ABSTRACT
In the everyday life of Moroccans and at a very symbolic level, each time that the monarch engages in different activities related to various socio-economic fields within the country or in relations to international relations, television viewers are reminded of the centrality of the monarchy in the Moroccan political scene, and of the relative irrelevance of other political actors as well as the weakness of the members of government in strategic matters. During the recent ‘blocage’ that Abdelilah Benkirane was faced with as he was attempting to constitute of the government following the 2016 elections, the activities and travels of the monarch were regularly and widely reported on television and radio. This reporting clearly and symbolically reinforces in the minds of people the importance and dominance of the monarchical institution and hence minimizes the weight and significance of other political actors and the multiplicity of parties that garnish the Moroccan political scene. This article deals with the ‘relevance’ and ‘irrelevance’ of the Moroccan political parties in the context of what I call the Moroccan ‘political theatre’. I argue that the parties are both irrelevant as far political power is concerned but they are simultaneously relevant in terms of sustaining the nature of the political regime in Morocco.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 The idea of ‘blocage’, as it came to be termed in popular media in both Arabic and French, was associated with the obstacles that AbdelilahBenkirane was facing in terms of establishing a government.
2 The Ex-Head of Government, Abdelilah Benkirane regularly referred to this deep state as constituted of crocodiles and devils.
3 The PAM is often referred to the new Front de la défense des institutions constitutionnelles (FDIC) which was established by Hassan II in 1963 to counter the opposition.
4 This section is based on a report that was conducted by the author in collaboration with Mohamed Madani and Saloua Zerhouni, The 2011 Moroccan Constitution: A Critical Analysis, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2012 International IDEA Strömsborg, SE-103 34, Stockholm, Sweden.
5 In an interview with Jeune Afrique, Aziz Akhannouch does not hesitate to state that the "the majority of parties dream of the proximity with the palace’. Quoted in Younes Saoury’s "Aziz Akhannouch à Jeune Afrique: ‘La plupart des partis rêvent d’une proximité avec le Palais’" Tel Quel, 4 Mars, 2019.
6 The next sections are drawn from a slightly modified version of a report prepared by the author with the Baker Institute for Public Policy. See Driss Maghraoui, ‘Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections’. Issue brief no. 05.29.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas, 2018.
7 This was especially the case in the introductory articles of journalist Taoufik Bouachrin in Akhbar al Yaoum.
8 He emphatically stated that ‘leading the government is not synonymous with holding power’.
9 King Mohmmed VI’s speech can be found in: http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-integral-du-discours-royal-loccasion-de-la-fete-du-trone-0