ABSTRACT
In the ongoing global ‘war on migration’, no character has been more vilified than the ‘human smuggler’. Images of unscrupulous men taking advantage of innocent people flood the media and political discourse. Morocco, with its strategic geopolitical position as a main gateway between Africa and Europe, is no exception in this regard. In this article, I examine how the smuggler has come centre stage in the borderwork around the Europe–Morocco frontier. The concept of borderwork has gained traction in recent scholarship as a way of describing the complicated and rapidly changing empirical complexity of the creation and control of borders. This article further develops this notion, focusing on three intertwined aspects of the borderwork complex: policies, policing and practices of migrant smuggling. Rather than providing counter-arguments to the evil smuggler narrative (a task that has been admirably accomplished by many scholars) I here take an interest in the different intersecting forms of moral labour that go into anti-smuggling policies, local policing of migrants and practices of migrant smuggling, and make a preliminary case for the concept of moral borderwork. This concept allows us to consider how social concerns are raised, reproduced and handled in the borderwork complex. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, the point of departure for this article is a particular moment in time during the summer and autumn of 2018 in Morocco, where black migrants were violently arrested and expelled in large numbers from the northern part of the country.
Notes
1. Approximately 18€
2. In this article I use the term ‘black migrants’ to describe the population that was primarily targeted during this period. I do this to underscore how the pursuit of foreigners in Morocco rested on racialised discrimination. See also GADEM 2018:4, for a similar argument about terminology.
3. The official mandate of the EU military operation, running from 2015 to 2020, was ‘to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea.’ https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/
5. As pointed out by various observers this included fishing rights: https://www.politico.eu/article/morocco-offers-fish-for-eu-recognition-of-its-claim-to-western-sahara/.
6. Many observers have also noted the importance of fishing agreements in this partnership which also extends to trade agreements. See e.g. https://mipa.institute/6866.
7. Action Document for the Implementation of the North Africa Window. T05-EUTF-NOA-REG-07
9. This does not mean that there were no conflicts/encounters/violence against migrants.
11. https://leseco.ma/el-khalfi-le-maroc-lance-une-operation-contre-les-reseaux-mafieux-de-migrants/.
12. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/11682/spain-takes-hardline-against-migrants-assaulting-borders.
13. https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/11754/maroc-deces-de-deux-migrants-lors-d-un-deplacement-force.
14. Cases that were confirmed in the press https://www.h24info.ma/maroc/deces-deux-migrants-maliens-pendant-un-deplacement-force/.
16. Of course, migrant smuggling comes in multiple forms like any other enterprise, and can at times (also) be cynical, violent and exploitative.