The parliamentary dimension of the Presidency of the Council of the EU: a framework for systematic research

ABSTRACT

Strengthening the role of national parliaments in EU matters has triggered a broad discussion on whether the legislatures are effective and which parliamentary functions they should fulfil within the EU political system. The involvement of national legislatures can be measured by applying the concept of parliamentary strength based on a set of indicators. However, some important elements of parliamentary activities and functions are fully overlooked in the existing literature, especially the participation of national parliaments in the preparation for and administration of the Council Presidency within the framework of the ‘parliamentary dimension’ of the rotating Presidency. Despite the growing importance of the Presidency Parliament, which goes hand-in-hand with the broadening of the framework for inter-parliamentary cooperation, current research pays little attention to this topic, even though it is important for understanding parliamentary strength in EU policy-making. For this reason, this paper presents a summary of the current body of knowledge with the aim of proposing an analytical framework which can be used for future systematic research in this field.

KEYWORDS:

• Council Presidency
• European Union
• interparliamentary cooperation
• national parliaments
• parliamentary dimension
• Presidency Parliament

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Protocol (No. 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.

2 We have in mind the so-called Early Warning Mechanism by which NPs monitor whether EU legislative proposals comply with the subsidiarity principle. The mechanism itself functions according to the degree of dissent by national parliaments. The well-established analogy for this is the use of penalty cards issued during football matches. Yellow or orange cards can be issued; the weight of dissent correlates to the upper limit of 54 votes available in the system, representing twice the current number of 27 Member States. Each national parliament has two votes which are distributed on the basis of each national parliamentary system. In a bicameral parliament, each chamber has one vote. If a complaint garners a minimum of one third of all possible votes, a yellow card is issued. But when a proposal belongs in the domain of the former third pillar, the threshold is lowered to one quarter. In the event that the issuer of a proposal, usually the Commission, receives a yellow card, it must review the proposal and decide whether to continue pursuing it, amend it or withdraw it. When the decision is made to pursue a proposal, a reasoned decision is given. The wording, which provides the Commission with the opportunity but not obligation, is considered problematic from the point of view of the parliaments, as it creates an asymmetrical situation where the Commission assesses its own proposal but is not obliged to change it. An orange card is issued when the simple majority of parliamentary or chamber votes expresses dissent. Again, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. If the Commission decides for the first option, it then forwards its own reasoned opinion to the European Parliament and the Council of EU (Kaniok, 2018).

3 The Lisbon Treaty confirms the format of the Trio Presidency, in place since 2006, when it was introduced by the EU Council's rules of procedure. The Trio Presidency consists of a pre-defined group of three countries which are expected to cooperate within an 18-month period. However, in praxis each of the countries involved takes the lead during its 6-month mandate (Batory & Puetter, 2013).

4 Inter-Parliamentary Conferences

5 Here we can also include bilateral visits to the EP related to the preparation for the rotating Presidency. According to Pegan and Högenauer (cited in Fason & Lupo, 2016, p. 158), there were 19 such visits from the Polish parliament in 2010.

6 The decision to establish the COSAC Secretariat was adopted under the Hellenic Presidency in 2003. This permanent body was established to facilitate the work and exchange of information between NPs and to facilitate the preparations for COSAC meetings. It comprises one Permanent Member and four members seconded from the Trio Parliaments (Fason & Lupo, 2016, p. 312).

7 EU Speakers Conference, COSAC meetings, Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP), Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union.

8 Permanent Representation of the Presidency-holding country to the EU.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by project “Perspectives of the European Integration III” ((MUNI/A/1138/2020).

Notes on contributors

Petr Kaniok

Petr Kaniok works as an associate professor at the Masaryk University.

Tereza Nováková

Tereza Nováková is a doctocal student at the same institution.