https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1312-629X
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ABSTRACT
Shortfalls in personnel are common across UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). An ongoing concern is that many PKOs lack sufficient resources to effectively fulfil their mandates. This may in turn be a major contributing factor to shortages of peacekeepers. How do provisions of non-personnel resources to UN PKOs shape other states’ voluntary commitments of peacekeeping personnel? This study focuses on the role of the U.S.’s voluntary peacekeeping assistance as a mechanism for reducing personnel shortfall. By providing additional assistance for specific peacekeeping operations, the U.S. enhances the ability of states that are willing but lack the resources to deploy peacekeepers and increases the willingness of states that are otherwise reluctant to make personnel commitments to these operations. In turn, these provisions of support lead to greater personnel commitments to the missions where the U.S. allocates this aid. Results from an analysis of U.S. peacekeeping assistance and personnel commitments within UN operations from 2000 to 2015 indicate that these aid provisions lead to reductions in shortfalls of peacekeepers. These findings suggest that the U.S. not only increases collective personnel commitments by providing this additional assistance but, in doing so, may also enhance the effectiveness of the missions it supports.
KEYWORDS:
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 For instance, the US’ Global Peace Operations Initiative, established by the George W. Bush Administration in 2004, was created to “alleviate the perceived shortage of worldwide trained peacekeepers and ‘gendarmes,’ as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them” (Serafino Citation2009). Also, see Smith (Citation2013).
2 The Appendix provides more descriptive information about the US’s peacekeeping assistance programs.
3 This problem was a central feature of the Brahimi Report, a central UN document which outlines recommendations for transforming peacekeeping to meet challenges in the 21st century (see https://undocs.org/A/55/305).
4 Smith (Citation2013, p. 77) highlights that the U.S. is “the largest bilateral capacity-builder of any UN member state.” 5 For example see https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/IPI-ERPT-European-Contributions.pdf Accessed April 16, 2022; also see Henke (Citation2019, p. 152).
5 As a starting point, see Bobrow and Boyer Citation1997.
6 While the UN reimburses countries for their personnel provisions, recent scholarly work, in addition to surveys conducted by the UN, has shown that, for most states, these reimbursements do not cover the full range of costs that states pay to participate (Coleman Citation2014, Coleman and Nyblade Citation2018).
7 In fact, Henke (Citation2019) codes the US as the lead state for 29 out of 38 UN missions initiated between 1990 and 2005. A state is considered a lead state if it ranks three standard deviations above the mean in the number of times that it vocally advocates for a mission in the UNSC and engaged in diplomatic attempts at conflict resolution with a mission host prior to the formation of the mission.
8 For instance, Guéhenno (Citation2015, p. 206) observes that many African armies were overstretched and lacked the selfsustainment capacity necessary for quick deployments to UNAMID at the outset of the mission.
9 Authorization values come from Passmore, Shannon, and Hart (Citation2018).
10 Personnel contribution values come from the IPI’s peacekeeping data.
11 Other studies similarly highlight that the U.S. provided substantial mission-specific training and equipment for peacekeepers deployed to Darfur (Soderberg Citation2011, p. 18).
12 The types of non-personnel commitments made by the U.S. referred to here are made beyond what the U.S. pays for its financial assessments to the UN. It is important to note that while some voluntary contributions of material resources to specific operations are formally accounted for within the UN’s peacekeeping budget, these tend to make up a very small proportion of operational expenses, and additional ad hoc voluntary contributions are not accounted for in the budgeting process (see Coleman Citation2014, p. 6).
13 In another example, Coleman and Williams (Citation2017, p. 12) highlight that, in 2015, the U.S. and France were key partners in assisting Gabon to airlift essential equipment to its contingent, a rapid reaction battalion, in MINUSCA. Also see https://www.africom.mil/article/27841/gabonese-interoperability-with-u-s-france-key-to-minusca-incentral-africa, Accessed April 10, 2022.
14 In a more recent example, the U.S. provided “four MD530 helicopters, spare parts, and related crew training” to El Salvador to “sustain the deployment of an aviation unit” to MINUSMA, see https://usun.usmission.gov/factsheet-u-s-commitments-at-the-2021-seoul-peacekeeping-ministerial/ and Accessed April 10, 2022.
15 For example, in 2014, the U.S. began providing mission-specific training for several states deploying police units to MINUSCA (see Brown Citation2021).
16 In 2021, the U.S. pledged different forms of peacekeeping assistance that align with each of these categories and aim to support the following more general goals: “enable peacekeepers to safely operate in higher-risk mission environments”, “strengthen medical capabilities to keep peacekeepers safe in the field”, “enhance peacekeeping intelligence to enable information-led operations”, and “ensure peacekeepers have the training facilities they need to effectively prepare for mission deployments”, among others. The U.S. also pledged to assist specific operations and personnel contributors. See https://usun.usmission.gov/fact-sheet-u-s-commitments-at-the-2021-seoulpeacekeeping-ministerial/ Accessed April 10, 2022.
17 The first recorded value in the data for U.S. peacekeeping assistance is in 1999.
18 The mission year is used as opposed to mission month since the values for U.S. peacekeeping assistance are only recorded annually.
19 For instance, assume shortfall in a hypothetical mission UNRX in 2010 is 1000 peacekeepers. This means that the actual number of personnel deployed to the mission is 1000 fewer than the level authorized by the UN. If shortfall in 2011 is 500, then the change in shortfall between 2010 and 2011 is -500. This indicates an increase in the total number of peacekeeping personnel to UNRX.
21 Table A.1 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for the variables including the analysis.
22 This analysis is relegated to the appendix as the available data for these commitments end in 2010 and thus reduce the sample size significantly.
23 The range of years for this data match those from the main analysis.
24 Table A.6 in the appendix also reports the top three increases in personnel commitments by country within each mission where the U.S. provided assistance.
27 See GAO-18-243 https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-243.pdf and GAO-06-331 https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao06-331-highlights.pdf Accessed April 11, 2022
28 https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20001108.gaspd199.doc.html; https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sgsm21062.doc.htm Accessed April 16, 2022
29 Importantly, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the measures for US peacekeeping assistance and financial commitments is positive but low at 0.27.
30 See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmis/background.shtml Accessed April 11, 2022
31 See https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2007/95812.htm Accessed April 11, 2022
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jared Oestman
Jared Oestman, b. 1989, PhD in Political Science (Rice University, 2022); Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; research interests: foreign policy, peacekeeping, conflict resolution.