Xi Is Not Emperor of All He Surveys

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Notes

1 Schuman 2022.

2 Karl 2017.

3 Zhang 2010; Perdue 2015.

4 McMaster 2020.

5 Liu 2022.

6 Jones and Hameiri, 11.

7 Jones and Hameiri, 21.

8 The idea is borrowed from studies of fragmented authoritarianism. See for example Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988.

9 This is an important chapter, since prominent national security issues such as the South China Sea are generally the first point of reference for those seeking to advocate for the essentially centralized nature of the Chinese state. If the claim cannot hold in this case, therefore, the edifice falls. Arguably, without a discussion of the South China Sea, or the Taiwan question as a possible substitute, the book would pack considerably less punch.

10 Suisheng Zhao, quoted in Jones and Hameiri, 30.

11 Jones and Hameiri, 42.

12 Jones and Hameiri, 43, 170.

13 Jones and Hameiri, 49-55.

14 Jones and Hameiri, 48.

15 Reilly, 2.

16 Reilly, 2.

17 Reilly, 39.

18 Reilly, 39.

19 I did not fully understand why Reilly presents this as contributing to a specifically Chinese strategic culture, as it was not a practice specific to China at the time, and surely is not now, either.

20 Reilly, 34.

21 Reilly, pp. 80-81.

22 Reilly 39.

23 Reilly, 40.

24 Reilly, 46-48.

25 Jones and Hameiri, 56, 70.

26 Reilly, 34.

27 Jones and Hameiri’s article on the flawed regulatory state in Britain, and how the hollowing out of state capacity and the outsourcing of implementation to corporations rendered dysfunctional the national Covid pandemic response, is informative here. At its core, this is an international, not a Chinese or even an authoritarian phenomenon. See Jones and Hameiri 2022.

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Notes on contributors

Jane Hayward

Jane Hayward is a lecturer in China and Global Affairs at the Lau China Institute, King’s College, London.