ABSTRACT
This article considers differentiated cooperation between European Union (EU) member states and third countries in diplomatic statements at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Using a novel dataset on interventions in OSCE Permanent Council meetings, it analyzes when and why third countries align with the EU's positions. The observed alignment patterns underline the complexity of third country motivations to form part of the EU's diplomatic alliances, such as their institutional proximity to the organization, or their own involvement in regional conflicts. In so doing the article explores the limits of differentiated diplomatic cooperation with the EU in multilateral security organizations. It also points to the constraints the EU faces when trying to establish itself as a relevant player in European and international security through diplomatic acceptance and amplification of its own views by others.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré and Monika Sus for their tremendous work as the organizers of the EUI seminar which led to this special issue. I would also like to thank all the participants of the seminar for the fruitful discussions and useful feedback received. Lastly, I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the CSP editors for their useful feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 More precisely the negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act and the later Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the OSCE's immediate predecessor.
2 Both Moldova and Ukraine have received official candidate status in June 2022 in the context of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine.