Why can’t the drama stop? US–China rivalry and security triangulation on the Korean peninsula

ABSTRACT

Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large, comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as indispensable players ­in all major issues pertaining to peninsular security. The second section introduces complex systems theory as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely, how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things might play out in the future.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• United States
• South Korea
• North Korea
• complexity systems theory

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 I used the singular form of Korea to refer to the peninsula.

2 The pent-up surge of nationalist pride on the occasion of inter-Korean summits, such as the ones in 2018, and joint appearances at major world events, such as the Olympics, attested to the resilient bond of ethnic solidarity (e.g. Park, 2019).

3 This does not mean the risks of war do not exist (e.g. Jervis & Rapp-Hooper, 2018).

4 On the occasion of the treaty’s 60th anniversary, Xi and Kim exchanged congratulatory telegrams, as did the two foreign ministers. When asked about the treaty’s status, the foreign ministry spokesperson said that in the absence of a mutually agreed-upon revision or cessation, the treaty remained in force (Foreign Ministry, 2021).

5 In his memoir, Mike Pompeo, Trump’s secretary of state, recalled that Kim Jong-un admitted in 2018 that he needed US forces in South Korea to protect the country from China (Pompeo, 2023). In my private discussions with Chinese experts, they almost uniformly accepted Kim’s suspicion of China as valid, even as they rejected Pompeo’s retelling as crude and unreliable.

6 Namely, no further expansion of the THAAD system, no US – Japan – ROK alliance, and no participation in the US-led missile system network.

7 The author’s conversations with many Chinese observers at the time indicated that ‘stunned’ was the operative word. See also (Zheng, 2018).

8 It is no wonder that the Chinese government has yet to publish or publicize even a vaguely worded plan or timetable.

9 It does not help that South Korea’s relations with Japan have been in tatters because of the comfort women dispute and trade feud.

10 In similar vein, Kydd (2015) proposed a similar compromise for Korea’s unification.

Additional information

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Xiangfeng Yang

Xiangfeng Yang holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC), and is an associate professor in the Department of Government & International Affairs at Lingnan University, Hong Kong SAR. His research has appeared in, among others, International Affairs, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Issues & Studies, Pacific Focus, and Chinese Journal of International Politics.