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ABSTRACT
In China, ‘heritage’ as a terminological construction was shaped within specific discursive and organizational frames over the course of decades. As an outcome, UNESCO’s heritage discourse, universal by intention, was definitively redefined in China to adjust it to an ideology that would legitimize Chinese authorities’ cultural control over ethnic minorities. The heritagization of the genealogy writing tradition of the Chinese Sibe ethnic group as an integral part of this process, promotes the nation-building aspirations of powerholders. Taking the case study of an unpublished book as its starting point, this article examines the role performed by Sibe intellectuals in influencing how ‘common Sibe people’ think about their genealogy writing ‘heritage.’ It explores this process in its historicity with a focus on the textual strategies adopted by Sibe intellectuals who had to adjust to particular political and socio-cultural contexts.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. I have been conducting regular fieldwork among the Sibe in Qapqal over the past ten years. I was unable to attend the meeting, but have reconstructed what was said based on the recollections of participants and a photocopied version of the functionary’s speech, which I received in 2015.
2. The Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, previously known as the Propaganda Department, was founded in 1924. It is an important organ in China’s propaganda system and works with other organizations such as the General Administration of Press and Publication.
3. On the root causes of the problem, see Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 114–15.
4. On a similar process elsewhere, see Sjöholm, Heritagisation, Re-Heritagisation and De-Heritagisation, 26–27.
5. This is of course not peculiar to Xinjiang, see, for example, Cui, “Heritage Visions,” 223–24.
6. Smith, Uses of Heritage, 16–17.
7. Yan, World Heritage Craze, 184; and Svensson, Evolving and Contested Cultural Heritage, 34.
8. For a similar discussion on heritage in another highly politicized context, see Beazley, “Politics and Power,” 63.
9. I have borrowed this term from Haiming Yan, see Yan, World Heritage Craze, 2.
10. Zerubavel, Ancestors and Relatives, 9.
11. The Sibe language belongs to the so-called Jurchenic branch of the Tungusic language family. The Jurchen were the cultural and linguistic predecessors of both the Manchus and the Sibe. According to Zikmundová, (spoken) Sibe is most likely a descendant of the Manchu coinée, see Zikmundová: Spoken Sibe, 15. In 1947, a linguistic project among the Sibe in the XUAR resulted in official recognition of the Sibe language as different from Manchu, see Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 13.
12. Li, Manzu zongpu yanjiu, 1.
13. Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 112–13.
14. Tongjia and Wen, Xibozu feiwuzhi wenhua yichan daibiaozuo, 145.
15. See Shirokogoroff, Social Organization of the Manchus, 62. For example, Shirokogoroff notes that the Manchu who lived in Aigun district abandoned their homes during the Boxer movement. When they returned, months later, they found that their houses had been burned down by Cossacks who had also stolen their cattle and horses; they had thus ‘lost most of their personal property and the clan lists, with the names and relationship of all clan members,’ see Shirokogoroff, Social Organization of the Manchus, 4.
16. See, for example, He et al. “Xibozu zongpu wenhua yichan.”
17. See, Smith, Uses of Heritage, 48.
18. As Karla B. Hackstaff has mentioned, knowing who our ancestors are is fundamental to our sense of who we are, see Hackstaff, “Who Are We?” 183.
19. See Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 83–85.
20. Guan, Manhua xibozu, 23.
21. On the Sibe knowledge elite, see Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 32.
22. Shenyang Shi Minwei Minzu Zhi Bianzuan Bangongshi, Shenyang xibozu zhi, 57–76; for more information on who led the collection of these genealogies and in what frames the work was performed, see Na and Han, Zhongguo xiboren, 1–101.
23. See, for example, Han, “Hashihuli jiazu” and Han, “Biantai Hashihuli shi.”
24. For a detailed description of Han Qikun’s story and its significance, see Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 109–32.
25. Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 131–32.
26. See also Yan, World Heritage Craze, 17.
27. For theories on the nature of memory, see, for example, Burke, “History as Social Memory,” 100; Schudson, “The Present in the Past,” 113; and Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln, 203.
28. For a detailed discussion on the Sibe elite’s use of genealogies to make past narratives during their ethnonationalist movements, see Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 109–132.
29. Lai, “The Emergence of ‘Cultural Heritage’,” 50–51, 79.
30. See also Cao, “Zhongguo Wenwu,” 4–5; and Yan, World Heritage Craze, 29.
31. Meissner, “China’s Search,” 7–8.
32. The difference between the two expressions can be best captured through the concepts of ‘cold memory’ and ‘hot memory’; the term ‘cultural relics’ refers to ‘antiquities’ that have lost daily relevance and serves to freeze changes in history, see Assmann, Cultural Memory, 50–53.
33. Yan, World Heritage Craze, 31.
34. Zhongguo Kexueyuan Minzu Yanjiusuo, Xibozu jian shi jian zhi hebian, 82–115.
35. For detailed discussion on the bifurcation of the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘superstition’ in China, see Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes, 6–11; and Overmyer, “From ‘Feudal Superstition.’”
36. Anagnost, “Politics and Magic,” 43–44.
37. See also Meissner, “China’s Search,” 47.
38. Svensson, “Evolving and Contested Cultural Heritage,” 39.
39. It is important to note that situating the concept of heritage in a cultural context can be seen as a relatively new aspect also in the West, let alone in China. See Tunbridge, and Ashworth, Dissonant Heritage, 2–3; and Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade, 4–5.
40. Kipnis, “The Flourishing of Religion,” 36.
41. “Xibozu Jianshi” Bianxiezu, Xibozu jianshi.
42. Ibid., 97–120, 135–38.
43. Han, “Biantai Hashihuli shi,” 224–25.
44. Yan, World Heritage Craze, 35.
45. Ibid., 45.
46. Although ‘cultural relics’ was ‘replaced’ with ‘cultural heritage,’ it is still an important concept in China.
47. Cao, “Zhongguo Wenwu,” 4–5.
48. For a discussion on a similar process in the Republic of Ireland, see Moles, “A Landscape of Memories,” 130.
49. For an analysis of the sudden rise in the number of articles on the subject, see Blumenfield, “Recognition and Misrecognition,” 171. For an overview of the most significant topics, see Svensson and Maags, “Mapping the Chinese Heritage Regime,” 11–15.
50. Yan, World Heritage Craze, 80–82.
51. Chau, “The Commodification of Religion,” 953.
52. Svensson, “Evolving and Contested Cultural Heritage,” 42.
53. See also Yao and Han, “Challenging, but not Trouble-Making,” 293–97.
54. Yan, World Heritage Craze, 86.
55. General Office of the State Council, “Guanyu jiaqiang wo guo.”
56. The phrase is used in a number of publications, see, for example, Shenyang Shi Minwei Minzu Zhi Bianzuan Bangongshi, Shenyang xibozu zhi, 63–64. The following variant appears in a study drawing on the genealogy of the An clan in north-eastern China: ‘There is no clan without a history, there is no family without a family tree,’ see Tongjia and Wen, Xibozu feiwuzhi wenhua, 144. As I have not seen the original genealogy, I cannot tell which of the two statements adheres more closely to the original wording.
57. Sárközi, From the Mists of Martyrdom, 178–79.
58. Svensson, “Evolving and Contested Cultural Heritage,” 39.
59. On a similar process in Vietnam, see Endres, “From ‘Wasteful Superstition.’”
60. During my fieldwork in Qapqal in 2019, I was informed that some of the genealogies, to which the names of descendants had been added, had been prepared for publication. However, several Sibe clans had not allowed their genealogies to be documented or had been unable to clarify the relationships between relatives. The non-professional historian in Qapqal continues to decline to cooperate with the cadres even though they have offered to pay him 40,000 yuan (approximately 5060 euros) for the family trees he has collected.
61. Ibid., 9.
62. Svensson, “Evolving and Contested Cultural Heritage,” 32.
63. See also Chan, “Temple-building and Heritage,” 65.
64. Svensson, “Evolving and Contested Cultural Heritage,” 33.
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Notes on contributors
Ildikó Gyöngyvér Sárközi
Ildikó Gyöngyvér Sárközi is a research fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungary. Her research explores heritagization in contemporary China.