What makes coups outside the chain of command in Turkey succeed or fail?

ABSTRACT

Existing work on civil-military relations in Turkey has left the question of coup outcomes understudied. Although coups organized in line with the military chain of command are automatically assumed most likely to succeed, not all coup attempts carried out by junior/mid-ranking officers are doomed to fail. While 27 May 1960 coup by junior officers succeeded, three other coups attempted outside the chain of command in 1962, 1963, and 15 July 2016 in Turkey failed. Why? This article uses ‘coordination game’ framework as a theoretical tool to provide an answer. These cases lend significant support to application of game theoretic models to the literature on military coup outcomes.

KEYWORDS:

• Coordination games
• Turkish armed forces
• 15 July 2016
• 27 May 1960
• Talat Aydemir
• Gulenists

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Notes

1. 3 July 2013 coup in Egypt is the most recent example. For 1963 coup in Iraq as a supporting case, see Batatu, pp.975–981. 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union-Russia provide another example. For the claim that if the Russian military was not divided, 1991 coup would have been successful despite civilian opposition, see Soviet Union-Russia Country Reader n.d., p. 1927.

2. Aydemir’s failure the second time can be likened to Admiral Gruber’s failed coup attempt in Venezuela in 1992. As Singh (31) says ‘The only information that could be gleaned was that the coup attempt was undertaken by allies of Colonel Hugo Chavez, who was imprisoned awaiting trial for his coup attempt in February of that year. Since Chavez, while popular, had failed in the February attempt, the challengers did not convey that they were strong and their victory was inevitable’.

3. A ‘swing man’ is the last adherent to a coup who provides a critical margin of support either because he has influence within the armed forces, he enjoys prestige among the public or he holds critical position within the armed forces. See (Needler, 1966, p. 621).