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ABSTRACT
The treaty that the Ryukyu Kingdom signed with the US government in 1854 was crucial for understanding cooperation between the US and Japanese governments when the latter annexed the Ryuku Islands in 1879 (an episode known as the Ryukyu shobun). The article explores how Japan-US negotiations over treaty rights facilitated Japan’s ambitions in the Ryukyus, Ogasawara Islands, and Korea, as well as their confrontation when the US annexed the Kingdom of Hawai’i. By the early twentieth century, these two powers had mutually accepted each other’s territorial acquisitions and, in so doing, built their own empires and brought stability to East Asia and the Pacific. Reviewing the informal agreement between Japan and the US during the annexation of the Ryukyus, we can better appreciate how the first shobun set the stage for later events.
Acknowledgements
I deeply thank Professors Laura Hein and Tristan R. Grunow for their support, comments, and suggestions that greatly inspired me to improve the quality of my article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Smits Citation2001; Uemura Citation2003; Meyer Citation2015; O’Shea Citation2019.
2 See, for example, Kinjō Citation1978; Araki Citation1980; Gabe Citation1979; Nishizato Citation2005; Namihira Citation2014.
3 For the role played by other foreign powers in the annexation process, see Tinello Citation2021a. For another important study about the Ryukyuan treaties as seen from the lens of international law, see Yanagihara Citation2018.
4 In so doing, I omit some important events including the British Minister’s mediation role in the Taiwan Expedition of 1874 and negotiations between Japan and Russia over Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles in 1874 and 1875 which could also be reinterpreted in the light of the shobun.
5 Message of the President of the United States, Citation1855, 8–9.
6 Message of the President of the United States, Citation1855, 12.
7 Message of the President of the United States, Citation1855, 109.
8 For a detailed analysis of these negotiations, Citation1855, see Tinello Citation2018.
9 Message of the President of the United States, Citation1855, 169–170.
10 Message of the President of the United States, Citation1855, 169–170.
11 Williams Citation1970; 447–451.
12 Tinello Citation2019.
13 See, for example, Miller Citation1942.
14 In the 1860s, both the French and Netherlands governments did not ratify their treaties with Ryukyu, as they had received further information about Ryukyu’s subordination to Satsuma, resulting from the bakufu’s new foreign policy towards Ryukyu. See Yokoyama Citation1996.
15 In the Japanese primary sources, the Meiji leaders did not refer to the “annexation” of Ryukyu as a consequence of the Ryukyu king’s new title.
16 Foreign Records of the United States (FRUS), Citation1873–1874, No. 244 (De Long to Fish, November 6, 1872), 553–554.
17 FRUS Citation1873–1874, No. 247 (Fish to De Long, December 18, 1872), 564.
18 Treaties were considered to have an expiration clause “in case either of the contracting parties loses its existence as an independent State.” See Wheaton Citation1866, Part III, Chapter II, Section 275.
19 On the negotiations between the Japanese foreign minister and the Tokyo-based foreign diplomats regarding the Ryukyuan treaties, see Tinello Citation2021a.
20 FRUS Citation1873–1874, No. 158 (Avery to Fish, May 30, 1875), 331–332.
21 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America Volume 6, 784–785.
22 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, Citation1980, 1265–1266.
23 From the mid-1870s, the British minister acted as the representative of the Netherlands in Japan.
24 On the content of the Ryukyuan petitions, see Tinello Citation2021a.
25 Diplomatic Dispatches (N.A.M. 133), Japan, Vol. 38, No. 844 (Bingham to Evarts, September 2, 1878), 24–28.
26 Diplomatic Instructions, Citation1801-Citation1906, Japan, N. A. M 77, Roll 105 vol. 2 (2), 133 (131), 1878, No. 380, (F. W. Seward to Bingham, October 9, 1878), 455–458.
27 Diplomatic Instructions, Citation1801-Citation1906, Japan, N. A. M 77, Roll 105 vol. 2 (2), 133 (131), 1878, No. 380, (F. W. Seward to Bingham, October 9, 1878), 455–458.
28 In 1873, Italy and Germany tacitly approved Japan’s encroachment on Ryukyu in return for treaty rights in the islands. Unlike the US, France, and the Netherlands, however, those countries had never been Ryukyu’s treaty partners. Since the US was the only government that had signed a treaty with Ryukyu and also asked for its privileges to be maintained, it seems reasonable to argue that the US tacit approval of Japan’s advance in Ryukyu in 1872 and 1876 was of the utmost importance for the Meiji leaders.
29 DNGB, Citation1939, vol. 12; 191–200.
30 Inoue Kowashi den, shiryō hen dai ichi, Citation1966. On Inoue Kowashi's memorandum, see Tinello Citation2021a.
31 On the role played by American diplomat D.B. McCartee in relation to Grant’s mediation and the shobun, see Barrett Citation2022. On the role played by Grant in the dispute between China and Japan, see Tinello Citation2021b.
32 On the termination of the Ryukyuan-American Treaty, see Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Vol. 6, 1942, 786.
33 On the history of the Bonin/Ogasawara Islands, see Ishihara Citation2007; Eldridge Citation2008; Yamamoto Citation2015; Chapman Citation2016; and Rüegg Citation2017.
34 FRUS, Fish to Bingham, n. 185, December 20; Citation1877.
35 Suzuki Citation2006, 118–148.
36 On the question of the Korean treaties in relation to the annexation of Korea, see, among others, Nish Citation1985; Moriyama Citation1987; Ogawara Citation2001; Paku Citation2004; and Carty Citation2005.
37 Okamoto Citation2017.
38 Kim Citation2007, 467–489.
39 Paku Citation2004, 247.
40 DNGM, 38-1; 546.
41 Choi Citation2004, 330.
42 British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914, Gooch and Harold Termperley eds., H. M. S. O., 1926-1938; the original source is FO 371/877, No. 122, Grey to MacDonald, July 19, 1910.
43 DNGM, Citation1939, vol. 43-1, 694–695.
44 The different approaches adopted by the Meiji government in promising to respect the powers’ full privileges in Ryukyu (1870s) and Ogasawara (1876), on the one hand, and the granting of economic concessions in the case of Korea (1910), on the other, illustrate the changing nature of Japan’s relations with both the foreign powers and its Asian neighbors, as well as Japan’s growing mastery of international law.
45 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
46 Iriye Citation1972; Morgan Citation2011.
47 Morgan Citation2011, 198–217.
48 The 1871 treaty between Japan and Hawai’i stipulated that the subjects of each country “shall have the liberty freely and securely to come to all places, ports, and rivers where trade with other nations is permitted.”
49 Morgan Citation2011, 208.
50 One could suppose that Ōkuma was also following the pattern established by the earlier agreements concerning American treaty rights in Ryukyu; however, in the available primary sources, there is no irrefutable evidence that he had in mind those previous negotiations between Japan and the US when he dealt with the Hawai’i issue.
51 DNGM, vol. 30, 978.
52 DNGM, vol. 30, 986.
53 On this question, earlier studies interestingly suggested to compare the 1872 Hamilton Fish’s approval of De Long’s request to uphold American privileges in Ryukyu with “the American note of June 25, 1897” concerning the termination of the Hawai’i treaties. Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Vol. 6, 1942, 784.
54 DNGM, vol. 30, 997–999.
55 DNGM, vol. 30, 1002–1004.
56 DNGM, vol. 30, 1029–1034.
57 DNGM, vol. 30, 1057.
58 DNGM, vol. 30, 1064–1065.
59 The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Citation1951, May 3, 1897, Roosevelt to Alfred Thayer Mahan, 607–608.
60 The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Citation1951, August 3, 1897, Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 637–638.
61 Since 1946, General Douglas MacArthur had been convinced that retaining Okinawa was essential to the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. He was greatly reassured on this count when on September 20, 1947, the Japanese Emperor informed MacArthur that he was willing to accept a lengthy US occupation of Okinawa in exchange for Japan’s swift regaining of its sovereignty. The people of Okinawa did not learn of this exchange until years later. See Vogt Citation2015, 51.
62 Gabe Masaaki has pointed out that the relationship between the US, Japan, and Okinawa, as shaped by the Anpo Treaty of 1960, takes the form of an “inverted” triangle, with Washington and Tokyo at the top and Okinawa, unequally, tapering to a point at the base. See Gabe Citation2003; 60.
63 Norimatsu and McCormack Citation2012; 85.
64 Norimatsu and McCormack Citation2012; 83–87.
65 Ishii Citation1993. On this point, see also Yamamoto Citation2015.
66 The case of Hawai’i, however, illuminates a previously unnoticed aspect of Meiji diplomacy. When the interests of Japan and other powers clashed, cooperation had limits. As I hope to demonstrate through further research, this is another significant clue to understanding Japanese expansionism.
67 Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands, Approved by the Security Council of the United Nations 2 April Citation1947, and by the President of the United States 18 July 1947 (usnwc.edu).
68 Iriye Citation1972.
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Marco Tinello
Marco Tinello is an Associate Professor of East Asian and Japanese history with the Faculty of Cross-Cultural and Japanese Studies at Kanagawa University, Japan. His research focuses on early modern and modern East Asian diplomacy. He is the author of Sekai-shi kara mita “Ryukyu shobun” (Yōju shorin, 2017) and “Early Meiji Diplomacy Viewed through the Lens of International Treaties Culminating in the Annexation of the Ryukyus” (The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (2021)).