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ABSTRACT
Despite decades of large-scale immigration, systemic and institutionalized racism and ethnonationalism remain very strong in South Korea. One reason is obvious: South Korea is the quintessential homogeneous nation-state. Many observers, in fact, believe that it is one of the few societies in the world that is naturally homogenous. For this and other reasons, the prospect that South Korea can or will transform from homogenous nation-state to multicultural society is generally given very short shrift. I argue, however, that small but extremely significant steps toward a multicultural society have already been made and that the key reason is due to the introduction of ‘multiculturalism’ as an idea and discourse in Korean society. While a focus on ideas/discourse is hardly new, this paper contends that it has been seriously underappreciated, particularly in analyses of South Korea, as a cause of institutional stability on the one hand, and of institutional change and transformation, on the other hand.
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2018-LAB-2250001). I am also grateful to Changzoo Song, Seungsook Moon, Yichun Chien, and Lynne Park who provided feedback on an earlier draft of this article as part of panel presentation at the Association for Asian Studies (AAS-in-Asia) Conference in Bangkok, Thailand in 2019.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. The consortium consists of 17 principal organizations plus six networked coalitions (with some overlapping membership). Seven professors at Korean universities also signed as independent researchers. The report’s full title is, Republic of Korea NGO Alternative Report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereafter, Alternative NGO Report).
2. Alternative NGO Report, 7.
3. Until the late-1980s, this category of individuals was composed mostly of the children of a Korean woman and a Black or white American, usually a soldier stationed in South Korea; thus, they were also referred to as Amerasians (by westerners) or, pejoratively, as honhyol (or mixed-blood) by Koreans. Since the 1990s, however, there has been a rapid increase of children born to a Korean father and Southeast Asian mother; these children have been referred to as Koasian.
4. Alternative NGO Report, 5.
5. Alternative NGO Report, 53.
6. The adjective ‘multicultural,’ strictly speaking, ‘refers to the empirical fact of diversity [while] “multiculturalism” is a normative response to that fact’ (Loobuyck, ‘Liberal Multiculturalism,’ 108). While I recognize the distinction, to avoid awkwardness – i.e., ‘multiculturalism society’ – I will use the term ‘multicultural society’ in a normative sense. I also recognize that term ‘multiculturalism’ is subject to intense debate. As with most or even all normative concepts, achieving universal consensus on a definition may not be possible. ‘Liberal multiculturalism,’ moreover, has generated a separate debate given the tensions between liberal principles of equal treatment and recognitions of distinct identities built into multiculturalism. For an in-depth examination of the two debates see Loobuyck, ‘Liberal Multiculturalism.’
7. In the earliest available report from 1987, CERD wrote, in a response to the State Party report prepared by the South Korean government, ‘the enactment of specific domestic legislation was necessary for the implementation of articles 4 and 6 [of ICERD]’ (110). Article 6 of the Convention (see United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner), in particular, spoke to the necessity of specific domestic laws against ‘any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination’ (n.p.). In subsequent reports, the Committee’s recommendation became more direct and forceful. In 1999, for example, one member told South Korea’s representatives that the Committee ‘expected Korea to introduce legislation explicitly condemning racial discrimination and showing that the country hand taken the measures required under the Convention’ (CERD, “Summary Record of the 1308th Meeting,” 6).
8. I confirmed this in several interviews with those involved in writing the NGO report, including Jean Kim (an attorney working for Duroo), Jirim Kim (an attorney with Gong Gam), and Hyun Mee Kim (a professor at Yonsei University). The interviews were conducted in Seoul from July 15–18, 2019.
9. Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously,” 9.
10. Shin and Chang, “The Politics of Nationalism,” 123.
11. Cited in Kim, et al., Asan Public Opinion Report.
12. Kim, “Soft Talk, Hard Realities.”
13. I recognize that the concept of multiculturalism in the Korean context is subject to varying interpretations. For further discussion, see Watson, “Paradoxical Multiculturalism in South Korea.”
14. I say ‘ostensibly’ because, to the extent liberal multiculturalism does exist in the West, it not evident in every western country and, in those places where it does exist, it has clearly been under attack over the last decade and more. It is also the case the liberal multiculturalism was a very long time in the making; in fact, it was not until the late-twentieth century (circa the 1960s to 1980s) that bastions of liberal multiculturalism today – e.g., Canada, Australia, and the United States – finally took that turn. For most of the twentieth century (and, of course, throughout earlier periods), western countries, even those with extremely large and diverse immigrant populations, constructed and maintained profoundly racist immigration regimes and were hardly advocates of multiculturalism, liberal or otherwise.
15. Over the past decade or so, the presumption of organic homogeneity has been carefully examined and effectively debunked by a range of scholars. See, for example, Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea; Kim, Imperial Citizens; and Kim, Voices of Foreign Brides.
16. Loobuyck, “Liberal Multiculturalism,” 110.
17. There is some controversy surrounding the term as it has come to bear a number of negative connotations, particularly illegitimacy. The same can be said for the Korean term Honhyeolin (literally ‘mixed blood people’), which has even stronger negative connotations within South Korea. I am using the term advisedly in this spot, but will later adopt the term, “multiracial Korean.”
18. Analytically, as a number of scholars have emphasized, it is crucial that ideas not be treated a single or generic concept. Schmidt (‘Discursive Institutionalism’), for example, breaks ideas down into three interrelated levels: (1) policy ideas, (2) programmatic ideas or paradigms, and (3 philosophical ideas or public sentiments, which might also be referred to as foundational ideas. Philosophical ideas or public sentiment are the basic truths that most members of a society hold; they are widely accepted worldviews.
19. Cited in Choi, “Sociopolitical Change and Nationality Law,” 19.
20. Cited in Shin and Chang, “The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations,” 125.
21. Hwang, Korea’s Grievous War, 93.
22. See Béland and Cox, “Introduction: Ideas and Politics”; Mehta, ”From ‘whether’ to ‘how’”; and Boswell and Hampshire, “Ideas and Agency in Immigration Policy.”
23. Lee and Skrentny, “Korean Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective,” 301.
24. Lee and Skrentny (see note 18 above) are quite explicit on this point. They write, ‘The instrumental nature of Korean immigration policy-making fits with the notion of a developmental state focused on growth over other concerns (relative to other industrialized states)’ (emphasis added, 322).
25. See Han, “The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogenous Nation-State”; and Choe, “National Identity and Citizenship.”
26. Kim, “Soft Talk, Hard Realities.” To support this view, Kim cites a passage in the Presidential Council of Nation Branding (PCNB), which selected ‘Multicultural Korea’ as one of the ‘top five strategic areas to increase national brand value’ (2015, p. 67). The PCNB report is available at http://pcsi.pa.go.kr/publish/chp05.asp?ex=v&ex2=1&seq=3851.
27. Kim, “Soft Talk, Hard Realities,” 68.
28. Kim, “The State and Migrant Women,” 106.
29. Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously.”
30. Boswell and Hampshire, “Ideas and Agency in Immigration Policy,” 133.
31. Cartensen and Schmidt, “Power through, over, and in Ideas,” 325.
32. Cartensen and Schmidt, “Power through, over, and in Ideas.”
33. In a document promoting adoption, ‘Adoptees by Types of Disability: Domestically and Abroad,’ mixed-raced ancestry was represented as a type of physical disability, categorized with ‘harelip, deformity, prematurity, mental illness, and heart disease.’ Cited in Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples in the Korean National Imaginary and Family.”
34. Ragin, The Comparative Method.
35. Collier, “The Comparative Method.”
36. Buck did not coin the term to refer specifically to children born to a Korean woman and American soldier; instead, it was meant to be a general term since American soldiers were present/stationed in a range of Asian countries (e.g., Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Japan). In fact, the term is more commonly used to refer to children born to a Vietnamese woman and US soldier.
37. There were some US soldiers stationed in South Korea before the Korean War, but their numbers were very small. In 1950, for example, there were only 510 US troops; in Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2005.”
38. Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2005.”
39. Most of the interactions between US soldiers and Korean nationals occurred in and around military bases, primarily in the gijichon or ‘military towns.’ While originally coined to refer to residential and commercial areas situated around the major bases, the term later became synonymous with ‘sex market’ (Okazawa-Rey, “Amerasian Children of GI Town.”)
40. Lee, “Hard Knock Lives of Koreans Born to US Soldiers.”
41. Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples in the Korean National Imaginary and Family.”
42. Oh, To Save the Children of Korea.
43. Cited in Oh, To Save the Children of Korea, 54.
44. All statistics cited in Kim, “A Country Divided,” 8.
45. Yang, “State Responsibility toward a Perpetual Minority.”
46. See Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples in the Korean National Imaginary and Family,” for a fuller discussion of patriarchy and, more specifically, the intersection of patriarchy and race with respect to multiracial Koreans, both Amerasian and ‘Koasians.’
47. Cited in Kim, “Amerasians, Legacy of U.S. Military Presence, Live Under Prejudice.”
48. Cited in Korea National Statistical Office, “Dropout Rates of Students (Table 5–9).”
49. See note 47 above.
50. I endeavored to find the original survey by Pearl S. Buck International, which presumably would have included more information about the sample size and other methodological procedures. Yet, despite being cited in a number of scholarly sources, I was unable to locate the original survey or even more details about the survey. Still, there is little doubt that multiracial Koreans faced serious obstacles in the search for employment.
51. Cited in Yang, “State Responsibility toward a Perpetual Minority.”
52. The exceptions include athletes who win a medal (bronze, silver, or gold) in the Olympic Games or a gold medal in the Asian Game. Classical musicians who win a major music competition are also exempted, but so far, all other musicians, no matter how successful, are still required to serve in the military. Award-winning artists and dancers may also be exempted (Robertson, “Debating South Korea’s Mandatory Military Service”). There are also exceptions for convicts and men incapable of performing military service due to disease or ‘mental or physical incompetence.’ Others with serious but not completely debilitating conditions are required to enlist in ‘supplemental or second citizen services,’ which includes social work, public health, expert research, industrial technical work, among other categories (Korea Legislation Research Institute, ‘Military Service Act’). Until 2018, the South Korean government refused to acknowledge conscientious objector status. However, in November of that year, ‘The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in favor of conscientious objectors … ending the country’s decades-long position as the world’s leading jailer of those who refuse to join the armed forces’ (Kwon and Griffiths, “South Korea’s Top Court Legalizes Conscientious Objection.”)
53. Cited in Yang, “State Responsibility toward a Perpetual Minority,” 33.
54. Ryall, “Flight or Fight.”
55. Cited in Franckling, “America’s Forgotten Children: Korea.”
56. The full text of the Support for Discharged Soldiers Act can be found at the following URL: http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?lang=ENG&hseq=38949&joseq=JO0020000 .
57. Women who did not serve in the military, as well as the disabled, were also severely disadvantaged by this law.
58. For example, in referring to South Korea, albeit only in passing, Will Kymlicka – widely considered to be one of the foremost authorities on multiculturalism – wrote, ‘Very few countries around the world are historically mono-national (Iceland, Portugal, and the Koreas are the most frequently cited examples)’ (Multicultural Odysseys, 62).
59. For further discussion, see Kim, “Flexible Yet Inflexible.”
60. See Jones, Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea, 258, note 12.
61. ‘Hines Ward’s #86 Official Biography.’
62. Crowe, “Ward Learned by Mom’s Example.”
63. It is not the case, however, that his prior success had not attracted any attention within South Korea. In 1998, for example, the Korean Broadcast System (KBS-1) aired a serial on Ward and his mother titled, Korean Mother and Black Son Hines Ward” (cited in Ahn, “Rearticulating Black Mixed-Race”). Notably, though, Ward is referred to as a ‘Black son’ in stark contrast to his portrayal in 2006, when he was often depicted as Korean or as a biracial Korean. It is also clear that, before 2006, Ward himself assumed that he was entirely unknown in Korea. As he put it, in an interview with the Korea Times, ‘I don’t think that Korean people even knew who I was before this, But then, all of a sudden, they find out I was born in Seoul, and I start seeing Korean kids wearing my ‘86ʹ jersey all over the place’ (Han, “Hines Ward: The Legend Goes On.”)
64. Choe, “From an Ostracized Class, a Hero for Koreans.”
65. Ahn, “Rearticulating Black Mixed-Race,” 397).
66. Korea Herald, “No. of Foreign Residents in Korea More Than Doubles in Decade.”
67. Ahn, “Rearticulating Black Mixed-Race.”
68. Park “Segyehwa: Globalization and Nationalism in Korea”, provides a similar argument but focuses on efforts to incorporate the Korean diaspora into a new de-territorialized or transnational national community composed of ethnic Koreans (preferably those from wealthier countries) living outside the country’s national boundaries. Ethnic Koreans, however, were not all treated equally: some were given a privileged status, while others were purposefully marginalized. Park used the term ‘hierarchical diaspora’ to refer to distinction the South Korean state has tended to make between ethnic Koreans from poorer countries or communities. Seol and Skrentny (‘Ethnic Return Migration’) have also highlighted the hierarchical nature of South Korea’s policies regarding ethnic return migration.
69. Ahn, “Rearticulating Black Mixed-Race,” 399.
70. Ibid., 411.
71. UPI, “South Korea to Allow Mixed-Race Soldiers.”
72. Cited in Jung, “Western Mixed-Race Men Can Join Military.”
73. Statutes of the Republic of Korea, “Military Service Act.”
74. Cited in Chosun Ilbo, ‘New Pledge of Allegiance.’
75. Cited in Yoon, ‘Military and Multicultural Families are Allowed to Join Together.’
76. Goto, “Extreme Bullying Reflects Tensions within Korean Society.”
77. See note 72 above.
78. Chosun Ilbo, “Hines Ward’s Mother Recalls Hard Road to Success.”
79. Interestingly, the Chosun Ilbo (15 May 2006) retitled his interview with the Pittsburgh paper as, “Hines Ward Speaks Out about Lingering Korean Racism.”
80. Bouchette, “Steelers’ Hines Ward Still Basking in MVP Glow.”
81. CERD, “Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article of the Convention: Addendum Republic of Korea.”
82. CERD, “Reports Submitted by States Parties,” 2.
83. Zwetsloot, “Discrimination in Korean Law.” The interviews were with Jirim Kim and Youngah Park both attorneys working with Gong Gam (www.kpil.org), a public interest lawyers’ group in Seoul, and with Jean Kim, an attorney with Duroo (www.duroo.org), another public interest legal group focusing on human rights for the disabled and for children and youths. The interviews were conducted in Seoul from July 15–18, 2019.
84. Zwetsloot, “Discrimination in Korean Law.”
85. Unfortunately, no updated data are available for the drop rate among multiracial (Black and white) children specifically, although a 2014 report from the Ministry of Education, discussed in a Korea Times article (‘Multicultural Children Still Face Discrimination at Schools’), estimated that the school dropout rate for ‘multicultural children’ (which includes multiracial Koreans, but is mostly composed of ‘Koasians’) was four times higher than for their Korean peers. The higher dropout rate was attributed primarily to interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) discrimination. Importantly, the article also noted that upwards of 1 million multicultural children were enrolled in the public education system, signifying that barriers to the schooling have been drastically reduced.
86. Cited in Park, “Korean Adults Less Accepting of Multiculturalism.”
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Timothy C. Lim
Timothy C. Lim is a professor in the Department of Political Science at California State University, Los Angeles in Los Angeles, California, USA. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii, Manoa in Honolulu, Hawaii and his MA in International Affairs from Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), in New York City. His research centers on the politics of labor migration in Asia and nationalism, identity, and multiculturalism in South Korea.