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ABSTRACT
The rise of sectarianism in the Middle East has predominantly been explained by realist or soft constructivist approaches. This article offers an alternative poststructuralist reading, analysing sectarianism as a specific, yet ambiguous ethno-religious discourse in which the ‘sectarian taboo’ continues to restrain aggressive forms of sectarian enunciations. Drawing on rare first-hand material and interviews, it is shown how sectarian referents both are securitized, deferred and invoked in Hezbollah’s political discourse legitimizing its warfare in Syria. However, it also suggests that we need to look beyond official discourses, and into the world of popular culture, where religious mythology and music diffuse the boundary between the real and the simulated. In the end, sectarianism may reveal a common post-modern condition of longing for authenticity and solid ground.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
2. Valbørn and Hinnebusch similarly distinguish between banal, instrumental, and radical forms.
3. For instance, AA Media Production, Electronic Resistance, Keystoeternity/Middle East Monitor, al Mayadeen, and the Iranian Purestream.
4. Denoting a limited number of discourses which struggles within the same terrain e.g., Laclau and Mouffe (Citation1985, p. 113).
5. Ali Barakat is a famous Hezbollah singer and song-writer, who’s tracks are heralding Hezbollah victories on the battlefield in Syria and widely circulated on YouTube. Barakat emphasized in an interview with that he was not financed or commissioned by Hezbollah. http://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/Interview/544380-10-questions-for-ali-.
6. e.g., Electronic Resistance1, ElectronicResiance313 (which also is the number of soldiers in the army of the hidden Imam in Shia Islam) or @C_military1, 2 @C_military3.
7. In late 2011 early 2012 reports start appearing that Hezbollah fighters have been detected in Syria and that some fighters have been killed and quietly buried at home in Lebanon.
9. Sayyeda Zainab is one of the ‘heroines’ or key religious figures to Shia, being part of the Holy household, and revered both for her deemed sacrifices and for her propagation of the specific Shia institution of Ashura.
10. See Ruggie’s excellent analysis of the re-conciliation of the extra-territoriality of embassies in modern age of exclusive territorially bounded sovereignty (Citation1993: pp. 164–66).
11. Since the 1980s the Zainab shrine area has been an important site and scholarly institution for Shias from Iraq, Iran and Lebanon (Carnegie). Many of the Iraqis that fled from the sectarian strife in Iraq after 2003 also settled here.
12. In one of my interviews with Hezbollah in 2014, the official corrected me, when I mentioned ‘jihadist groups’ in Syria. ‘We do not use that term’ he emphasized. As Hezbollah views its own fighters in Syria as carrying out jihad or jihadist duties, the takfiri distinction allows it to separate its own ‘religious violence’ from Sunni Islamist groups in Syria.
14. Herein of course also lies a contradiction. Hezbollah very deliberately employs the takfiri term instead of the term kufars, in order to distinguish itself from Sunni jihadi groups use of takfir – yet although Hezbollah do not call these groups infidels, the takfiri term is in practice that which allow for Hezbollah fighters to kill fellow Muslims and wage war against the so-called takfiris.
15. In 2012 Hamas broke with Hezbollah, Iran and the Assad Regime. Lately the relationship appears to have been mended.
17. Sayed is a religious title of honour within Shia Islam denoting descendants from Prophet Muhammed and Imam Ali, Nasrallah refers to himself.
20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34UZsf9OdGI See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcmAJf7gxik.
21. see https://www.facebook.com/hussainisoldier2/videos/200600996772871/?fallback=1 for videos displaying how Abbas flag is raised at the Zainab mosque area.
22. The horse Hussein rode at the battle of Karbala.
23. Yasid refers to what Shia considers to be the illegitimate and oppressive leader of the Umayyad Dynasty.
24. Abbass was the half-brother of Hussein, who, according to Shii mythology at the battle of Kabala went to bring water to Hussein, but was wounded twice, loosing both of his arms, yet he carried on by holding the water urn with his chin.
25. See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wt20TPCXmWI.
26. See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wt20TPCXmWI.
27. The transnational element is similarly visible in the way the videos are circulated and commented. For instance, the videos by the young Syrian boy Faour appears with Hezbollah flags in the background, and is shared by Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese social media accounts. e.g., http://www.alkawthartv.com/news/87541.
28. See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dCPWjqclFZo or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=–AZFbbWVJk.
30. See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tijoCvvyrCE.
32. A defining battle in the Syrian war, where Hezbollah for the first time.
33. Ali Karrar is one of the many names Shias use for Imam Ali. Karrar means lion in Arabic and is a symbol of strength and bravery in war.
35. This can also be seen from the commentaries posted to the videos, which are often overtly aggressive and direct, calling for the enemy’s elimination or celebratory, invoking slogans such as ‘Shias are the best’.