Situating non-central government foreign revenue mobilization within Agenda 2063: A case study of Nigeria

ABSTRACT

Funding is critical to the attainment of Aspiration 1 of the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, which aims to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development. However, the funds required to meet these targets are not readily available in Africa. In Nigeria, constitutional provisions for revenue mobilization and public expenditure place restrictions on the foreign economic relations capabilities of non-central governments (NCGs) as well as undermine their capacity to raise the revenue required to meet development objectives. Against this background, this article reviews the strategies utilized by NCGs to overcome their fiscal powers–constitutional responsibilities mismatch and argues that in the context of the development imperatives subsumed in Aspiration 1, the strategies are counterproductive.

KEYWORDS:

• Agenda 2063
• development
• income-expenditure convergence
• Nigeria
• revenue mobilization
• non-central government

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Since independence, Nigeria has formulated over a dozen identifiable development plans ranging from the four National Development Plans of 1962–1968, 1970–1974, 1975–1980 and 1981–1985 to the annual National Rolling Plans of 1990 to 1999. There was the National Economic Direction (1999–2003) and the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (2003–2007). See Ikeanyibe (2009, 199–201) for an analysis of Nigeria’s development planning history. Currently in place is the Medium-Term National Development Plan 2021–2025. This succeeded the medium-term Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) (2017–2020), which among other things aimed at sustained inclusive growth, structural economic transformation, increased national productivity, and sustainable diversification of production (Elebeke 2020; Ministry of Budget and National Planning 2017).

2 Nigeria deposited its instrument of ratification with the African Union Commission chairperson on 5 December 2020.

3 Cap. L5 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004.

4 Cap. T2 LFN 2004.

5 Note that the foreign debt stock in USD (i.e. column c¹) is multiplied by the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) official foreign exchange rate of NGN 306.95 to USD 1 as at 19 August 2019 to arrive at the figures in column c².

6 See Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010, 631) for the distinction between pubic finance deficit and debt.

7 Cap A15 LFN 2004.

8 [2009] 1 TLRN 82.

9 [2010] 3 TLRN 30.

10 [2010] 3 TLRN 94.

11 Cap. H8 Laws of Lagos State 2015.

12 Cap V1 LFN 2004 (as amended).

13 Cap. N107 LFN 2004.

14 For example, Usibe (2019) reported that 10 state governors from Nigeria had side meetings with international partners during the course of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly wherein they solicited assistance with the implementation of SDGs. Adekoya (2019) also reported that the governor of Lagos State undertook a diplomatic visit to China to seek partnership with the Chinese government and businesses in specific sectors to aid the state’s development drive.

15 Cap P8 LFN 2004.

16 For an exposition on the utility of the maxim, see Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs & Anor v Onakade (2016) LPELR-41133(CA).