Euro 2016 and its security legacy for football supporters: a conceptual blurring of hooligans and terrorists?

ABSTRACT

This essay debates how the 2016 European Football Championship in France together with the acute terrorist threat served to pass quickly and with minimal opposition in the Parliament a controversial ‘counter-hooligan’ law. For this purpose, debates in both parliamentary chambers were explored. It is shown that in the discourse, hooliganism and terrorism were intermingled as both became part of one pervasive line of reasoning based on a sense of urgency and a need to suppress any activities that could disrupt the desired image of a successful hosting country that does not succumb to the fear of terrorism. However, the relation between the proposed ‘counter-hooligan’ measures and security at the tournament could not be satisfactorily explained by the legislators. Also, the politicians rarely attempted to understand the football-related violence and rather resorted to ‘genuine supporters/bad hooligans’ dichotomy which, however, largely ignores the complexity of the phenomenon in the country.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Giulianotti and Klauser, ‘Sport mega-events and ‘terrorism’’.

2. Assemblée nationale, ‘Proposition de loi renforçant la lutte’.

3. Administrative stadium bans were adopted in 2006 under a counter-terrorist law. They were imposed via orders issued by prefects on anyone considered as a threat for public order in connection with a sport event. The purpose of the measure was not considered ‘strictly punitive’ but rather preventive. However, this measure was quite controversial. It is contested whether it does not constitute punishment which should be dealt within a criminal procedure with all the guarantees for the defendant. Service-public.fr, ‘Interdiction de stade’; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, 182–8.

4. See note 2 above.

5. Senat, ‘Comptes rendus de la commission.’

6. Senat, ‘Session ordinaire de 2015–2016.’

7. Maes, ‘C’est Larrivé de la dictature.’

8. Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes’; Tsoukala, ‘Controlling football-related violence in France.’

9. At the beginning, a prefect could impose the administrative stadium bans for a maximum length of three months. Even before their efficiency could be evaluated, the duration of this measure was considered too short. In 2010, it was prolonged to 6 months or 12 months in case of recidivism. Finally, in 2011 the duration was again increased to 12 months, and 24 for recidivists. Hourcade, Lestreline and Mignon, Livre vert du supportérisme, 54; Tsoukala, ‘Regulating Football-Related Violence in France,’ 82.

10. Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes’; Tsoukala, Football Hooliganism in Europe.

11. Hourcade, Lestreline and Mignon, Livre vert du supportérisme, 17–21.

12. Ibid., 47–48.

13. Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes,’ 129. In this regard, Tsoukala concludes that ‘[m]ore often than not, innovative law-making and policing were event-linked rather than embedded in a global counter-hooliganism strategy.’ Tsoukala, ‘Regulating Football-Related Violence,’ 76.

14. Police nationale, ‘La lutte contre les Hooligans’; Ministère de l’Intérieur, ‘Sécurité dans le football.’

15. Assemblée Nationale, ‘27 janvier 2016.’

16. Asssamblé nationale, ‘04 février 2016.’

17. AFP, ‘Les spécialistes de la lutte contre le hooliganisme.’

18. Hourcade, Lestreline and Mignon, Livre vert du supportérisme, 27–28; Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes.’

19. Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes,’ 46–50.

20. Ibid., 23.

21. See note 15 above.

22. See note 16 above.

23. See note 15 above.

24. See Assemblée nationale, ‘04 février 2016.’

25. See note 15 above.

26. Member of the Socialist Party Régis Juanico stated that ‘everyone can realize the financial cost that this [risk football matches] represents for the clubs as well as for the state, whereas these resources could be more usefully allocated to security of our fellow citizens, even more in a context of state of urgency’. Assemblée Nationale, ‘04 février 2016.’

27. Assemblée nationale, ‘28 avril 2016.’

28. Senat, ‘15 juin 2016.’

29. Senat, ‘29 mars 2016.’

30. Ministère de l’Intérieur, ‘Interventions du ministre.’

31. Gouvernement.fr, ‘L’Europe a été attaquée.’

32. Gouvernement.fr, ‘L’Euro 2016 doit se tenir.’

33. Gouvernement.fr, ‘Communiqué. Euro 2016.’

34. In fact, there is one feature shared by hooligans and terrorists. Baudrillard spoke about ‘the logic of attempted role reversal’ in which spectators ‘turn themselves into actors; usurping the role of the protagonists (players), under the gaze of the media, they invent their own spectacle.’ The violence – or rather images of violence – of the alleged football hooligans can get blurred with images of terror as both these groups can in any moment become the actors that simply do not fit the desired image of the hosting country. It can be argued that this was all happening in the context of a ‘simulated reality of risk, terror, threat and violence at international sports mega-events’. Baudrillard concludes that ‘[o]nce wrenched away from its basic principle, sport can be pressed into the service of any end whatsoever: as a parade of prestige or of violence.’ And this was exactly what the authorities attempted to control. Baudrillard, Transparency of Evil, 76–77; Atkinson, and Young, ‘Shadowed by the corpse of war,’ 295.

35. See note 16 above.

36. Assemblée nationale, ‘26 avril 2016’; ‘Rapport fait au nom.’

37. Assemblée nationale, ‘28 avril 2016’; Assemblée nationale, ‘26 avril 2016.’

38. See note 29 above.

39. See note 27 above.

40. Ibid.

41. In this regard, Tsoukala has already noticed that the Communist Party is an exception as it ‘regularly denounces securitisation in football stadia.’ Tsoukala, ‘Regulating Football-Related Violence,’ 87.

42. After this criticism, socialist deputy Patrick Menucci accused him of holding this view only because there were fascists among football hooligans. Assemblée Nationale, ‘04 février 2016.’

43. Senat, ‘Proposition de loi.’

44. See note 29 above.

45. This perspective is known as the ‘Elaborated Social Identity Model’ of crowd behaviour. It emphasizes the context dependency of this behaviour. In interaction with the context including actions by police, a common social identity among the crowd participants emerges. If the police treat them badly, the perceived illegitimacy of police behaviour can become part of the fans’ social identity who can then find it legitimate to retaliate against the police, which can lead to a further spiral of conflict. See for example Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’; Stott, Hoggett and Pearson, ‘Keeping the Peace.’

46. Tsoukala, ‘Boundary-creating Processes,’ 141.

47. Hourcade, Lestreline and Mignon, Livre vert du supportérisme, 19.

48. Ibid., 20–21, 30–31.

49. See for example Redhead, ‘Some reflections on discourses,’ 479; Pearson, ‘The English Disease?’; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism; Spaaij, Understading Football Hooliganism, 4, 10; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, 15; Hourcade, ‘Le rapport ambivalent à la violence’; Tsoukala, Football Hooliganism in Europe, 4; and Tsoukala, Pearson and Coenen, Legal Responses to Football Hooliganism, 4, 13.

50. Pearson, ‘The English Disease?’ 6, 7.

51. Hourcade, Lestreline and Mignon, Livre vert du supportérisme, 53; Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes,’ 124.

52. Tsoukala, Football Hooliganism in Europe, 92.

53. Assemblée nationale, ‘28 avril 2016’; ‘04 février 2016.’

54. See note 15 above.

55.. Assemblée nationale, ‘04 février 2016.’See note 16 above.

56. See note 29 above.

57. Tsoukala, ‘Boundary-creating Processes,’ 149.

58.. Tsoukala, ‘Controlling football-related violence,’ 140.

59. See Spaaij, Understading Football Hooliganism; Armstrong, Football Hooligans, 312; Hourcade, ‘Principes et problèmes,’ 136–137.

60. Assemblée nationale, ‘Proposition de loi visant à interdire.’

61. Della Porta and Reiter, ‘The Policing of Transnational Protest: A Conclusion,’ 187–188.

62. Ibid.

63. Assemblée nationale, ‘Lutte contre le hooliganisme’; Senat, ‘Proposition de loi.’

64. Ceyhan, ‘Technologie et sécurité’; Tsoukala, ‘Les nouvelles politiques de contrôle.’

65. See Klauser, ‘Commonalities and Specificities in Mega-Event Securitization’; Shvets, ‘Legal Responses to “Football Hooliganism”.’

66. In France, the trends that contributed to reinforcing legal measures against football hooliganism have been embodied by ‘a rapidly changing security landscape where control of rising domestic social unrest and Islamist radicalism was heavily influenced by risk-focused policies, growing politicization of security, and the legitimized erosion of civil rights and liberties in the name of the “war on terror”.’ Tsoukala, ‘Regulating Football-Related Violence,’ 79.

67. Armstrong and Hobbs, ‘Tackled from behind,’ 225.