https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5431-6962
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ABSTRACT
Why do interethnic tensions in some multiethnic countries escalate into violence while in other cases, the tensions exist but they are contained? Most theories focus on the nation-state model’s exclusionary logic, different forms of institutional design, and external intervention by third-party actors. My argument centres around political divisions among the ethnic majority elites over conceptions of nationhood. Elites divided by a nationhood cleavage create an opportunity space for violence through a process of double ethnic outbidding. Majority nationhood cohesion, on the other hand, facilitates cooperation on ethnic issues among majority elites, prevents outbidding, and thus preserves interethnic peace. I develop these arguments building on outcome variation among three otherwise similar Southeast European countries and on conducting 33 semi-structured elite interviews. Post-communist Bulgaria and Montenegro built enduringly peaceful interethnic relations despite dark shadows of an assimilationist past in the former and the threat posed by greater Serbian ideology in the latter. Postcommunist North Macedonia, by contrast, has frequently experienced violent conflict despite a multiethnic past and a series of consociational arrangements tried until present.
Acknowledgments
I thank Şener Aktürk, Andrew Bennett, Hüseyin Alptekin, Murat Somer, Ioannis Grigoriadis, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, Sarah Wolff, and three anonymous reviewers for Mediterranean Politics for comments and suggestions, which significantly improved the quality of the manuscript and sharpened the argument presented here. Earlier versions of the manuscript were presented at the Oslo Summer School in Comparative Social Sciences in July 2017 and at the Fourth Annual European Symposium on Turkey in Stockholm in November 2018. The field work for this article was funded by Koç University’s Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities (GSSSH).
Supplemental Material
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.
Notes
1. This matches the mainstream operationalization of violence in the literature (Kalyvas, Citation2006, p. 20).
2. A complete chronological list of the interviews used for this article is given in the Appendix. Henceforth, in-text data from the interviews will be referenced via footnotes in which the appropriate chronological number of the interview listed in the Appendix is given.
3. Majority counterelites refer here to the majority party in opposition that has a different vision of nationhood from the incumbent majority party. Similarly, concerning minority counterelite, it refers to the minority party in opposition. Theoretically, minority counterelites can emerge as a splinter faction within the minority party in power, as an independently new formed party, or in some cases, even as an extra-parliamentary actor that actually uses or threatens to use violence.
4. Majority nationhood cohesion can be either multiethnic, as the case of Montenegro will show, or non-multiethnic, as the case of Bulgaria will show.
5. Interview # 1
6. Interview # 23
7. Interview # 5
8. Interview # 23
9. Interview # 2
10. Interview # 1
11. Interview # 4, # 5, and # 6
12. Interview # 1 and # 3
13. Interview # 6 and # 23
14. Interview # 1
15. Interview # 23
16. Interview # 19
17. Interview # 17
18. Interview # 21
19. Such as president and vice-president of the parliament; leading editors of the then only newspaper Pobjeda and State Television
20. Interview # 14
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Interview # 16
24. Interview # 21 and # 22
25. Interview # 14 and # 17
26. Specifically, it won overwhelming majorities in the December 1990, December 1992, and November 1996 parliamentary elections and controlled the presidency throughout (Bieber, Citation2003)
27. Interview # 18 and # 21
28. Interview # 20 and # 21
29. Significantly, Perovic, who is a Muslim ethnic Albanian, was appointed vice-president of the parliament.
30. Interview # 19
31. Interview # 16
32. Democratic Alliance of Montenegro (LDMZ) was the first ethnic Albanian party in Montenegro founded in September 1990 and led by Mehmet Bardhi. Democratic Union of Albanians (UDSH), the second Albanian party, was founded in November 1993 by Ferhat Dinosha and Bajram Rexha.
33. Combined, Albanians, Bosniaks, and Croats make up 18 % of Montenegro’s population (Monstat, Citation2011).
34. Interview # 16, # 19, # 20, and # 22.
35. Interview # 15
36. Critical was the decision of the small Montenegrin party, United Reformist Action URA, to support the coalition of Serbian parties led by a non-partisan figure, Zdravko Krivokapic (Lika, Citation2020a).
37. Interview # 8
38. Interview # 7
39. Interview # 9 and # 10
40. Interview # 8 and # 10
41. Interview # 11
42. Interview # 10
43. Interview # 8
44. Interview # 7 and # 10
45. Interview # 8
46. BDI is the political party the insurgent UÇK formed after OFA.
47. Interview # 11
48. The crowning achievement of antiquization policies was ‘Skopje 2014ʹ, a €250-300 m worth urban renewal scheme, that refashioned the capital Skopje ‘with a triumphal arch, two new bridges, hundreds of new statues, 15 new buildings reflecting architectural styles drawn from classical antiquity, and gigantic statues of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great’ (Hislope, Citation2013, p. 622).
49. Interview # 13
50. Interview # 12
51. The referendum asked the citizens whether they are in favour of EU and NATO membership by accepting the Prespa Agreement between Macedonia and Greece. An overwhelming majority of the 34.7 % who turned out voted in favour, but the turnout fell short of clearing the 50 % required threshold.