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World.
8 Some notable exceptions in English include Dalton et al., “The Patterns of Party Polarization in East Asia”; Slater and Arugay, “Polarizing Figures”; Arugay and Slater, “Polarization without Poles”; Mietzner, “Sources of Resistance to Democratic Decline”; Wilkinson, “Democratic Consolidation and Failure.”
9 Lee, “Main Source of Ideological Conflict in Korea”; Ka, “Voters’ Participation in Election and Partisan Polarization”; Park et al., “20th Korean National Assembly Election”; Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election”; Kim and Lee, “Partisan Identity and Affective Polarization in South Korea.”
10 Lee, “[The Unlikeable Presidential Election].”
11 Kim and Lee, “Partisan Identity and Affective Polarization in South Korea.”
12 Kim, “South Korean Democratization.”
13 Choi, “Reconsidering the Korean Democracy.”
14 Choi, “Reconsidering the Korean Democracy”; Shin, “South Korea’s Democratic Decay”; Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”
15 Jeong, “South Korean Identity”; Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election.”
16 Im, Development and Change of Korean Democracy Since the Democratic Transition of 1987; Choi, Democracy After Democratization.
17 Park, “Successor Parties in Korean Politics”
18 Choi 2006; Kwak, “The Splits and Mergers of Korean Parties”; Park, “Successor Parties in Korean Politics.”
19 Kwak, “The Splits and Mergers of Korean Parties”; Park “The 1987 System.”
20 Park, “The 1987 System”; Park, “Successor Parties in Korean Politics”; Roh and Lee, “Is the Korean Party System Unstable After Democratization?”
21 Hellmann, “The Development of Party Systems”; Dalton and Tanaka, “The Patterns of Party Polarization in East Asia.”
22 See Appendix Figure 5.
23 Roh and Lee, “Is the Korean Party System Unstable After Democratization?”
24 Hellmann, “The Development of Party Systems”; Roh and Lee, “Is the Korean Party System Unstable After Democratization?,”18.
25 Dalton and Tanaka, “The Patterns of Party Polarization in East Asia”; Jou, “Left-Right Schema in East Asia”; Shin and Jhee, “How Does Democratic Regime Change Affect Mass Political Ideology?”
26 See Part I in the Appendix for further description of the data.
27 Cheong and Haggard, “Polarization in Korea Part I.”
28 Hanelt, “In the Orbit of Democracy: Satellite Parties in South Korea’s 2020 Parliamentary Election.”
29 Jeong, “South Korean Identity”; Lee, “Partisan Polarization in the South Korean Mass Public.”
30 Lee, “South Koreans’ Ideological Disposition,” 327.
31 Lee, “Main Source of Ideological Conflict in Korea.”
32 Yun, “2002 Presidential Election in South Korea”; Lee, “Main Source of Ideological Conflict in Korea”; Lee, “Partisan Polarization in the South Korean Mass Public”
33 Hernández et al., “Affective Polarization and the Salience of Elections.”
34 For robustness checks of potential concerns using the KGSS data, see Part II of the Appendix.
35 The result remains largely consistent after including both the Democratic Party and Uri Party as the left party for the year 2004. The median point among the left party identifiers moves closer to the middle (from 3 to 4) when both left parties are pooled.
36 See Kim and Lee, “Partisan Identity and Affective Polarization in South Korea” for an application to South Korea.
37 Saunders and Abramowitz, “Ideological Realignment and Active Partisans in the American Electorate”; Layman et al., “Party Polarization in American Politics”; Collitt and Highton, “The Policy Polarization of Party Activists in the United States.”
38 Aldrich, “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism”; Miller and Schofield, “Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States”; Carmines and Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics; Layman et al., “Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics.”
39 Aldrich, “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism.”
40 Kim and Lee, “Ideological Orientation and Conflict of the Korean People”; Kang, “Ideological Traits of South Korea’s Domestic Conflict.”
41 Lee, “Main Source of Ideological Conflict in Korea”; Ka, “Has the Korean National Assembly been polarized”; Hur et al., “Does Ideological Polarization Persist?”; Kang, “19th National Assembly of Korea.”
42 Lee, “South Koreans’ Ideological Disposition”; Jeon, “16th Korean National Assembly”; Han, “Elite Polarization in South Korea.”
43 Ka et. al. 2008, Lee, “[The Unlikeable Presidential Election]”; Han, “Elite Polarization in South Korea.”
44 Kang, “19th National Assembly of Korea”; Park et al., “20th Korean National Assembly Election”; Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election.”
45 Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election”; Park et al., “20th Korean National Assembly Election”; Kang, “19th National Assembly of Korea”; Lee and Lee, “A Study of Influence of Ideological Voting.”
46 See Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election,” 77–80 for further details.
47 Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election.”
48 Lee, “Main Source of Ideological Conflict in Korea”; Park et al., “20th Korean National Assembly Election”; Kang, “19th National Assembly of Korea”; Kang et al., “21st Korean National Assembly Election.”
49 Lee and Lee, “The Political Effect of Traditional Media and New Media.”
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Yeilim Cheong
Yeilim Cheong is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Her research interests include political polarization, political parties, and consequences of authoritarian rule in new democracies as well as various forms of political opposition in autocracies.
Stephan Haggard
Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego. He has a long-standing interest in transitions to and from democratic rule and has most recently published Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World (2021, with Robert Kaufman).