ABSTRACT
This article begins by examining UK government discourse on welfare and migration for the period 2010–2016, viewed here as the expression of a distinctive process of moralisation. This discourse is characterised by claims to fairness, responsibility, and austerity, and explicitly sets domestic welfare dependency and migration in opposition to each other. Its operationalisation is traced through a formal mapping of civic stratification in relation to both domestic welfare and freedom of movement within the European Union, while also noting the absence of supporting empirical evidence. The article then looks to the informal aspect of civic stratification, and the role of political discourse in negatively shaping the moral standing of both domestic welfare recipients and EU migrants. Together with the uneven impact of welfare reform, their discursive opposition provides an important amplification of common understandings of the Brexit vote as delivered by the ‘left behind’ (Goodwin, M. and Heath, D. (2016) ‘The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind’, The Political Quarterly 87(3): 323–332).
KEYWORDS:
Disclosure statement
No financial interests or benefits have arisen from the research in this paper.
Notes on contributor
Lydia Morris holds a Bachelor's degree in Sociology and Politics from Keele University, and a PhD in Anthropology from the London School of Economics. She has worked as a researcher for Lambeth Council, and at Swansea University, and as a lecturer at Durham University and the University of Essex. She was made a Professor at Essex in 1995 and was Head of the Department from 2001 to 2004.
Notes
2 David Cameron holds the worst house building record since 1923 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-housing-housebuilding-prime-minister-england-john-healey-a7144646.html.
4 An estimated 2% of total claims.
6 For a list of changes see http://www.npi.org.uk/files/7613/7477/4989/Table_of_changes_to_welfare.pdf, and https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-welfare-reform/2010-to-2015-government-policy-welfare-reform.
8 Currently being phased-in, to integrate Job Seekers Allowance, Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Employment Support Allowance (for the disabled), and Income Support (for the economically inactive).
9 See note 7.
10 E.g. differential requirements for participation in the Work Programme.
11 http://www.entitledto.co.uk/help/Benefit_Changes_April_2016. See also note 6.
15 Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/1511) and SI (2014/2761).
16 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/accelerating-action-to-stop-rogue-eu-benefit-claims. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tough-new-migrant-benefit-rules-come-into-force-tomorrow.
18 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7445 The main working age benefits are JSA (for unemployment), ESA (for disability) and Income Support (for economically inactive).
21 On perceptions of benefit fraud see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/voters-brainwashed-by-tory-welfare-myths-shows-new-poll-8437872.html, and on migrant access to welfare see https://www.ipsos-mori.com/DownloadPublication/1634_sri-perceptions-and-reality-immigration-report-2013.pdf chapter 3.
22 See https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/fact-check-43-eu-migrants-claim-benefits and compare with http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3467563/886million-eye-watering-sum-pay-benefits-work-EU-migrants-just-one-year.html.
25 53.4% in England, with Scotland and Northern Ireland supporting Remain (Sensier and Devine Citation2017).
26 An electoral unit of average population 7000, analysed by Becker et al (Citation2016) for four cities.
27 Prior support for the UK Independence Party or the British National Party.
30 Notably the Scottish vote (62 per cent Remain) displayed a different pattern of response.