“Homosexualization” revisited: an audience-focused theorization of wartime male sexual violence

ABSTRACT

This paper builds upon and challenges existing literature regarding the causes of wartime male sexual violence (particularly Sivakumaran’s concept of “homosexualization”). The author argues that norms about sexuality and the intended audience of violence motivate male sexual violence in three ways. First, perpetrators choose to express power over the individual victim through the weaponization of masculinity, bodily integrity and/or sexual identity. Second, sexual violence can be used to reaffirm group belonging and hetero-masculinity among perpetrators. Third, sexual violence sends a message to a larger community or nation regarding supremacy and power hierarchies. Two examples (Abu Ghraib and Nazi concentration camps) are presented to illustrate the framework’s concepts.

KEYWORDS:

• Male sexual violence
• sexual violence
• homosexualization
• military masculinity
• military socialization

Notes on Contributor

David Eichert is a JD Candidate at Cornell Law School in Ithaca, NY, USA. He earned an MA in European & Mediterranean Studies from New York University in 2017.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Sivakumaran’s analysis of the “prevention of procreation” is an important contribution to the literature on wartime sexual violence against men. Sivakumaran points out that when men are castrated or have their reproductive capabilities destroyed, it supports a larger narrative of ethnic cleansing by reducing the targeted gene pool. Thus, wartime sexual violence may be motivated by strategic concerns about reproduction. Preventing an individual from procreating also allows the abuser to symbolically emasculate his victim by removing an essential aspect of his victim’s masculine identity and community role. However, Sivakumaran’s analysis on emasculation is much more subjective, and its value as a way of explaining an attacker’s motive varies depending on the sociological factors surrounding the armed conflict. See Myrttinen (2018) for additional analysis.

2 However, as will be discussed later in this article, sexual violence to a corpse can send a symbolic or strategic message to a victim’s community about the perpetrator’s relative power and masculinity.

3 My goal here is not to “ignore” the very real social and psychological ramifications of sexual violence on male victims; rather, I am simply arguing that a perpetrator’s decision to use sexual violence is solely determined by his cultural and social context. For example, we cannot conclude that a perpetrator was attempting to “homosexualize” his victim simply because the effect of the violence is that the victim is worried that he is now homosexual. Similarly, a perpetrator may attempt to “make his victim homosexual” through sexual violence, but the effect of the violence on the victim and his society is outside of the perpetrator’s control.

4 The concept of “hegemonic masculinity” has been widely discussed and debated in the literature on masculinity over the past three decades (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), and this article makes no attempt to engage with this large body of work.

5 Drumond (2018) also discusses how the taboo against incest can be exploited alongside heteronormative norms against homosexual activity to increase the symbolic meaning of sexual violence. This violence “simultaneously unsettle[s] and reiterate[s] liveable sexual norms by violently forcing the targeted ethnic group to stand outside the intelligible sex/gender/desire matrix” in a way that constructs a set of “pathologised sexual practices and behaviors” that is foisted upon the victimized group and absent in the perpetrator's group (159).

6 It is also valuable to note how racial dynamics within the perpetrator’s own military unit can inspire racialized and gendered “othering” and an emphasis on purity. Belkin, for example, shows how American military socialization prized the white, heterosexual man over men of color, gay men and women, all of whom were constructed as weaker, inferior and disease-prone, and thus did not “belong” in the military unit (2012, 177–178).

7 While it is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that female combatants like those at Abu Ghraib are also socialized into hyper-masculine military cultures, sometimes committing sexual violence against male enemy combatants (Sjoberg 2013). While this paper does not discuss this aspect of male sexual violence, the audience-focused perspectives proposed above can easily be applied to female soldiers who must adapt by asserting masculine traits and downplaying their femininity (Zaleski 2015). Additionally, both Richter-Montpetit (2007) and Sjoberg (2013) provide compelling analyses of the actions of female soldiers at Abu Ghraib.

8 This position has been problematized by Oosterhuis (1997) and Wackerfuss (2015), who point out the prominence of homosexual men in SA and Hitler Youth leadership before 1934. Oosterhuis argues that some homosexual men may have even been attracted to the newly formed Nazi movement because of its emphasis on male comradeship, physical beauty and masculinity (1997, 190). While Nazi rhetoric against homosexuality certainly hardened after the 1934 purge of key SA leadership like the homosexual Ernst Röhm (Oosterhuis 1997, 195; Wackerfuss 2015), these policies were not as evenly implemented as extermination orders against other groups (Giles 2002).

9 For a more nuanced discussion of Nazi scientific beliefs regarding homosexuality, see Oosterhuis 1997.

10 It is important to note that not all known homosexuals were arrested or murdered under National Socialism. In contrast to Nazi efforts to eradicate the Jews, the persecution of homosexuals was often politically motivated (Giles 2002). Some well-known homosexuals were able to live undisturbed in Germany, and several artists were even protected by Nazi leaders (Oosterhuis 1991, 248). Furthermore, Nazi persecution of homosexuals largely targeted German and Austrian men (as well as non-German men who had had sexual relations with a German partner). Because of Nazi conceptions about race and Aryanism, many of these men were released after being re-educated or medically treated. In other words, while many “incurables” were sent to concentration camps, the goal for many Nazi leaders was the eradication of homosexuality, not homosexuals (Schulze 2011, 29).

11 Because “homosexuality” is difficult to prove or disprove, it is possible that not all men imprisoned for being “homosexual” were in fact sexually attracted exclusively to men. Nonetheless, this paper presumes that most of these men were in some way not heterosexual, just as the majority of victims at Abu Ghraib were presumed to be not homosexual.