Anti-populist discourse in Greece and Argentina in the 21^st century

ABSTRACT

In recent years, especially after the outbreak of the economic crisis, the phenomenon of populism has returned to the forefront. Populism is all around us, on the front pages of the newspapers, in the political repertoire, in academic papers. Politicians, journalists and researchers discuss this phenomenon, try to define it, examine its principal features and analyse its relationship with democracy. A large part of the mainstream parties and politicians have succeeded, through a strong anti-populist rhetoric, in consolidating the idea that populism is a dangerous ideology. Technocrats, mainstream media and many researchers blame the anti-establishment parties and argue that populism is an ‘irrational’ phenomenon that threatens politics and society. But is that really the case? In this article, we examine anti-populism after the economic collapse in Greece (2008/09) and Argentina (2001) to highlight the danger that derives from this kind of discourse. Our main goal is to find the chief characteristics of anti-populist discourse in both countries in order to emphasize its problematic and controversial perspective.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Yannis Stavrakakis and Pierre Ostiguy for their support and extremely valuable feedback on earlier versions of this piece, and Paris Aslanidis for his helpful advice. Moreover, I would like to thank the editor of JPI, Michael Freeden, and both reviewers for their insightful comments on the article. The PhD research of Grigoris Markou was financially supported by the General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT) and Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation (HFRI) (Scholarship Code: 391).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. This article was presented as a paper at the PSA 68th Annual International Conference, 26–28 March 2018, Cardiff, Wales, UK, under the title: ‘Populism and anti-populism in the semi periphery: Lessons from Greece and Argentina’. One part of the same research has been presented at the workshop of Populism Specialist Group (PSA) ‘Defining populism: concepts, contexts, genealogies’, 23–24/03/2018. The title of the presentation was: ‘Populism or civilization? Anti-populist discourse in Greece and Argentina in the 21st century’, University of Bath, Bath, England, UK.

2. Over the last decades, a number of liberal, social-democratic and conservative parties have followed neoliberal paths and have promoted austerity policies in their countries. It seems that neoliberalism is gradually replacing the ‘mild liberalism’ of the past (e.g. Keynesian approaches). However, there can also be liberal forces without neoliberal agendas. It is a common fact that liberalism and neoliberalism is not the same thing. A major difference is that the social subject of liberalism is the ‘individual’, while the social unit of neoliberalism is ‘customer’. Read more here: M. Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

3. See, N. Mouzelis, Politics in the semi-periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (New York: Macmillan, 1986).

4. Mouzelis, ibid., p. xiii.

5. Mouzelis, ibid., p. 219.

6. E. Kefala, Peripheral (Post) Modernity, The Syncretist Aesthetics of Borges, Piglia, Kalokyris and Kyriakidis (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), p. 4.

7. Kefala, ibid., p. 4.

8. Eleni Kefala develops her argument about the similarities between Greece and Argentina in a remarkable way. She begins from their independence in the early nineteenth century and the formation of their states, and ends up with the military interventions in politics, the North American intervention in their domestic affairs, the mass mobilization of urban and rural populations in the 1960s and the dictatorial regimes and their fall from power. We could add in this context the economic collapse of Argentina in 2002, the economic crisis in Greece that begun in 2008 and the rise to power of left-wing populists (Kirchners and SYRIZA). Kefala, ibid., pp. 4–18.

9. See for example, C.R. Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, and P. Ostiguy (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); C. Mudde and C.R. Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and B. Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political style, and Representation (Stanford: California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

10. For different approaches see, Moffitt, ibid., pp. 11–27.

11. E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism (London: NLB, 1977), p. 173.

12. E. Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a Name?’, in F. Panizza (Ed) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 32–49.

13. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 107–108.

14. P. Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), p. 4.

15. C. Mudde and C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: Comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America’, Government and Opposition, 48 (2013), pp. 147–174.

16. Mudde and Kaltwasser, ibid., pp. 160, 164, 167.

17. D. Filc, ‘Latin American inclusive and European exclusionary populism: Colonialism as an explanation’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 20 (3) (2015), pp. 265–266.

18. Laclau, Politics and Ideology, op. cit., Ref. 11, p. 175.

19. R. Barr, The Resurgence of Populism in Latin America (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2017), p. 60.

20. See, G. Katsambekis, ‘The place of the people in post-democracy: Researching antipopulism and post-democracy in crisis-ridden Greece’, POSTData, 19 (2) (2014), pp. 555–582.

21. See also, Y. Stavrakakis, ‘How did ‘Populism’ become a pejorative concept? And why is this important today? A genealogy of double hermeneutics’, Populismus, Working Paper 6 (2017), p. 3.

22. Y. Stavrakakis, ‘The return of “the people”: Populism and anti-populism in the shadow of the European crisis’, Constellations, 21 (4) (2014), p. 509.

23. P. Marlière, ‘The demophobes and the great fear of populism’, openDemocracy (4/6/2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/philippe-marli%C3%A8re/demophobes-and-great-fear-of-populism.

24. T. Akkerman, ‘Populism and democracy: Challenge or pathology?’, Acta Politica, 38 (2) (2003), pp. 147–159: J. W. Müller, What is Populism? (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); and S. Rummens, ‘Populism as a threat to liberal democracy’, in Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, and Ostiguy (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism, op. cit., Ref. 9.

25. Moffitt, op. cit., Ref. 9, p. 136.

26. See, F. Furedi, ‘Recapturing the sociological imagination: The challenge for public sociology’ in V. Jeffries (Ed.) Handbook of Public Sociology (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), p. 176.

27. Furedi, ibid., p. 176.

28. R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

29. Y. Stavrakakis, How Did ‘Populism’ Become a Pejorative Concept? op. cit., Ref. 21.

30. Stavrakakis, ibid., p. 6.

31. N. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 4–5.

32. G. Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978).

33. C. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 22.

34. Stavrakakis, ‘How did “populism” become a pejorative concept?’, op. cit., Ref. 21, pp. 6–8.

35. Of course, the two opposing sides (populist and anti-populist) are not homogeneous and stationary.

36. P. Ostiguy, ‘The high and the low in politics: A two dimensional political space for comparative analysis and electoral studies’, Kellogg Institute, 360 (2009).

37. P. Ostiguy, ‘Populism. A socio-cultural approach’, in C. R. Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, and P. Ostiguy (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism, op. cit., Ref. 9.

38. If we follow Laclauian theory, we can easily argue that the Greek radical left express a populist discourse, as we can find in its political discourse the central reference (nodal point) of ‘the people’ and an anti-establishment orientation. Despite the fact that SYRIZA was a euro-communist party, the leadership decided to transform its rhetoric after the eruption of the crisis and follow a left-wing populist path. This path had previously been formed mainly by the populist and patriotic party of Andreas Papandreou (the leader of PASOK in the period after the fall of dictatorship). In addition, according to several academic books and papers relating to populism, which follows different theories, methodologies and traditions (e.g. ideational, discursive, etc.), SYRIZA can be labelled as a populist party. See: Y. Stavrakakis and G. Katsambekis, ‘Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 19 (2) (2014), pp. 134–135; C. Mudde, SYRIZA. The Failure of the Populist Promise (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); P. Aslanidis and C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Dealing with populists in government: The SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece’, Democratization, 23 (6) (2016), pp. 1077–1091; Y. Stavrakakis and T. Siomos, ‘Syriza’s populism: Testing and Extending an Essex School Perspective’, ECPR general conference, Charles University, Prague, 7–10 September 2016.

39. R. Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 67.

40. N. Miller, Reinventing Modernity in Latin America: Intellectuals Imagine the Future, 1900–1930 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 16–17.

41. P. Ostiguy, ‘The high and the low in politics’, op. cit., Ref. 36.

42. W.H. Katra, The Argentine Generation of 1837: Echeverría, Alberdi, Sarmiento, Mitre (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1996), p. 245.

43. N. Sevastakis, ‘Modern Antipopulism: From political pathology to cultural evil’ [‘Σύγχρονος Αντιλαϊκισμός: Από την πολιτική παθολογία στο πολιτισμικό κακό’], in N. Sevastakis and Y. Stavrakakis, Populism, antipopulism and crisis [Λαϊκισμός, αντιλαϊκισμός και κρίση] (Athens: Nefeli, 2012), pp. 9–16. Many academics and researchers support a similar kind of argument. For example, Takis Pappas asserts that populism is the main responsible factor for Greece’s political and economic problems, but this view does not take into account the responsibilities of political and economic liberalism for the critical situation of the Greek economy. T. Pappas, Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

44. N. Diamandouros, ‘Cultural dualism and political change in postauthoritarian Greece’, working paper, Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 50 (1994), pp. 15–17.

45. N. Diamandouros, ‘Postscript: Cultural dualism revisited’ in A. Triantafyllidou, R. Gropas, & H. Kouki (Eds) Greek Crisis and European Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 213.

46. Diamandouros, ibid., p. 218.

47. Stavrakakis, ‘How did “populism” become a pejorative concept?’, op. cit., Ref. 21, p. 16.

48. H. Kouki and A. Liakos, ‘Narrating the story of a failed national transition: discourses on the Greek crisis, 2010–2014ʹ, Historein, 15 (1) (2015), p. 54.

49. Stavrakakis, ‘How did “populism” become a pejorative concept?’, op. cit., Ref. 21, p. 15.

50. E. Tsakalotos, ‘Modernization and centre-left dilemmas in Greece: The revenge of the underdogs’, GreeSE Paper No 13, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe (April 2008), p. 4.

51. Kouki and Liakos, ‘Narrating the story of a failed national transition’, op. cit., Ref. 48, p. 54.

52. ‘Kyr. Mitsotakis: Greece will win the battle against populism’ [‘Κυρ. Μητσοτάκης: Η Ελλάδα θα κερδίσει τη μάχη κατά του λαϊκισμού’], Naftemporiki (29/05/2017), http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1219562.

53. ‘Gennimata: We will not allow populism to dissolve Europe’ [‘Γεννηματά: Δεν θα επιτρέψουμε στον λαϊκισμό να διαλύσει την Ευρώπη’], Kathimerini (28/06/2016), http://www.kathimerini.gr/865412/article/epikairothta/politikh/gennhmata-den-8a-epitreyoyme-ston-laikismo-na-dialysei-thn-eyrwph.

54. ‘Pagkalos: We were cheats … ’, [‘Πάγκαλος: Ήμασταν απατεώνες … ’], Documento (16/02/2017), http://www.documentonews.gr/article/pagkalos-hmastan-apatewnes-o-laos-einai-dieftharmenos-den-xreokophsame-logw-skandalwn-alla-apo-ton-tyropita-video.

55. ‘Pagkalos: A people of idiots cannot hold referendums’ [‘Πάγκαλος: «Ένας λαός ηλιθίων δεν μπορεί να κάνει δημοψηφίσματα’], Protagon (16/01/2018), http://www.protagon.gr/epikairotita/44341550084-44341550084.

56. C. Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2013), p. 64.

57. ‘Dare – Declaration against populism and irresponsibility in public speech’ [‘Τολμήστε – Διακήρυξη κατά του λαϊκισμού και της ανευθυνότητας στον δημόσιο λόγο’], To Vima (01/06/2011), http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=404226.

58. S. Ramfos, Politics by word of mouth [Πολιτική από Στόμα σε Στόμα] (Athens: Armos, 2016), p. 218. The concept of ‘re-balkanization’ has a negative meaning in anti-populist rhetoric. Balkan countries (e.g. Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, etc.) are considered as ‘unprogressive’ and ‘uncivilized’. It is no coincidence that these countries had communist regimes in the past.

59. T. Veremis, ‘About populism’ [‘Περί λαϊκισμού’], Kathimerini (12/01/2014), http://www.kathimerini.gr/738443/opinion/epikairothta/arxeio-monimes-sthles/peri-laikismoy.

60. According to the concept of ‘national-populism’, the populist phenomenon presents common characteristics in both left-wing and right-wing parties and movements. For this concept see: A. Pantazopoulos, ‘The National-Populist Illusion as a “Pathology” of Politics: The Greek Case and Beyond’, Telos Scope (25 March 2016), http://www.telospress.com/the-national-populist-illusion-as-a-pathology-of-politics-the-greek-case-and-beyond/.

61. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, ‘Left-wing populism in the European periphery’, op. cit., Ref. 38, pp. 134–135.

62. D. Koutsikou (Ed.), Something ‘Beautiful’: A Guide to Modern Greek Bad Taste [Κάτι το Ωραίον: Μια περιήγηση στη Νεοελληνική Κακογουστιά] (Athens: Friends of the Periodical Anti, Polytypo, 1984), pp. 14–16.

63. New Democracy decided also to oppose the popular culture of the period, criticizing rebetiko, a kind of folk music that PASOK recognized as a constituent part of the Greek culture. The conservative camp and a large part of intellectuals considered that rebetiko undermined moral order because of its ‘primitive’ folk and oriental style (see, S. Sofos, ‘Popular Identity and Political Culture in Post-Dictatorship Greece: Towards a Cultural Approach of The Populist Phenomenon’ [Λαϊκή ταυτότητα και πολιτική κουλτούρα στη μεταδικτατορική Ελλάδα: προς μια πολιτισμική προσέγγιση του λαϊκιστικού φαινομένου], in N. Demertzis (Ed.), Political Culture Today [Πολιτική Κουλτούρα Σήμερα] (Athens: Odysseas, 2000). Specifically, the above political camp believed that this type of popular music was contrary to the project of modernization promoted by the Greek governments.

64. P. Ostiguy, ‘Argentina’s double political spectrum: party system, political identities, and strategies, 1944–2007ʹ, Kellogg Institute, 361 (2009), p. 10.

65. It is noteworthy that caudillos were not a homogeneous group.

66. P. Ostiguy, ‘Syncretism in Argentina’s Party System and Peronist Political Culture’, in D. Galvan and R. Sil (Eds) Reconfiguring Institutions Across Time and Space: Syncretic Responses to Challenges of Political and Economic Transformation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 88–90.

67. Ostiguy, ibid., p. 90.

68. Ostiguy, ‘Argentina’s Double Political Spectrum’, op. cit., Ref. 64, pp. 10–11.

69. D. Balderston and M. Gonzalez (Eds) Encyclopaedia of Latin American and Caribbean Literature: 1900–2003, London-New York: Routledge (2004), pp. 143–144. Prior to the dispute between the Unitarians and Caudillos, a strong conflict was played out between the liberal supporters of Mariano Moreno (secretary of the Primera Junta) and a conservative camp led by Cornelio Saavedra (President of the Primera Junta). B. Keen and K. Haynes, A History of Latin America (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009), p. 167.

70. Ostiguy, ‘Syncretism in Argentina’s party system’, op. cit., Ref. 66, p. 90.

71. Ostiguy, ibid., p. 91.

72. V. Smith (Ed.) Encyclopaedia of Latin American Literature (London-Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997), p. 384.

73. Ostiguy, ‘Argentina’s double political spectrum’, op. cit., Ref. 64.

74. J. Horowitz, ‘Populism and Its Legacies in Argentina’, in Michael L. Conniff (Ed) Populism in Latin America (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1999), pp. 32–33.

75. A. Spektorowski, ‘Peronism: The consumerist Revolution and the New Argentinean, in Matthew Feldman, Jorge Dagnino, Paul Stocker (Eds.) The ‘New Man’ in Radical Right Ideology and Practice, 1919–45 (London, Oxford, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), p. 159.

76. The Radicals have been one of the main historic representatives of anti-Peronism. See M. G. Sebastiani, ‘The other side of peronist Argentina: Radicals and socialists in the political opposition to Peron (1946–1955)’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 35 (2) (2003), pp. 311–339.

77. M. Schuttenberg, ‘The opposition to Kirchnerism. An approach of the positioning and reconfigurations of the “centre-right” (2003–2011)’ [‘La oposición al kirchnerismo. Una aproximación a los posicionamientos y reconfiguraciones de la “centro derecha” (2003–2011)’], Sudamérica, 3 (2014), p. 62.

78. M. Schuttenberg, ‘The politics of de-politicization. An analysis of the construction of PRO’s story’ [‘La política de la despolitización. Un análisis de la construcción del relato PRO’], Desafíos, 29(2) (2017), p. 287.

79. Schuttenberg, ‘The opposition to Kirchnerism’, op. cit., Ref. 77.

80. G. Morales, ‘Democracy of Kirchner is similar to Mussolini’s’ [‘La democracia de Kirchner es similar a la de Mussolini’], Urgente24 (18/12/2006), https://www.urgente24.com/37884-gerardo-morales-la-democracia-de-kirchner-es-similar-a-la-de-mussolini.

81. ‘Carrió compares Christina with Ceausescu’ [‘Carrió comparó a Cristina con Ceausescu’], La Nación (20/04/2008), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1005905-carrio-comparo-a-cristina-con-ceausescu.

82. Schuttenberg, ‘The politics of de-politicization’, op. cit., Ref. 78.

83. Schuttenberg, ibid., p. 279.

84. Schuttenberg, ‘The opposition to Kirchnerism’, op. cit., Ref. 77, p. 75.

85. ‘Gabriela Michetti assured that populism during the past decade “made society ill”’ [‘Gabriela Michetti aseguró que el populismo durante la década pasada “enfermó a la sociedad”’], Uno (8/6/2017), https://www.diariouno.com.ar/pais/gabriela-michetti-aseguro-que-el-populismo-la-decada-pasada-enfermo-la-sociedad-20170608-n1412343.html.

86. ‘Michetti: “Populism is the worst enemy that we have in democracy”’ [‘Michetti: “El populismo es el peor enemigo que tenemos en democracia”’], Letrap (12/05/2017), http://www.letrap.com.ar/nota/2017-5-12-12-35-0-michetti-el-populismo-es-el-peor-enemigo-que-tenemos-en-democracia.

87. ‘Macri insists that “no-one can leave populism from one day to the next”’ [‘Macri insiste en que “no se sale del populismo de un día para otro’] Europa Press (24/02/2017), http://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-macri-insiste-no-sale-populismo-dia-otro-20170224114426.html.

88. ‘Mauricio Macri, Ernesto Sanz and Elisa Carrió appeared together in the Book Fair’, [‘Mauricio Macri, Ernesto Sanz y Elisa Carrió se presentaron juntos en la Feria del Libro’], Infobae (27/05/2015), https://www.infobae.com/2015/05/11/1727928-mauricio-macri-ernesto-sanz-y-elisa-carrio-se-presentaron-juntos-la-feria-del-libro/.

89. P. Biglieri and G. Perelló, ‘Populismo y retorno neoliberal. Algunas reflexiones tardías sobre el kirchnerismo y tempranas sobre el macrismo’, Trabajo presentado en el marco del Proyecto de investigación Theorizing Transnational Populist Politics (2015–2018), https://www.academia.edu/36943188/Populismo_y_retorno_neoliberal_Algunas_reflexiones_tard%C3%ADas_sobre_el_kirchnerismo_y_tempranas_sobre_el_macrismo.

90. See ‘Milagro Sala, Yet Another Chapter of Human Rights Violations in Argentina’, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2/10/2017), www.coha.org/milagro-sala-yet-another-chapter-of-human-rights-violations-in-argentina/.

91. As T. Basok underlines, ‘On 27 January 2017, […] Mauricio Macri issued a Necessity and Urgency Decree (Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia or DNU) that reformed the 2004 Immigration Law #25,871. […] DNU 70/2017 denies entry or residence to some migrants, namely those who have any criminal record, regardless of the gravity of their offence. It also sets in motion a process of expeditious expulsions of migrants deemed deportable. The President justified this decree by alluding to a public safety “crisis” that exceptional measures, outlined in the decree, would alleviate’. According to Basok, DNU 70/17 and other measures attempt to restrict admission and deny permanent residency to poor immigrants and those of non-European ancestry. See: T. Basok, ‘Regional Migration and Argentina’s “Hospitality” in Crisis’, in Cecilia Menjivar, Marie Ruiz and Immanuel Ness (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises (Oxford University Press, 2019).

92. See: J. M. Anderson, ‘The impossible Black Argentine political subject’, in Kwame Dixon and Ollie A. Johnson III (Eds.) Comparative Racial Politics in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2019).

93. ‘We Are All Descendants from Europe: Argentine President’, Telesur (25/01/2018), https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/We-Are-All-Descendants-from-Europe-Argentine-President-20180125-0013.html.

94. ‘Argentina’, Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The State of the World’s Human Rights (London, 2018), p. 76.

95. Macri linked the current economic problems directly with the period of Kirchnerism and the case of corruption. ‘Macri confirms that austerity returns with capital letters to Argentina’ [‘Macri confirma que la austeridad vuelve con mayúsculas a Argentina’], Euro news (03/09/2018), https://es.euronews.com/2018/09/03/macri-confirma-que-la-austeridad-vuelve-con-mayusculas-a-argentina.

96. For instance, see the case of Theodoros Pangalos in Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis, op. cit., Ref. 56, p. 64.

97. Many of the researchers characterize right-wing populists as ‘authoritarian populists.’ On authoritarian populism see J. Morelock (Ed), Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018).

98. An important book that holds a neutral attitude towards left and right-wing populism and develops its positive and negative implications for liberal democracy is Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas, op. cit., Ref. 9. An article that characterizes ‘left-wing populism’ as a threat to democracy is K. Weyland, ‘The threat from the populist left’, Journal of Democracy, 24 (3) (2013), pp. 18–32. A critical approach to populism is J.W. Müller, What is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

99. Mudde, SYRIZA. The Failure of the Populist Promise, op. cit., Ref. 38, p. 66.

100. C. Mudde and C. R. Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 8.

101. C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy’, Democratization, 19 (2) (2012), pp. 184–208.

102. Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas, op. cit., Ref. 9, p. 16; M. Canovan, ‘Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy’, Political Studies, 47, (1999), pp. 2–16.

103. Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism, op. cit., Ref. 9, p. 149.

104. See: C. Crouch, Post-democracy (London: Polity, 2004).

105. There is more than one type of anti-populist discourse. For instance, various harsh anti-populist arguments have been developed by communist parties, which analyse populism as a kind of demagogy that wants to deceive the working class and as a political movement of the petty bourgeois class that is not interested in implementing a socialist society without inequalities. Their criticism, however, does not usually have the character of today’s anti-populism. The fundamental element is that the people does not have a negative character in the political discourse of the communist parties and is not connected with barbarism or absurdity, but instead it is apportioned some positive characteristics. Communist ideas do not see the people as bad, naive or stupid, but mainly as a trapped subject within dominant ideology. It is no coincidence that the socialist states have assigned a great symbolic value to the concept of ‘the people’ and ‘popular’.

106. See Katsambekis, ‘The place of the people in post-democracy’, op. cit., Ref. 20, and Marlière, ‘The demophobes and the great fear of populism’, op. cit., Ref. 23.

107. Furedi, ‘Recapturing the sociological imagination’, op. cit., Ref. 26, p. 175.

108. N. Demertzis, ‘Greece’, in R. Eatwell (Ed), European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 118.

109. C. Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 1–2.

110. Stavrakakis, ‘The return of “the people”’, op. cit., Ref. 22, p. 506.

111. G. Katsambekis, ‘Populism in post-democratic times: Greek politics and the limits of consensus’, Paper presented at the 61st UK Political Studies Association Annual Conference 19–21 April (2011), p. 8.

112. M. L. Levy, Argentina under the Kirchners: The Legacy of Left Populism (Rugby, UK: Practical Action Publishing, 2017), pp. 28–31, 40–44.

113. ‘A. Samaras: We must re-occupy our cities’ [‘Α. Σαμαράς: Πρέπει να ανακαταλάβουμε τις πόλεις μας’]. Naftemporiki (29/03/2012), https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/387960/a-samaras-prepei-na-anakatalaboume-tis-poleis-mas.

114. P. Panayotu, ‘Towards a transnational populism: A chance for European democracy (?) The case of DiEM25ʹ, POPULISMUS Working Papers No. 5 (2017), p. 16, http://www.populismus.gr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/panayotu-final-upload.pdf.

115. For the notion of nativism, see: C. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

116. Y. Stavrakakis, G. Katsambekis, N. Nikisianis, A. Kioupkiolis and T. Siomos, ‘Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: revisiting a reified association’, Critical Discourse Studies, 14 (4) (2017), pp. 420–439.

117. B. De Cleen, ‘Populism and Nationalism’ in Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, and Ostiguy, The Oxford Handbook of Populism, op. cit., Ref. 9, pp. 358–357.

118. B. Moffitt, ‘The populism/anti-populism divide in Western Europe’, Democratic Theory, 5 (2) (2018), p. 13.