Bundling and splitting: workspace tenure in two vectors

ABSTRACT

The Bundling and Splitting Matrix is a conceptual framework of real property tenure. It is used here to derive hypotheses as to the effects of two principal-agent problems: adverse selection and moral hazard on commercial office workspace energy performance under differing tenure types. The purpose of testing these hypotheses, in future research, is to inform disclosure policy. Disclosure here refers to the sharing of information between commercial office workspace lessors and lessees. In demonstrating this framework’s use, this paper’s contribution is methodological. Mitigating adverse selection is the objective of international ex-ante disclosure programs but past research has not isolated ex-ante disclosure’s effect in that mitigation from its other effects. The use of this framework also extends the method used by research measuring energy performance under different contract types. By putting tenure type, rather than a single contract as the object of inquiry, it sets out single or multiple possibly additive or counter-veiling principal-agent problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, each with its disclosure remedy. It is argued that doing so is increasingly significant with the growth in information age forms of workspace tenure such as coworking.

KEYWORDS:

• Energy efficiency
• principal-agent theory
• disclosure
• coworking
• commercial offices

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.