Hybrid Neoliberalism: Capitalist Development in Contemporary Iran

ABSTRACT

This article contends that Iranian neoliberalisation problematises the dominant methodological tendencies that either emphasise factors operating within national borders or privilege the global institutionalisation of market-driven reforms without leaving sufficient room for the agency of domestic forces. In contrast, informed by a relational method of analysis, it argues that Iran's neoliberal restructuring was part of a response to the global crisis of overaccumulation that hit the Global South in the 1980s. Aiming to revive capital accumulation, some members of the ruling class viewed integration into the new global economy, characterised by the internationalisation of capital, as an alternative developmental strategy that would generate economic growth. While the uneven development of capitalism, the movement of international capital and the international rivalries arising out of the emergence of new centres of accumulation have drastically impacted Iranian restructuring, the struggles of an emerging internationally-oriented capital fraction and a reconfigured nationalist class force have equally shaped the process. The upshot of this has been a particular form of hybrid neoliberalism. With its sensitivity towards external and internal determinants and global and local dynamics, the paper suggests that the methodological approach of the study as an interpretive mode of enquiry could be deployed for the analysis of neoliberal restructuring anywhere.

KEYWORDS:

• Fractions of capital
• hybrid neoliberalism
• internal relations/totality
• internationalisation of capital
• Iran
• uneven development

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Andreas Bieler, Kamran Matin, Adam David Morton, Joerg Nowak, Daniel Ritter, Roberto Roccu and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions on the earlier drafts of this paper. Remaining errors and oversights are the author's sole responsibility.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 In the Persian language, ‘state’ is translated to ‘dolat’ while in the Iranian political structure and the public realm ‘dolat’ generally refers to ‘government’. For this reason, a better translation of ‘state’ is ‘hokumat’. This is crucial in the argument because I consider both government and public ownership as two forms of state ownership. Accordingly, throughout the article, government-own enterprises (GOEs) and publicly-owned enterprises (POEs) will be categorised as two types of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

2 For detailed accounts of the IRGC’ involvement in the privatisation process see Alfoneh (2010) and Iran Online (2016).

3 This figure is also speculated by some commentators and journalists. For instance, see Mojtaba Hosseini's Interview with Asadollah Asgar-Owladi in Etemad (2017).

4 For more information about foreign investments in Iran after the nuclear deal see Reuters. (2017), BBC Persian. (2018a) and BBC Persian. (2018b).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kayhan Valadbaygi

Kayhan Valadbaygi is a fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ) in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham. He successfully defended his Ph.D. thesis on 30 January 2020.